Abstract
The focus of this chapter is on the first years after Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge (in 1929). His discussions with Piero Sraffa deepened his interest in the material reality of human practice. In the use of gestures, Wittgenstein sees the world and the body as pre-structured by an order of existing practices. Thus, even before human beings learn ordinary language, they develop a regulated use of their bodies. Together with the structuring practices, this forms the precondition for following rules. Language use is conceived of as an operating with words, but in contrast to material practice, it is governed by a “grammar” that is independent of actions. Grammatical rules are capable of generating their own uses and thus give rise to new meanings.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Malcolm (2001), pp. 58–59. Sraffa himself was later unable to remember this scene. When his student Amartya Sen, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, asked him about it much later, he responded simply that he had argued with Wittgenstein so often that “my fingertips did not need to do much talking.” (A. Sen 2003b, p. 30 f.)
- 2.
In Investigating Wittgenstein (1989), Merrill and Jaako Hintikka show that Wittgenstein had already abandoned his theory of language from the Tractatus in 1929: he had moved from a “phenomenological” to a “physicalist” conception of language. They attribute this change of direction to his “verification paradigm,” which had taken shape in discussions with the Vienna Circle. The characteristics of this conception of language, as described by the authors, correspond to what I will refer to below as the principle of operating with words. The resulting change of paradigm led to a new problem, of which Wittgenstein was aware but which the two authors do not mention: it meant that the entity that ensures the consistency of the world and its elements changes as well. In the phenomenologically oriented conception of language from the Tractatus, this entity was the self at the limit of the world, looking into the world with a steady gaze and an extramundane standard. In Wittgenstein’s second philosophy, the world is grasped from within; it thus requires intramundane methods and standards of sameness. Wittgenstein finds these in the rules of “behavioral grammar”—in usage, and in language-games.
- 3.
In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations from 1945, Wittgenstein wrote that he was “indebted” to Piero Sraffa for providing the “stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book.” Further by-products of their discussions are scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s entire subsequent body of work. In line with the overall pattern of his philosophy, he never reflected systematically on the relationship between gestures and language, but made numerous remarks that explicitly established such a connection. The number of meetings that took place between Wittgenstein and Sraffa gives an idea of the intensity of their intellectual exchange. In an investigation of the two men’s private records—which are not publicly accessible—Alexandra Marjanovic reported that they had at least 238 discussions between February 1929 and November 1950 (Marjanovic 2005, 2006).
- 4.
Sen (2003b), p. 30.
- 5.
See Veigl (2004), p. 195 (translation from the German): Sraffa “was the middleman who ensured that Gramsci’s writings from his time in prison were preserved after his death with the help of another influential friend in the banking industry.”
- 6.
- 7.
Sen (2003b), p. 54.
- 8.
Sen (2003b), p. 32.
- 9.
- 10.
On gesture in Naples, see Ernst Gombrich’s discussion of Aby Warburg’s reflections on the iconography of gesture in art in “The Dissertation on Botticelli” (Gombrich 1970, pp. 43–59); Didi-Huberman 2002, pp. 201–223; Raulff 2003, pp. 17–47. Didi-Huberman provides a summary of de Jorio’s book on Neapolitan gesture, La mimica degli Antichi investigata nel gestire Napoletano, Naples 1832, Didi-Hubermann, p. 215. Warburg’s idea of the “pathos formula” largely originated with this richly illustrated work. The book can be viewed in the library of the Warburg Institute in London.
- 11.
“It may be said: the friendly eyes, the friendly mouth, the wagging of a dog’s tail, are among the primary and mutually independent symbols of friendliness; I mean: They are parts of the phenomena that are called friendliness.” (PG, p. 178, cf. WL, p. 178)
- 12.
Wittgenstein speaks of “gestures” especially in the case of sensations, probably based on W. Wundt.
- 13.
