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Individuation and Heidegger’s Ontological “Intuitionism”

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Phenomenology and the Primacy of the Political

Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 89))

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Abstract

When Heidegger insists that each of us is distinctive because “the most radical individuation” is both possible and necessary for us, he might mean:

  • (1) it is possible and necessary to be an individual in the most radical way; or

  • (2a) it is possible and necessary to engage in the project of becoming a distinct individual in the most radical way; or

  • (2b) it is possible and necessary to see the distinct individual that I am, and to do so in the most radical way.

Although all three readings are possible and defensible, I’d like to explore in this paper a (2b)-type reading of Heidegger’s claim. What would it mean to see the distinct individual that I am in the most radical way?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Heidegger (1977), 38. Citations to Heidegger (1977) are to the marginal page numbers; all translations have been modified.

  2. 2.

    For a discussion of authenticity as a demand to which we are subject, see Wrathall (2015).

  3. 3.

    There is something paradoxical about the idea of a radical self-perception, given that Heidegger seems to think that my ability to discern my individuality is a precondition to becoming an individual, “ownmost” self. How can my ability to see myself in my individuality precede my individuation? Although I won’t pursue this point in this essay, understanding what is involved in perceiving ourselves as individuals should shed some light on the other two readings. That is, if we know what is involved in discerning myself as an individual, then we will get some insight into the project of becoming an individual, and into the nature of a radically individuated being.

  4. 4.

    Durchsichtigkeit is commonly and legitimately translated “transparency.” But the usual translation obscures the sense in which Heidegger’s term is ambiguous between an act of seeing through, and a condition of being see-through-able. “Perspicuity,” however, names both the power of insight or clarity of perception, and a state that admits of being seen through clearly.

  5. 5.

    Heidegger (1976), 57. All translations are modified.

  6. 6.

    Heidegger (1976), 113.

  7. 7.

    Taminiaux (1997), 64.

  8. 8.

    Taminiaux (1997, Chap. 2).

  9. 9.

    Taminiaux (1997), 62.

  10. 10.

    See Taminiaux (1991), 42.

  11. 11.

    Heidegger, of course, tries to enlist Aristotle as an ally in giving priority in the account of selfhood to human practices and habituation. But, Taminiaux argues, Heidegger’s reliance on Aristotle is a result of his “very unusual reading of Aristotle” (Taminiaux 1996, 207).

  12. 12.

    Taminiaux (1996), 206–7, quoting Arendt (1987), 39–41.

  13. 13.

    Taminiaux (1996), 208–9.

  14. 14.

    Taminiaux (1996), 208.

  15. 15.

    “das originär gebende ›Sehen‹” (Husserl 1976, 282/315).

  16. 16.

    “die Sache leibhaft gebende Anschauung” (Heidegger 1976, 114).

  17. 17.

    Heidegger (1977), 346.

  18. 18.

    Heidegger (1977), 170.

  19. 19.

    Heidegger (1977), 336.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Heidegger (1977), 147.

  22. 22.

    Heidegger (1977), 61.

  23. 23.

    Heidegger (1977), 69.

  24. 24.

    Heidegger (1977), 149.

  25. 25.

    Heidegger (1977), 122.

  26. 26.

    Merleau-Ponty (2012), 133/164–5.

  27. 27.

    Heidegger (1977), 146.

  28. 28.

    Heidegger (1976), 16.

  29. 29.

    See, for example, Heidegger (1977), 12 (translation modified): “The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. This does not require the theoretical perspicuity of the ontological structure of existence.”

  30. 30.

    Heidegger (1977), 146.

  31. 31.

    For a more detailed discussion of Heidegger’s account of selfhood, see Wrathall (2016) and Wrathall (Forthcoming).

  32. 32.

    Heidegger (1977), 146).

  33. 33.

    See Heidegger (1977), 20.

  34. 34.

    Heidegger (1975), 392; translation modified.

  35. 35.

    Heidegger (1982), 99; translation modified.

  36. 36.

    Heidegger (1982), 99; translation modified.

  37. 37.

    Heidegger (1977), 146.

  38. 38.

    Heidegger (1977), 300.

  39. 39.

    See Heidegger (1977), 305.

  40. 40.

    Heidegger (1977), 308.

  41. 41.

    Heidegger (1977), 308.

  42. 42.

    Heidegger (1977), 322.

  43. 43.

    Heidegger (1977), 288.

  44. 44.

    Heidegger (1977), 144.

  45. 45.

    Heidegger (1977), 144.

  46. 46.

    Heidegger (1977), 299.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of California, Riverside, CA, USA

    Mark A. Wrathall

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Correspondence to Mark A. Wrathall .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, USA

    Véronique M. Fóti

  2. University of Patras, Patras, Greece

    Pavlos Kontos

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Wrathall, M.A. (2017). Individuation and Heidegger’s Ontological “Intuitionism”. In: Fóti, V., Kontos, P. (eds) Phenomenology and the Primacy of the Political. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 89. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56160-8_5

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