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Part of the book series: History of Analytic Philosophy ((History of Analytic Philosophy))

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Abstract

It is through aspect-seeing that Wittgenstein is able to find a vantage point from which he can examine himself and his problems in life for the first time. Not language, but seeing, allows the subject to gain access to this experience. On the other hand, the prominent position that Wittgenstein accords to seeing, a non-discursive activity, prevents him from taking a position in relation to himself.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    One could say that Augustine was standing with one foot still in paradise. Wittgenstein appears to have found this position and the linguistic approach associated with it highly attractive, but it had no place in his own life.

  2. 2.

    Drury (1984), p. 91.

  3. 3.

    Pico della Mirandola (1942).

  4. 4.

    On “deep play,” see Geertz (1972).

  5. 5.

    Kant (1969).

  6. 6.

    On Wittgenstein’s conservatism, see the study by Nyíri (1982).

  7. 7.

    See von Wright (1982), p. 116: “Wittgenstein did not, like Spengler, develop a philosophy of history. But he lived the ‘Untergang des Abendlandes’, the decline of the West, one could say. He lived it, not only in the disgust for contemporary Western civilization, but also in his deep awe and understanding of this civilization’s great past.”

  8. 8.

    Bourdieu (2002), p. 349.

  9. 9.

    One might also think, for example, of Victor Klemperer’s LTI project on the language of the Third Reich, the “Lingua Tertii Imperii” (Klemperer 1947).

  10. 10.

    Pascal (1984), p. 47.

  11. 11.

    Pascal (1984), p. 35.

  12. 12.

    There is a remark Wittgenstein made about himself that may give some indication that he wanted to be the way he was: “It’s a good thing I don’t allow myself to be influenced!” (CV, p. 1e)

  13. 13.

    See the remark by Ilse Somavilla: “Wittgenstein’s implicit appeal to encounter the phenomena of the visible world with mindfulness and attention, to discover the remarkable or wonderful in the everyday and ‘banal’ differs fundamentally from an astonishment at what is sensational and new.” (Somavilla, translated here from the German, p. 370)

  14. 14.

    Pascal (1984), p. 47.

  15. 15.

    Philip R. Shields refers to this attitude, using a concept from Max Weber, as “worldly asceticism” (in: Shields 1993, p. 92).

  16. 16.

    See PI, §524: “Don’t take it as a matter of course, but as a remarkable fact, that pictures and fictitious narratives give us pleasure, and absorb us. – (“Don’t take it as a matter of course” – that means: puzzle over this, as you do over some other things which disturb you. Then what is problematic will disappear, by your accepting the one fact as you do the other.)” I am grateful to Shields (1993, p. 92) for pointing out this quote.

  17. 17.

    See also CV, p. 5e: “Man has to awaken to wonder – and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again.” (Shields 1993, ibid., makes reference to this quote.)

Other Authors

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Gebauer, G. (2017). Epilogue. In: Wittgenstein's Anthropological Philosophy. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56151-6_9

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