Abstract
I approach the subject of human enhancement—whether by genetic, pharmacological, or technological means—from the perspective of Thomistic/Aristotelian philosophical anthropology, natural law theory , and virtue ethics. Far from advocating a restricted or monolithic conception of “human nature ” from this perspective, I outline a set of broadly-construed, fundamental features of the nature of human persons that coheres with a variety of historical and contemporary philosophical viewpoints. These features include self-conscious awareness, capacity for intellective thought, volitional autonomy , desire for pleasurable experiences, and the necessity of healthy biological functioning. On this basis, I contend that there may be legitimate forms of human enhancement for specific purposes related to the physical, cognitive, and emotive dimensions of human existence. However, wider philosophical considerations call into question whether societal attitudes towards enhancement and the differences that may emerge between those who are enhanced versus the unenhanced may raise insurmountable questions of justice, as well as a loss of virtues associated with what Alasdair MacIntyre refers to as our “acknowledged dependency.” This presentation will navigate towards conclusions differentiating principled from practical objections to specific forms of, and means towards achieving, enhancement of certain human capacities . While critical of some forms of human enhancement, I nevertheless argue that other forms of enhancement are, in principle, morally permissible—and for which any practical concerns may be surmountable—insofar as they positively support human flourishing according to our nature as living, sentient, social, and rational animals.
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Notes
- 1.
An example of a group who generally approves of any form of enhancement is the World Transhumanist Association, also known as “Humanity+” (More 2013). General critical assessments of enhancement technologies are developed by Michael Sandel (2007) and Jürgen Habermas (2003); Frances Kamm (2009) and Elizabeth Fenton (2006) offer critical responses to Sandel and Habermas, respectively. The President’s Council on Bioethics (2003) provides a comprehensive evaluation of various forms of human enhancement.
- 2.
The Kantian concept of autonomy is centered upon the will’s capacity to self-legislate—that is, to govern oneself in accordance with the rationally understood moral law (Kant 1997); whereas the Millian concept is centered upon the unbridled exercise of an individual’s will so long as harm does not accrue to another being with moral status (Mill 1989).
- 3.
The theorists cited here consider it essential to being a person that one is actually engaging in these activities, or could at least immediately do so without any intrinsic impediment. I, however, consider it sufficient for being a person if one possesses the intrinsic active potentiality to engage in these activities, the actualization of which may require development over time (Eberl 2014a); furthermore, such potentialities may persist even if the material foundation to immediately exercise some of them has been irreversibly damaged (Eberl 2005).
- 4.
This general definition captures the essence of being a person, but omits many distinct nuances that are often contested. For example, it is debated whether having a capacity for self-conscious rational thought and autonomous volition requires having a biological cerebrum, or whether a functionally equivalent silicon information-processing system would suffice. Also debated is what is required to be a member of the moral community. For example, a severely mentally disabled human being may not be a contributing member of the moral community—in that she does not have the mental capacity to fulfill duties to others—but may be a recipient member—in that she has rights which entail others fulfilling duties toward her.
- 5.
The purpose of phantasms is to be available for the intellect to use in abstracting the intelligible form—that is, the universal essential concept—of perceived things. Hence, phantasms are between the immediate mental impression of an object perceived by sensation and the intellectual understanding of that object’s nature as abstracted from any individuating characteristics.
- 6.
Note that one’s body need only subserve the capacity —understood in the Aristotelian sense of an “intrinsic active potentiality”—for the activities definitive of personhood in order for one to count as a person. Thus, human embryos and fetuses, or those in a persistent vegetative state, arguably count as persons even though they cannot yet, or can no longer, exhibit the activities of self-conscious rational thought and autonomous volition (Eberl 2006).
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
The fundamental good of promoting pleasure and avoiding pain for both oneself and others is also affirmed by non-natural law moral theorists, most notably utilitarians Jeremy Bentham (2007) and John Stuart Mill (2001). Utilitarianism, however, values pleasure for its own sake; whereas natural law theorists Patrick Lee and Robert George contend that “pleasure is good (desirable, worthwhile, perfective) if and only if attached to a fulfilling or perfective activity or condition. Pleasure is like other goods in that a fulfilling activity or condition is better with it than without it. But pleasure is unlike full-fledged goods in that it is not a genuine good apart from some other fulfilling activity or condition” (2008, p. 115).
- 10.
Discussion of the various pros and cons of performance enhancement can be found in Savulescu et al. (2011, pt. IV).
- 11.
Discussion of the various pros and cons of lifespan extension can be found in Savulescu et al. (2011, pt. V).
- 12.
Such a tediously immortal existence is imaginatively depicted in an episode of Star Trek: Voyager entitled “Death Wish,” in which a member of an immortal race of omnipotent beings desires to commit suicide to alleviate his insurmountable boredom.
- 13.
A recent art exhibit as part of a transportation safety campaign in Victoria, Australia projects how the human body would have to evolve in order to be able to survive high-impact automobile crashes (Delzo 2016); suffice it to say that the trade-off in aesthetic qualities may not be worth rendering ourselves invulnerable to vehicular accidents.
- 14.
As of this writing, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2016) has issued a final ruling which bans the marketing of antibacterial products with certain active ingredients not demonstrated to be “more effective than plain soap and water in preventing illness and the spread of certain infections,” citing as one of the reasons a public health concern over increased bacterial resistance.
- 15.
For a discussion of how the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA] is seeking to enhance human capabilities for military purposes, see Keenan (this volume); presumably, DARPA is also researching how to combat enhanced human beings.
- 16.
A transhumanist may respond that our psyches could be uploaded into an android body capable of the same forms of sensation and concomitant experiences of pleasure, pain, and emotion as our biological bodies. Whether such an artificial construct could reproduce such sensations and experiences, or whether we would experience ourselves as integrated with such a body as we do our natural bodies, remain open questions.
- 17.
- 18.
Aristotle (NE, bk. VI ch. 5) defines practical wisdom (prudence) as an agent’s disposition to “deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.”
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Eberl, J.T. (2017). Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics, and Human Enhancement. In: Eberl, J. (eds) Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 127. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55766-3_21
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