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Codes for Side-Channel Attacks and Protections

  • Sylvain GuilleyEmail author
  • Annelie Heuser
  • Olivier Rioul
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10194)

Abstract

This article revisits side-channel analysis from the standpoint of coding theory. On the one hand, the attacker is shown to apply an optimal decoding algorithm in order to recover the secret key from the analysis of the side-channel. On the other hand, the side-channel protections are presented as a coding problem where the information is mixed with randomness to weaken as much as possible the sensitive information leaked into the side-channel. Therefore, the field of side-channel analysis is viewed as a struggle between a coder and a decoder. In this paper, we focus on the main results obtained through this analysis. In terms of attacks, we discuss optimal strategy in various practical contexts, such as type of noise, dimensionality of the leakage and of the model, etc. Regarding countermeasures, we give a formal analysis of some masking schemes, including enhancements based on codes contributed via fruitful collaborations with Claude Carlet.

Keywords

Leakage Model Dual Distance Adversarial Strategy Leakage Function Masking Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Part of this work has been funded by the ANR CHIST-ERA project SECODE (Secure Codes to thwart Cyber-physical Attacks).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sylvain Guilley
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Annelie Heuser
    • 3
  • Olivier Rioul
    • 2
  1. 1.Secure-IC S.A.S.Cesson-SévignéFrance
  2. 2.LTCI, Télécom ParisTech, Université Paris-SaclayParisFrance
  3. 3.IRISARennesFrance

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