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The Ethical Dimension of Transcendental Reduction

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Phenomenology and the Primacy of the Political

Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 89))

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Abstract

The following essay stems from my interest in finding out whether Taminiaux’s appealing and well-argued reading of the Greek and Platonic connivance between theôria and poiêsis in contrast to the fragility and contingency of human practical judgments and the human intrigue of our worldly abode—a reading that in his view is retrieved by modern and contemporary German philosophers, including Heidegger—may be applied to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and reduction. In my view, Taminiaux’s original and piercingly acute reading of the history of philosophy is above all due to his close and severe scrutiny of texts transmitted by the tradition, in dialogue with our experience of the “matters themselves.” Following this spirit, I risk an alternative reading of the phenomenological reduction, and specifically of its transcendental version, as an eminently practical—namely, ethical—achievement (Leistung), driven by a practical virtue, responsibility.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See especially Taminiaux (1995). Yet his concern for the relationship between modern and contemporary German philosophy and classical Greek thought is traceable ever since Taminiaux (1967).

  2. 2.

    Taminiaux (2004), 33; see also Heidegger (1972), 27 (henceforth SZ).

  3. 3.

    “Der phänomenologische Begriff von Phänomen meint als das Sichzeigende das Sein des Seienden, seinen Sinn, seine Modifikationen und Derivate” (SZ, 34–39; here 35).

  4. 4.

    Taminiaux (2004), 43–44; Taminiaux is referring to SZ, §§16, 18, and 31.

  5. 5.

    This expression—the “conventional comprehension” of Husserl’s thought—was introduced by San Martín (2015), especially 31 ff., inspired by Welton (2000), who introduced the contrast between the “established interpretations” and the “new Husserl.” These views were later developed by the contributors in Welton (2003).

  6. 6.

    Volumes from Husserliana—Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke, Husserliana Dokumente, and Husserliana Materialien—are cited as Hua, Hua Dok, and Hua Mat, respectively, with Roman volume numbers and Arabic page numbers, followed parenthetically by the page number of the translation, where available. Full information for individual works is included in the References, listed by volume number in the series concerned.

  7. 7.

    I have started drafting this attempt myself in several recent papers: Lerner (2015b, c, 2017).

  8. 8.

    For example, Heidegger minutely criticizes Husserl’s Ideas I (Hua III/1) in his 1923/24 and summer 1925 lectures (Heidegger (1994, 1979), respectively).

  9. 9.

    Indeed, he seems to have read only the Logical Investigations (Hua XVIII, XIX/1, XIX/2), Ideas I (Hua III/1), and—according to his own testimony—some manuscripts, among them those posthumously published as Ideas II (Hua IV) and, during the 1920s, the 1904/05 lectures on time-consciousness (Hua X), which he published in 1928.

  10. 10.

    This he clearly states in a 1923 letter to Karl Löwith that Hopkins (2001), 127 transcribes: “Looking back from this vantage point to the Logical Investigations, I am now convinced that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one second in his life. He becomes ever more ludicrous.” Also cited by San Martín (2015), 33.

  11. 11.

    See Zirión (2013), 6, 9. In contrast to the careful and excessively literal translation of Being and Time, and to the years Gaos dedicated to this work (he had finished it by 1947, but continued to work on it until its publication in 1951), the Gaos translation of Ideas I proved to be inaccurate and hastily done (Zirión 2013, 8, n. 8, 9).

  12. 12.

    Orringer (2001), 149, cited by San Martín (2015), 64. In the abstract that heads this paper, Orringer asserts that “the influence of Georg Misch, disciple of Dilthey, explains since 1932 Ortega’s views on Husserl’s epoché and Heidegger’s analytics of Dasein” (see http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=620844).

  13. 13.

    See San Martín (2015), 35: “Ortega (…) insists that (…) the text published by Husserl is in truth not his, but belongs to his disciple Fink, as can be deduced by the language and proposals.” San Martín quotes Ortega’s text “Notes on Thought: Its Theurgy and Demiurgy” initially published in 1942 in Argentina (Ortega 2006, 3–29), where his Husserl critique—previously known in his classes since 1929—appeared in print for the first time.

  14. 14.

