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Modelling Specific Aspects of COIN Operations: On the Possibility of a First Mover Advantage

  • Lucía Martínez Ordóñez
Chapter
  • 629 Downloads
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Abstract

“Mission Accomplished” said the banner on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln from which in May 2003 the then US President, George Bush, declared the conclusion of the military operations against Iraq. Nothing could have been further from the truth, which was highlighted when, in the fall of 2006, the security deterioration in Iraq peaked.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Payoff Distribution Payoff Matrix 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lucía Martínez Ordóñez
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsRuhr University BochumBochumGermany

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