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The Disease-Preventative Use of Condoms: Why It Is Not Forbidden According to Catholic Doctrine

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Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics

Part of the book series: Philosophy and Medicine ((CSBE,volume 127))

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Abstract

This essay argues that contemporary Catholic teaching does not forbid the use of condoms to prevent the transmission of HIV . It begins by making clear that this question is distinct from the main one treated by Humanae vitae n. 14, and from its treatment of “therapeutic means” (n. 15) with a contraceptive effect. It further distinguishes the use of condoms by those engaged in immoral behavior—such as prostitution or fornication—from that of married couples, the most difficult aspect of the question. Regarding the former, it argues that the Church should not articulate norms for how to engage in such immoral behavior but should call such persons to live the virtue of chastity, while noting—with Pope Benedict XVI—that such unchaste persons at least show a sense of responsibility when they try to avoid infecting their partners with a serious disease. Regarding the latter, it argues—in light of the December 22, 2010 CDF note on “The Trivialization of Sexuality”—that this is an open question, depending on whether the physical pattern of semination “into”—not merely inside—the vagina is required for a conjugal act. It argues for the development of a sexual ethic in which the essential truth governing sexual ethics is found not in the absolute inviolability of semination, as in some traditional approaches, but in the full truth of the virtue of conjugal chastity in marriage. The essay also treats related matters, such as the stance the Church should take regarding so-called ABC programs.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    By “physicalism” I mean, especially, an approach to moral theory that determines moral good or evil from the physical or natural order without giving properly moral reasons why, for example, a particular bad caused effect or the frustration of a natural end is also morally evil. For a more detailed discussion of physicalism, see Rhonheimer (2011b).

  2. 2.

    The first two of these were later republished in Cessario and DiNioa (1999). These essays were followed by a further articulation of Thomistic action theory by Rhonheimer (2004b). All three of these were later republished in a broader collection (Rhonheimer 2008).

  3. 3.

    In order to understand the context in which these arguments were made, it should also be noted that, in spite of a period of openness in one journal, after the 2004 publication of “The Truth about Condoms ” most of these venues have been unwilling to consider the publication of articles supporting Rhonheimer’s positions.

  4. 4.

    For a recent attempt to present Aquinas’s moral theory in a strongly physicalist way, see Long (2007), the thesis of which was that “the correct understanding of the object and species of the moral act … depends wholly on natural teleology” (p. 137). The approach of Long’s “primer” (p. xi), which seems to have been a rushed attempt to intervene in these disputes, was soundly refuted by numerous subsequent authors. For a more helpful body of work that also considers morality with particular attention to physical action and caused effects, but includes an ongoing critique of Long’s work and engagement with various interlocutors, including Rhonheimer, see Jensen (2010, 2015).

  5. 5.

    This location of the right reason that measures human acts in the rational structures of the virtues distinguishes this approach from not only the physicalists, but also the New Natural Law Theory grounded in a theory of “basic human goods.”

  6. 6.

    Brock (2008, pp. 14–15) affirms “one of the most prominent ideas in [Rhonheimer’s] ethical writings: that the first proper principle and measure of moral acts is reason. We should be grateful to him for insisting on this and keeping it before us. There can be no doubt that it is Thomas’s view.”

  7. 7.

    Regarding the most serious attempt to uphold at least a moderate physicalism, a promotional blurb on the back cover of Jensen (2015) says “it breathes new life into the traditional approach to Thomistic ethics that looks to human nature as the foundation for moral reasoning.” This quotation might be read to indicate that Jensen endorses physicalism, but in this book he explicitly rejects it (e.g., p. 24), and actually presents a more nuanced approach that is worthy of careful study. For an earlier explicit defense of what he calls “moderate physicalism,” which seems to be his ongoing position, see Jensen (1997).

  8. 8.

    I put “male” in brackets as the inclusion of this word in the English translation was highly disputed, resulting in a clarification from the Vatican press secretary that the Pope’s remarks had a broader scope than male prostitutes. Regarding the controversy concerning the publication of the English translation of this book, see the remarks below.

  9. 9.

    See, e.g., Weigel (2010).

  10. 10.

    Now renamed the Anscombe Bioethics Centre: http://www.bioethics.org.uk/

  11. 11.

    Relying on Steven A. Long’s moral theory, Janet Smith’s (2010a, b) contributions to the OSV website surprisingly fault Rhonheimer for following the fundamentally Thomistic distinction between acts in their moral and merely physical species, a criticism that reveals her work to be following—at least at that time—a crude form of physicalism that one would hope has been superseded by current scholarship; in other words, she could at least go to Jensen’s work (2010, 2015) for a more serious basis for the conclusions she wants to draw.

