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Faster Key Recovery Attack on Round-Reduced PRINCE

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Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy (LightSec 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10098))

Abstract

We introduce a new technique for doing the key recovery part of an integral or higher order differential attack. This technique speeds up the key recovery phase significantly and can be applied to any block cipher with S-boxes. We show several properties of this technique, then apply it to PRINCE and report on the improvements in complexity from earlier integral and higher order differential attacks on this cipher. Our attacks on 4 and 6 rounds were the fastest and the winner of PRINCE Challenge’s last round in the category of chosen plaintext attack.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Simula Research Laboratory, Bergen, Norway

    Shahram Rasoolzadeh & Håvard Raddum

Authors
  1. Shahram Rasoolzadeh
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  2. Håvard Raddum
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Håvard Raddum .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark

    Andrey Bogdanov

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Rasoolzadeh, S., Raddum, H. (2017). Faster Key Recovery Attack on Round-Reduced PRINCE. In: Bogdanov, A. (eds) Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy. LightSec 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10098. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55714-4_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55714-4_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-55713-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-55714-4

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