    “Philosophie gilt mir, der Idee nach, als die universale und im radikalen Sinne ‘strenge’ Wissenschaft” (Hua V, 139 [406]).

  15. 15.

    “Ich reduziere keineswegs die Philosophie auf Erkenntnistheorie und Vernunftkritik überhaupt, geschweige denn auf transzendentale Phänomenologie” (Hua Dok III/6, 205).

  16. 16.

    See the letter to Dietrich Mahnke, 25.02.1917: “All das ist vorausgesetzt, damit wir die aktuell gegebene Welt der Erfahrung, des Geisteslebens, die Welt, die da wirklich ist und die in den Wissenschaften in naiv-natürlicher Weise erforscht wird, absolut auszuwerten <vermögen>, ihren Sinn zu bestimmen und die Linien zu finden, die zu den metaphysischen Ideen Gott, Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit usw. hinleiten. Also zu einer absoluten Interpretation der gegebenen Welt, die zwar gegeben, aber philosophisch unverstanden ist” (Hua Dok III/3, 410).

  17. 17.

    Husserl discovers his “transcendental reduction” in 1905, and in 1908 he already describes his phenomenology in terms of a “transcendental idealism” (see Hua XXXVI). Simultaneously, in two texts from 1908 to 1909 strongly inspired by Leibniz, he begins to outline his “metaphysics” on monadological, teleological, and theological problems (see Hua XLII, Text Nr. 10 from 1908 to 1909 and Text Nr. 11 from 1908).

  18. 18.

    See the letter to Dietrich Mahnke, 5.09.1917: “[…] beschränke ich mich jahrzehntelang auf reine Phänomenologie und auf die Ausbildung ihrer Methode, auf die Lösung ihrer echten Grundprobleme, statt mich vorwiegend den meinem Herzen soviel näher gehenden religionsphilosophischen und sonstigen Transzendenzproblemen zuzuwenden” (Hua Dok III/3, 418).

  19. 19.

    See the letter to Hans Driesch, 18.07.1917 (Hua Dok III/6, 60).

  20. 20.

    Respectively, Hua XLII, xix (“die die Grenzen phänomenologischer Deskription überschreiten”); lxviii.

  21. 21.

    See Hua XXXIX, 480: “(…) man bedarf einer Rekonstruktion von solchem (aber eine evident wesensmäßige), was nicht direkt erfahren und erfahrbar ist; und die originale Form der fraglichen Wesensstücke, der zu rekonstruierenden, ist natürlich die primordiale. Hier ist die große Frage die nach der Methode der indirekten Konstruktion, aber doch Rekonstruktion eines Reiches unerfahrbarer Konstitution.”

  22. 22.

    According to Ullrich Melle, Husserl already registered the parallel tasks assigned to the different branches of a critique of reason in his 1902–1907 lectures (Ms. F I 26), partially reproduced in Hua XXIV, Hua Mat III, and Hua Mat V, as well as in a letter to W. Hocking from Oct. 11, 1903 (see Hua XXVIII, xxi–xxii).

  23. 23.

    See the 1906 notes in Husserl’s personal diary (Husserl 1956, reprinted in Hua XXIV, 442–449), as well as other documents of that time; see also Hua VIII, 23, 26. This conviction is already documented in 1902.

  24. 24.

    “Here, on the other hand, all of those egological functions do not lie alongside one another, but interpenetrate each other” (Hua VIII, 193).

  25. 25.

    Hua VIII, 25, 194. “Herewith universality emerges, whereby the reign of knowledge includes every sort of activity that originates in a sentient and willing subjectivity; admittedly a correlative similar involvement also <emerges here>, whereby the evaluative disposition (wertende Gemüt) and the striving will and action embrace the totality of subjectivity and all of its intentional functions” (Hua VIII, 193–194, italics mine; see also 23–25). If there were still to be any doubt, these lectures on First Philosophy stem from 1923 to 1924, thus before the publication of Being and Time whereby Husserl first becomes acquainted with his former assistant’s real work.

  26. 26.

    See Ms. A V 22, 19; see also Hart 1992, 21. We thank Ullrich Melle for allowing us to quote from this and the manuscripts referred to in the following for a preliminary version of this paper published in Lerner (2015a), 87–106.

  27. 27.