  12. 12.

    A helpful reading of these events that includes links to supporting documentation, and recognizes how the intervention of the CDF clearly encouraged the non-physicalist arguments offered by Rhonheimer, see Ivereigh (2010).

  13. 13.

    See Grisez (1983), ch. 9, q. C.3. Rhonheimer (1987) was later published in English (2000) as Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy . As already noted, Jensen (2010) provides on the one hand a corrective to the more crude forms of physicalism still present among Catholic moralists like Steven A. Long, while on the other hand providing—in line with traditional physicalism—what he calls a “moderate physicalist” reading of Aquinas that emphasizes physical behavior and caused effects.

  14. 14.

    In Murphy (2011), I respond to a revisionist who criticizes this article based on a physicalist misreading of Aquinas .

  15. 15.

    The use of various contraceptive technologies and practices for the purpose of preventing the conception of a child infected with the Zika virus, on the other hand, is a contraceptive act as defined by HV. The moral disorder, however, in such contraceptive acts would be significantly lessened by the difficult and tragic circumstances.

  16. 16.

    CDF (2010) also makes clear that “the Holy Father refers to the completely different case of prostitution , a type of behaviour which Christian morality has always considered gravely immoral.”

  17. 17.

    Even Jensen (2015, p. 24)—who has argued (1997) in defense of what he calls a “moderate physicalism” and whose recent work is praised as upholding the traditional emphasis on nature—writes “that physicalism is an inadequate moral theory and that Aquinas himself did not in fact hold it.” Although most serious scholars now distance themselves from some form of “physicalism,” further agreement on what this means is needed.

  18. 18.

    Thus, the important discussion going forward will concern how this rational rule and measure of human action relates to things in the physical or natural order, to caused effects, to human inclinations, to natural law, and to the ends or goals (e.g., justice, temperance, etc.) of the virtues . The most interesting interactions going forward would be between—on the one hand—the directions pioneered by Rhonheimer, who has driven the new consensus toward reason as rule and measure of human action, and has best integrated the virtues , and—on the other hand—the approach of Jensen, who provides an admirably lucid reading of Aquinas in dialogue with the various interlocutors while upholding the more traditional emphasis on “nature” and caused effects, but whose approach to moral action and natural law says little about the virtues which comprise the majority of the moral teaching in ST II.

  19. 19.

    To reiterate what was said above, this claim about the moral species—that, according to VS, is “primarily and fundamentally” determined by the moral object—in no way reflects a form of “subjective intentionalism” that is disconnected from moral realism. Instead it requires that ends deliberately sought by the agent be grounded in reason and reality, with an understanding of the moral order that is ultimately measured by the eternal law, and that locates the body and human inclinations within a broader rational order that is manifest in the ends of the virtues , including an account of conjugal chastity measured by the full truth about marriage. Along these lines, see Rhonheimer (2012).

  20. 20.

    The relevant text comes from Canon 1061 §1, which speaks of a marriage being consummated “if the spouses have in a human manner engaged together in a conjugal act in itself apt for the generation of offspring.” (Code of Canon Law 1983)

  21. 21.

    On the other hand, followers of the New Natural Law theory—who reject physicalism—also tend to reject the disease-preventative use of condoms . This seems to follow primarily from their adherence to the traditional understanding of the physical requirements for an act apt for the consummation of marriage; whereas the present approach proposes a reform of that teaching.

  22. 22.

    I allude here to Long (2007). Jensen (2015, p. 199) also relies on a more traditional reading of Aquinas’s account of the sin against nature to conclude, “The constraint comes from nature, from the ends set by nature, and from the causal relations with regard to these ends.”

  23. 23.

    I follow here Aquinas’s understanding that the inclinations are the seeds of the virtues . See, for example, ST I-II q.51, a.1 and q.63, a.1.

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  1. School of Theology, Pontifical College Josephinum, Columbus, OH, USA

    William F. Murphy Jr.

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Correspondence to William F. Murphy Jr. .

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  1. College of Osteopathic Medicine, Marian University, Indianapolis, Indiana, USA

    Jason T. Eberl

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Murphy, W.F. (2017). The Disease-Preventative Use of Condoms: Why It Is Not Forbidden According to Catholic Doctrine. In: Eberl, J. (eds) Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 127. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55766-3_18

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