On this interpretation of the changing relationship between the concepts of the regulated system and that of the language-game, see the work of Sedmak (1996): “Despite the dominance of the concept of calculus in 1931, Wittgenstein simultaneously began to undermine the understanding of language as calculus.” (p. 120) According to Sedmak, Wittgenstein had already begun gradually preparing the way for his concept of the language-game with his turn toward ordinary language in 1929 (p. 74). “Starting in 1939, Wittgenstein shifted further away from the concept of calculus by introducing games from a cultural-historical standpoint.” (p. 122)
- 14.
See WA IV, p. 183: “Does that mean that an explanation or chart can initially be used in such a way that you refer to it to ‘look things up’; that you look things up, as it were, in your head, picturing it before your inner eye (or something of the kind); and that you ultimately work without the chart, that is, as if it had never been there at all. In this latter case, you are therefore playing a different game.” The passage from which this quote was taken is in parentheses in the manuscript.
- 15.
See Gebauer (1997).
- 16.
Wittgenstein shows that certain interpretations of mentalist language cannot be verified in his critique of “private language.” The argument is directed against the assumption of direct introspection of one’s own inner psychic events. Wittgenstein bases his critique of unverifiability on the argument that one cannot adopt an epistemic perspective toward it.
- 17.
See Introduction, n. 13.
- 18.
Cf. M. Mauss (1935).
- 19.
Wallon (1970), p. 125, translated here from German.
- 20.
See PG, p. 188: “I do not even need to fabricate a case, I have only to consider what is in fact the case; namely, that I can direct a man who has learned only German, only by using the German language. (For here I am looking at learning German as adjusting (conditioning) a mechanism to respond to a certain kind of influence.”
- 21.
In his lectures, Wittgenstein uses the term “training” to refer to a bilateral and two-step process: “Training can be described as consisting of two steps (1) the trainer’s doing certain things, (2) the occurrence of certain reactions on the part of the subject, with the possibility of improvement. Teaching a language always depends on a training which presupposes that the subject reacts.” (WLII, p. 102) From this perspective, Wittgenstein’s concept of training does not equate the training of people with the training of animals.
- 22.
“Primitive reactions” are natural modes of behavior that occur in all human beings and that are culturally formed to a limited extent (see Chapter 8).
- 23.
- 24.
Tomasello (1999), p. 14.
- 25.
Geertz (1973), p. 44.
- 26.
According to Geertz (1973), “culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns—customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters—as has, by and large, been the case up to now, but as a set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, instructions…for the governing of behavior.” (p. 44)
- 27.
Ibid., p. 44.
- 28.
Ibid., p. 45.
- 29.
See Williams (1999), especially Chapter 6, “Rules, community, and the individual.” Williams, however, barely touches on the necessity to shape the biological body.
- 30.
Remark from February 1931 (WA III, p. 230). In the context of this remark, Wittgenstein reflects at length on gesture.
- 31.
By using the English terms “common body” and “common language” for the terms Umgangskörper and Umgangssprache in the German text, I am incorporating the notion of “common sense”—sound, practical knowledge shared by the members of a community. The Umgangskörper, or common body, is therefore the physical body shaped and adapted through practical use by the individual and through the individual’s practical interaction with the social environment. It is the physical body into which shared social practices are inscribed. In this context, Umgangsprache, translated here as “common language,” is more than just colloquial speech; it is the entire context of shared speech practices generated, adapted, and refined through social interaction and individual use.
- 32.
See Gebauer (1999).
- 33.
Nietzsche (1989), p. 74.
- 34.
Mauss (1975).
- 35.
- 36.
Bourdieu (1980).
- 37.
In Austrian German, Gebrauch (translated here as use or usage) is used synonymously with Brauch(tum), translated here as custom(s) or tradition(s). See RFM, Part V §22: “When I set the rules up I said something: I followed a certain custom.”
- 38.
WA III, remark dated 23.6.1931, p. 278.
- 39.
Cf. Wittgenstein’s parenthetical remark in PG, p. 47: “If someone asks me ‘What time is it?’ there is no inner process of laborious interpretation; I simply react to what I see and hear.”
- 40.
