Abstract
This article maintains the legitimacy of religiously-based conscientious objection to putatively medical interventions [RCO]. In particular, it considers the RCO status of Catholic medical professionals. It begins with a consideration of the aptness of speaking in terms of “conscientious objection”—a contested usage—rather than “refusal of medical care.” It argues on behalf of “conscientious objection” as the appropriate terminology. It places the debate concerning RCO within the larger context of professional medical autonomy. Thereby, it normalizes RCO. Noting the co-incidence of professional, ethical, and religious conscientiousness, it proposes that justifiable objection principally concerns interventions, not individuals. The article establishes that RCO extends to referrals, not only to the objectionable intervention. Relying on the traditional distinction between material and formal cooperation, the article argues that RCO does not extend to all acts that implicate one in the relevant objectionable act. For example, while forwarding medical records to a fellow professional who acquiesces to the patient’s objectionable request may further that goal, one who objects may in good conscience forward the materials. The article concludes noting that RCO imposes obligations upon the professional to notify relevant parties concerning the objection, disclose RCO status to patients, not to abandon the same, and to preserve patient-confidentiality.
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- 1.
See California Supreme Court case North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, (#S142892); a.k.a. Benitez v. North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group. Ms. Guadalupe Benitez sought and received fertility treatment from Drs. Christine Brody and Douglas Fenton, physicians at North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group. Her doctors had no objections to prescribing medication to facilitate fertility or to referring her to a non-objecting physician. They did, however, object to performing IUI. There was a factual dispute between the parties, never settled at court: the plaintiff asserted that the physicians objected to performing IUI in light of her sexual orientation. The doctors claimed to object to inseminating a single woman, regardless of sexual orientation. In effect, the court ruled that the basis upon which the physicians did not provide the service was not relevant. Their non-provision of the service had the effect of discrimination based on sexual orientation, regardless of their motive for non-provision. The court ruled that, while one need not provide the relevant service, if one does offer it, it must be provided to all: “defendant physicians can simply refuse to perform the IUI medical procedure at issue here for any patient of North Coast, the physician’s employer. Or, ... defendant physicians can avoid such a conflict by ensuring that every patient requiring IUI receives “full and equal” access to that medical procedure though [sic] a North Coast physician lacking defendants’ religious objections” (part IV, p. 14 of the majority’s opinion). As noted, while the issue of abandoning a patient was not addressed in the case, it does seem relevant as North Coast did care for the plaintiff and may, thereby, have established reliance such that its physicians had a legal duty to provide further medical interventions provided for other patients. The court documents do not clarify why the physicians regarded the provision of certain fertility procedures and diagnostic tests to a single woman intent on conception as not violating their religious commitments while they did regard IUI as a violation. For example, the Group had prescribed Clomid to facilitate the patient’s ovulation in conjunction with intravaginal self-insemination. The Group also performed laparoscopy to determine if the patient suffered from endometriosis and hysterosalpingogram to diagnose blockage of the fallopian tubes.
- 2.
One typically diagnoses infertility after a couple has had regular, potentially fertile, sexual relations not resulting in conception over 1 year. Approximately one-third of infertility is due to characteristics of both the female and male, one third due to the female solely, and one third due to the male solely. Thus, fertility belongs to females united with males; while infertility belongs sometimes to both parties in the female-male union, sometimes just to females in such unions, and sometimes just to males in such unions. Accordingly, it seems reasonable for a fertility specialist, particularly one specializing in fostering natural reproduction, to regard the unit of treatment as the male-female couple.
- 3.
Much can (and needs) be said concerning the distinction between the form and the matter of one’s act. For our present purposes, suffice it to say that when one pours a cup of hot coffee, the form of one’s act bears on what one seeks to do, while the matter bears on what one causes without seeking it. So, for example, that the coffee ends up in a cup is a formal aspect of one’s act; that the cup itself ends up being hot is a material aspect of one’s act.
- 4.
For a more complete treatment of cooperation, see Cavanaugh (2007).
References
Cavanaugh, Thomas A. 2007. Cooperation: Material and formal. In Catholic social thought, social science, and social policy, ed. Michael Coulter et al. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
Thoreau, Henry David. 1973. Civil disobedience. In On civil disobedience, American essays, old and new, ed. Robert A. Goldwin. Chicago: Rand McNally.
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Cavanaugh, T.A. (2017). Conscientious Objection for Catholic Healthcare Professionals. In: Eberl, J. (eds) Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 127. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55766-3_40
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