    See, for example, Hua VIII, 197–198; Hua V, 138–140 (405–407); Hua IX, 299–301 (177–179); and Hua VI, 16, 273–276 (17–18, 338–341).

  28. 28.

    Hua XXV, 8–15 (79–89). It should be remarked that in Husserl’s view, epistemological scepticism offers no real danger for science, for scientists pay no attention to it and simply continue in their endeavours. On the contrary, however, “concerning ethics, this doubt is more serious” (Hua XXIV, 216).

  29. 29.

    In a 1906 manuscript in which he refers to Descartes, Husserl already includes the intentional object (see Ms. B II I, 47a, entitled Die Phänomenologie und Kritik der Vernunft. Phänomenologische Kritik der Vernunft). Nevertheless, he does not use the term “transcendental” in a proper phenomenological sense until 1908.

  30. 30.

    See, respectively, Hua IX, 284 (165); Hua XXIV, 387; Hua XXV, 78–79; Hua III/1, §§71–75; Hua II, 49 (39); Hua III/1, §§76–86.

  31. 31.

    Hua I, 177–178 (151–152). The naïveté in question concerns the notion of “absolute givenness” (introduced in 1907 in his five lectures on the Idea of Phenomenology, Hua II) that, as mentioned before, he identified as a problem in his 1910/11 lectures on the “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” (see Hua XIII, 160–169 [54–63])—namely, the fact that consciousness and self-consciousness are both temporal flows, so that “as soon as I want to seize what I have thus actually given as now, (…) it has already passed by. The Now has become a new Now, and what I wanted to find appears in it as gone by,” so that “the entire project of disengaging loses its meaning” (Hua XIII, 160 [54]). In my view, Husserl subsequently understands that the notion of “absolute self-givenness” must itself be interpreted and justified differently. In any case, Husserl recognizes the need for this “self-criticism” the moment that he actually starts working on his “first philosophy” (announced since the Introduction of Ideas I, 8 [22]), in Hua XXXV. The 1922 “London Lectures” (Londoner Vorträge 1922), entitled “Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Philosophy,” were originally published by Berndt Goossens as Husserl 1999; however, I will quote passages from those lectures as retrieved in Hua XXXV.

  32. 32.

    Hua XXXV, 314–315; to put it another way, “a specific form of human life is included, as it were, in the sense of an absolute ethical requirement, [belonging to it] as an original regulative model” (Hua XXXV, 58).

  33. 33.

    Here what is at stake is an opposition between surface (superficiality) and depth, rather than the Heideggerian opposition between authentic and inauthentic existence.

  34. 34.

    Hua VI, 156 (153); see also Goethe, Faust, “Finstere Galerie”, Part II, Scene 4, Act 1, 6216.

  35. 35.

    “To know what we’re doing” is Hannah Arendt’s renowned expression.

  36. 36.

    “As is the case with all undertakings which are new in principle, for which not even an analogy can serve as guide, this beginning takes place with a certain unavoidable naïveté. In the beginning is the deed” (Hua VI, 158 [156]); once again Husserl is referring to Goethe’s Faust, Part I, 1237.

  37. 37.

    “All souls make up a single unity of intentionality with the reciprocal implication of the life-fluxes of the individual subjects (…); what is a mutual externality from the point of view of naïve positivity or objectivity is, when seen from the inside, an intentional mutual internality” (Hua VI, 260 [257]). Husserl deals with the problem of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit, Historizität) throughout the Crisis in relation to “generativity” (Hua VI, especially in §6, Abhandlungen II and III, Beilagen 3, 5, 13, 23, 24, 26, 27) and in manifold earlier unpublished manuscripts and courses.

  38. 38.

    Hua I, 183 (157): “Do not wish to go out; go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner [human being].”

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  1. Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, Lima, Peru

    Rosemary R. P. Lerner

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Correspondence to Rosemary R. P. Lerner .

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  1. Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, USA

    Véronique M. Fóti

  2. University of Patras, Patras, Greece

    Pavlos Kontos

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Lerner, R.R.P. (2017). The Ethical Dimension of Transcendental Reduction. In: Fóti, V., Kontos, P. (eds) Phenomenology and the Primacy of the Political. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 89. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56160-8_4

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