Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to examine Husserl’s concept of ‘Urstiftung.’ Not only will I analyze the development of this concept in different contexts, ranging from the most basic fields of passive constitution up to the philosophy of history, but I will also highlight its connection to other concepts directly related to it, such as ‘Nachstiftung,’ ‘Neustiftung,’ ‘Endstiftung,’ etc. First, I present some historical and etymological considerations regarding the German concepts of ‘Stiftung’ and ‘stiften.’ Second, I trace the first references to the concept back to the analyses of perception and the I as correlate. Third, I examine the multiple genetic analyses of passivity. Fourth, I address the constitution of the ‘I’, with special attention paid to the ethical ‘I’. Finally, I analyze the problem of history and the crisis of European rationality and mankind. I argue, in particular, that the meaning of the concept of Urstiftung is rooted in the legal notion of Stiftung, which implies the idea of an active and legal institution of sense based on certain motivations which pursue a specific aim established at the very moment of this institution. I will conclude with the idea that despite its (passive) motivations, the Urstiftung implies an active commitment that constantly has to be renewed through Nachstiftungen, and in this way one can see both its teleological guiding force as well as the inner fragility embedded in every institution of sense.
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Notes
- 1.
As a matter of fact, it is a concept which is very difficult to translate, due to its actual and original meaning in German, as it will be shown in the first section. In English, French and Spanish one can find different possible translations (cf. Cairns 1973, pp. 119, 108). It might be translated into English as ‘primal-institution’, ‘primal-foundation’ or even as ‘primal-endowment’ depending on the connotation the translator wants to give to this word and also on the context. Considering this background, I will keep the German concept untranslated (and all concepts related to it, such as ‘Nachstiftung’, ‘Neustiftung’, etc.); only occasionally I will translate it depending on the context at issue.
- 2.
Although in the English speaking world it is usual to translate the German word ‘Ich’ by ‘ego’, I believe there are important phenomenological reasons for distinguishing between the ‘I’ and the ‘ego’, mainly because Husserl himself used both concepts, namely ‘das Ich’ and ‘das Ego’ with different meanings. When referred to its technical sense as a noun, i.e. not as personal pronoun, I will use the single quotation marks ‘I’. See Niel (2010).
- 3.
It is not the purpose of this paper to present all textual references where Husserl makes an explicit use of this concept. I will rather select some of the texts I consider to be essential for explaining its meaning.
- 4.
In this context, it shall first be distinguished between different German concepts that could be translated as ‘foundation’, such as Fundierung, Begründung and Stiftung: (1) Fundierung (and related to it the active participle fundierend) means ‘foundation’ in a constitutive sense, i.e., a ‘priority’ in the order of validity (Geltung); thus, the most basic constituting level is said to provide a ‘foundation’ for all higher levels of constitution. (2). Begründung means ‘foundation’ as the act of giving some ground or reason for something. (3) The concept of Stiftung will be closely analyzed in what follows. When Husserl uses the prefix Ur- he usually refers to the first concept mentioned above, occasionally also to the second one; in any case, it implies the dimension opened by the epoché.
- 5.
The ‘primal-phenomenon’ (Urphänomen), he says, is “the primal-ground of all validities (Urboden aller Geltungen)” (Hua XXXIV, p. 299).
- 6.
- 7.
“Die Stiftung ist eine mit juristischer Persönlichkeit ausgestattete Vermögensmasse zur Verwirklichung des vom Stifter bestimmten Zwecks” (Brox 2009, p. 332).
- 8.
Adelung (1793–1801, pp. 375–376).
- 9.
It should be pointed out that according to Husserl it is indeed through the phenomenological genetic and regressive method that it is eventually possible to come back to the original Urstiftungen (see Hua Mat VIII, 43). As Husserl says, the genetic approach is a “regressive inquiry (Rückfrage), into the primally-instituting genesis of every apperception” (Hua Mat VIII, 223); in other words, a “regressive and seeing grasping (rückschauende Erfassung) and the regressive transfer of the already formed apperceptions” (Hua Mat VIII, 223). This means that when I look back into my past experience this can only be done out of the present apperceptions. That is for instance the case when I bring a melody back to the present through recollection: the tones I heard that very first time (primal-institution) are in my present ‘affectively there’ and they can only be actively brought to the present through my memory (see Hua Mat VIII, 280). This implies that, methodically speaking, the way to get into the genetic first primal-institutions that made up my experience is by ‘reconstructing’ and ‘identifying’ the former formations of sense that made possible my present apperceptions (see Hua Mat VIII, 223). In this regard, Husserl is convinced that through the reflective attitude (i.e., through the phenomenological method) it is possible to identify (identifizieren) and come back (zurückkommen) to the former Urstiftungen (see Hua Mat VIII, 361). Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty points out that the way to come back to the Urstiftung is by ‘self-reflection’ (Selbstbesinnung) (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1996, p. 77).
- 10.
