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Military Operational Planning and Strategic Moves pp 37–48Cite as

The Advantage of Moving First Versus a First-Mover Advantage

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Abstract

In game theory, a player enjoys a first-mover advantage if he achieves a higher payoff by turning the game into a sequential one with him being the first mover, provided of course that the game can be changed in the first place. Leaving the proviso aside, once we are talking about tactics such a statement might sound obvious rather than revealing, though. Jensen (2015) argues that, if in a battle what can be seen can be hit, military actors should be primed for the offense, i.e. trying to make the first move by striking first. It holds true in particular in naval engagements and aerial dogfights, and obviously it is the lore told by countless Wild West movies: he who draws first wins.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In short sea control is exercised using the so-called three Bs: blockade, bombardment and boots on the ground (Armstrong 2015).

  2. 2.

    Global commons is used to refer to domains or areas that are not under the control of any state but on which all rely.

  3. 3.

    Salop and Scheffman also outlined the conceptual framework of raising rival’s costs to force market exit. See Salop and Scheffman (1983) and Salop and Scheffman (1987). Further literature on entry barriers based on increasing the costs of competitors can be found in Dixit (1979), and Rogerson (1984).

  4. 4.

    It is for this very reason that the strategy is called “raising rivals’ cost” rather than “raising rival’s cost”.

  5. 5.

    China itself does not use the term A2/AD but counter-intervention. See Fravel and Twomey (2015).

  6. 6.

    An evidence that the A2/AD strategy from China not only includes military objectives related to Taiwan would be China’s acquisition of aircraft carriers, which would not be needed in any Taiwan-only conflicts because Taiwan lies well within land-based Chinese aircraft. See Lovelace (2014, p. 167–168).

  7. 7.

    For 2015 it is expected that the military Budget will reach around &141,45 billion, 10,1% more than in 2014 (Gady 2015).

  8. 8.

    In 2010 China’s then foreign minister stated “China is a big country, and other countries are small countries, and that is just a fact.” Cited from Krepinevich (2015).

  9. 9.

    After a year of building artificial islands, China has recently announced the termination of the project. The end of this island building project can also be seen as an attempt to alleviate the tensions between the two countries on the verge of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), held in Washington in June 2015, and the first state visit of president Xi Jinping of China to the US in September 2015.

  10. 10.

    Some observers reported this new operational concept as a budgeting strategy to justify the investment in weapons programs for the Air force and the Navy in view of the Congressional hearings (Hoffman 2015).

  11. 11.

    For a wider explanation on the ASB concept development see Morris et al. (2015). Critics say, though, that JAM-GC is nothing but the old ASB, with merely some token land elements having been added in order to get the Army and the Marine Corps on board and avoid creating a picture of the different forces being at war with each other when it comes to persuading Congress to release the necessary funds (LaGrone 2015).

  12. 12.

    Unlike in the case where China’s A2/AD strategies consisted in mining, thus mining was dominated by no mining.

  13. 13.

    Otherwise, the game could not be solved.

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  1. Faculty of Economics, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Lucía Martínez Ordóñez

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Ordóñez, L.M. (2017). The Advantage of Moving First Versus a First-Mover Advantage. In: Military Operational Planning and Strategic Moves. Contributions to Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56108-0_5

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