A similar conception, inspired by Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory, can be found in Wittgenstein’s writings: “With our language (as physical phenomenon), we are not situated in, so to speak, the area of the projected image on the screen, but in the area of the film that goes through the lantern…” (WA V, p. 136, parentheses included by Wittgenstein).
- 41.
If the acting subject slams his fist on the table instead of using words to declare that an agreement has been reached, this blow would not open up a new situation but end the old one.
- 42.
This is the principle of nonsense poetry, for example, which is uniquely capable of creating new meanings but very different meanings than normal language.
Other Authors
Bourdieu, P. (1980). The Logic of Practice (trans: Nice, R.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Didi-Huberman, G. (2002). L’image survivante. Histoire de l’art et temps des fantômes selon Aby Warburg. Paris: Minuit.
Gebauer, G. (1997). Hand. Edited by C. Wulf, Vom Menschen. Handbuch Historische Anthropologie (pp. 479–488). Weinheim: Belz.
Gebauer, G. (1999). Die Sprachmäßigkeit des Körpers. Edited by H. E. Wiegand, Sprache und Sprachen in den Wissenschaften. Geschichte und Gegenwart (pp. 3–26). Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Gebauer, G., Wulf, C. (1995). Mimesis. Culture – Art – Society. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
Gebauer, G., Wulf, C. (1998). Spiel – Ritual – Geste. Das Mimetische in der sozialen Welt. Reinbek: Rowohlt.
Geertz, C. (1973). The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man. Edited by C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (pp. 33–54). New York: Basic Books.
Gombrich, E. H. (1970). Aby Warburg. An Intellectual Biography. London: Warburg Institute.
Hintikka, M., Hintikka, J. (1989). Investigating Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Jousse, M. (1974). Anthropologie du geste. Paris: Gallimard.
Leontjew, A. N. (1977). Probleme der Entwicklung des Psychischen. Kronberg, Taunus: Athenäum. Russian edition: 1959.
Lord, A. B. (1960). The Singer of Tales. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.
Malcolm, N. (2001). Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Marjanovic, A. (2005). Introduzione alla vita e alle carte di Raffaello Piccoli: un racconto. In Cartevive. Periodico dell’Archivio Prezzolini (pp. 26–84). Biblioteca cantonale Lugano 16, 1.
Marjanovic, A. (2006). Sraffa’s ‘Cambridge Pocket Diaries’. Reconstructing his Political Environment with Special Reference to Raffaello Piccoli (unpublished manuscript).
Mauss, M. (1935). Les techniques du corps. Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, 32 (3–4), pp. 271–293.
Nietzsche, F. (1989). Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy for the Future (trans: Kaufmann, W.). New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
Ong, W. J. (1987). Oralität und Literalität. Die Technologisierung des Wortes. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. English edition: Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and Literacy. The Technologization of the Word. London: Methuen.
Raulff, U. (2003). Wilde Energien. Vier Versuche zu Aby Warburg. Göttingen: Wallstein.
Sedmak, C. (1996). Kalkül und Kultur. Studien zu Genesis und Geltung von Wittgensteins Sprachspielmodell. Amsterdam, Atlanta: Rodopi.
Sen, A. (2003a). Sraffa, Wittgenstein, and Gramsci. Journal of Economic Literature, 41, 1240–1255.
Sen, A. (2003b). Piero Sraffa: A Student’s Perspective. Convegno internazionale Piero Sraffa (Rome, February 11–12, 2003) (pp. 23–60). Rome: Accademia nazionale dei lincei.
Tomasello, M. (1999). The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Veigl, H. (2004). Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Eine Spurensuche in Sachen Lebensform. Vienna: Holzhausen.
Wallon, H. (1970). De l’acte à la pensée. Essai de psychologie comparative. Paris: Flammarion (first published in 1942).
Williams, M. (1999). Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning. Toward a Social Conception of Mind. London, New York: Routledge.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gebauer, G. (2017). The Turn to Anthropology. In: Wittgenstein's Anthropological Philosophy. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56151-6_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56151-6_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-56150-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-56151-6
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)