Even when Husserl takes into account the most basic associations in the context of the constitution of time accomplished in the ‘primal-process’ (Urprozess) or ‘primal-stream’ (Urstrom), he also speaks of the “Primal-institution of the ‘fusion’ (Verschmelzung) as a unity-formation (Einheitsbildung) in the staying primal-now (im stehenden Urjetzt)” (cf. Hua Mat VIII, 87). The constitution of the past, as the “primally-instituting intentional modification of the present” (Hua Mat VIII, 131), follows the same logic: the Urstiftung is the ‘inaugurating moment’ as a modification of the present into past ‘for the first time’.
- 11.
Of course, these ‘influences’ of the past on the present must be understood as the result of passive syntheses and not (always) as an active awareness, i.e. when I see a new house I do not necessarily (actively) remember the first house I have ever seen in my life.
- 12.
This can also be seen in the frame of the constitution of intersubjective experience: the ‘analogizing apprehension’—the core of Husserl’s explanation of intersubjectivity in the Cartesian Meditations—as the analogizing seeing ‘for the first time’ of another body (Körper) as similar to my lived-body (Leib), is founded on “the first peculiarity of the experience of something other (Fremderfahrung)”, and this is an “enduring Urstiftung in its living actuality” (Hua I, 142). From that moment on, I passively institute the sense that configures the way I start to experience others as other living-bodies.
- 13.
It should be kept in mind that we are discussing research manuscripts and not published texts especially prepared for an edition.
- 14.
When Husserl wants to stress the absolute newness of something given by an actual ‘instituting’ act that happens for the first time (erstmalig) and that does not refer to any other Vorstiftung, he speaks—unfortunately, not unambiguously—about Ur-Urstiftung (Hua XXXIX, 2 n.2), i.e. ‘primal-primal-institution’, which might refer to the very first inauguration of an apperception-type for the first time (cf. Hua XXXIX, 3). As Ur-Urstiftung this act institutes and inaugurates a validity that transcends the concreteness of the singular ephemeral act (cf. Hua XXXIX, 47).
- 15.
In the Second Part of First Philosophy, Husserl addresses the changes of validities in the context of his analyses of the concept of ‘horizon’ (cf. Hua VIII, 149–150).
- 16.
It is a text attached to the manuscript of the lecture Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnistheorie given in Göttingen in 1909 (see Hua Mat VII).
- 17.
- 18.
In Ideas I (1913), Husserl had already defined the basic phenomenological principle of intuition, namely the ‘principle of all principles’, using a clear legal language: “No conceivable theory can leads us to mistakes [if we take into account] the principle of all principles: that every originary giving intuition is a legitimating source (Rechtsquelle [literal translation: ‘source of right’]) of knowledge, that everything offered to us originarily in an ‘intuition’ (so to speak, in its corporeal actuality), has to be accepted simply as that which is given, but also only within the limits in which it is given” (Hua III/1, 51; my emphasis). In the end, an authentic ‘legitimation’ can only be given through intuition (Anschauung, Intuition).
- 19.
As Husserl remarks, ethics is “the science of the whole acting life of a rational subjectivity under the perspective of reason that rules in a unitary way this whole life” (Hua XXVII, 21). Husserl’s conception of ethics and of an ethical life is most certainly worthy of further examination, albeit beyond the scope of the present study.
- 20.
Unfortunately, we cannot attempt a detailed account of this issue of the calling here (see “Teleologie in der Philosophiegeschichte”, in Hua XXIX).
- 21.
One must be careful with the meaning of this notion and others related to it. ‘Europe’, as Husserl emphatically points out, shall not be identified with the geographical concept of ‘Europe’ as a continent, since for him ‘Europe’ first and foremost refers to an ideal that was born indeed in the geographical Europe (although in this sense it should also be considered the geographical Asia if we take into consideration, for example, the Milesian philosophers), but that is not restrained to it. In any case, it is clear that for Husserl the ideal of Europe does not amount to the geographical Europe. ‘Europe’ is the ideal of absolute reason (as the ultimate tribunal for history and ourselves); this ideal shall be understood in teleological terms, i.e., as the historical development of ‘science’, though not as a particular science, but rather as the absolute system of knowledge founded upon phenomenology.
- 22.
As we have seen in Section 8.5 the idea of a ‘renewal’ is essential for the continuity of sense along history.
- 23.
This is mainly due to Descartes’ confusion between the transcendental ego and the soul (res cogitans): “The whole achievement, the great discovery of this ego was obliterated through an absurd supposition: a pure soul makes no sense in the epoché, unless ‘soul’ is considered in the context of the epoché in brackets, i.e. as a mere phenomenon” (Hua VI, 82).
- 24.
For a more detailed account of Husserl’s interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy see especially Hua VI, §§ 16–21.
- 25.
Regarding this issue, there is an interesting connection with some of Jacques Derrida ’s reflections on the instituting character of a signature. He asserts that there is necessary ‘undecidability’ in the very institution established through the signature (in this case, of the Declaration of Independence), since it implies, at the same time, a constative structure (of something ‘pre-given’) and a performative structure (the act of instituting). Unfortunately we cannot address this issue here (cf. Derrida 1984, pp. 20ff.).
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Niel, L. (2017). Husserl’s Concept of Urstiftung: From Passivity to History. In: Walton, R., Taguchi, S., Rubio, R. (eds) Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Phaenomenologica, vol 222. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55340-5_8
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