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Horizonality and Legitimation in Perception, Affectivity, and Volition

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Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology

Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 222))

Abstract

Husserl states that “the different types of reason interpenetrate themselves and constitute a unique reason with essential sides” (Hua XXVIII, 228). In this chapter, the author attempts to show how this uniqueness appears in different levels of reason and in the threefold dimension of subjective life. The chapter starts with an analysis of the supporting roots of reason. A primal hyle, a primal feeling, and primal kinestheses—the basis of perception, affectivity, and volition—converge in a primal horizon in which the mother soil of reason is to be found. A play of intention and fulfillment, the adjustment to standards, and teleological processes, can be discerned in a hidden reason that is tied to instincts. On the breakdown of instinct, a natural reason asserts itself by holding itself to standards represented by average achievement. In turn, philosophical reason is tied to the introduction of a priori norms, and operates through similar processes in the realms of perception, affectivity, and volition. First, a distinction of empty intentions and their fulfillment, along with processes of modalization, can be shown within the framework outlined by horizons. Analogous stages regarding the establishment of meaning and the attainment of truth are common both to theoretical and practical reason. Second, an a priori regulation through standards afforded by essences and values can also be shown. The three spheres are subject to norms that regulate the fulfillment of empty intentions. Finally, the progress of knowledge has its parallel in an open axiological linkage that attempts to attain the best possible value at each stage of an approach to infinite ideas.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    When reference is not made to an English version, all translations are the author’s. When both the original text in German and the English translation are consulted, the page number of the English translation will follow a semi-colon and the page number of the German.

  2. 2.

    “Das Erste der Weltkonstitution in der Primordialität ist die Konstitution der ‘Natur’ aus der hyletischen Urnatur, oder vielmehr aus dem dreifachen Urmaterial: sinnlicher Kern, sinnliches Gefühl, sinnliche Kinästhese. Dem entspricht der ‘Urinstinkt’” (Ms B III 9, 67a). I wish to thank the Husserl Archives in Leuven for permission to quote from Husserl’s unpublished writings.

  3. 3.

    „Im voraktiven Leben, das als Schicht durch alles Aktive hindurchgeht: eben (1) die Hyle, (2) die aber ist, was sie ist, als affizierende, als das ‚Gemüt‘, das Fühlen bestimmend [das fühlende Hingezogen-sein (positives Begehren) oder Abgestoßen-sein] und (3) das vorichliche Tun. – Hier die Kinästhese im Drama der Ontifikation; bis hinauf zur Objektivierung (Verweltlichung) spielen diese Momente beständig ihre Rolle, oder vielmehr, sie erhalten immer neue, höhere Rollen, sie bekommen immer höhere Funktionsgestalten.“ (Ms B III 9, 79b, my emphasis) See Hua XV, 385f., 604.

  4. 4.

    With reference to this text, Sebastian Luft observes that “a universal transparence of the Ego regarding its own self makes clear to it the fundamental synonymy of subjectivity and reason, provided that ‘reason’ is understood to be not simply pure reason, but all of the capacities of consciousness subject to describable rules” (2011, 94).

  5. 5.

    On the unity of reason and this universal structure of rationality as a pattern that can be disclosed in various levels of analysis, see J. N. Mohanty (2011, 290, 296–299).

  6. 6.

    With regard to the “subject of theoretical, axiological, and practical reason,” it is necessary to inquire into “the most general principles of this reason, the essential laws that regulate its behavior, not in fact but rather with necessity, if the subject is to come to the intellective certainty of itself as a subject that proceeds rationally, and attains truth, beauty, and practical good” (Hua XLI, 319).

  7. 7.

    “The same is valid in the sphere of feeling, only that this sphere has not been so exhaustively investigated, and whose logic of feeling as analogous to the logic of judgment—or, in our language, whose formal axiology—is not yet grounded or at least only now is emerging in connection with phenomenology” (Hua XXXVII, 227).

  8. 8.

    For a detailed account, see Drummond (1995) and Drummond (2002, 32 ff.).

  9. 9.

    In contradistinction to a type and an essence, an idea does not exhibit itself in horizons, but rather “indicates the vanishing point (Fluchtpunkt) of the horizonal references” (Sepp 1997, 266).

  10. 10.

    On the significance of the theoretical side, Husserl writes: “It belongs to the essential sense of all reason that, in an indispensably wide sense, it is a cognitive reason. It is a meditation, responsible from end to end, on what is true or false” (Hua VI, 430).

  11. 11.

    “Alles Leben ist unaufhörliches Streben, alle Befriedigung ist Durchgangsbefriedigung. Bloße Empfindungsdaten und in höherer Stufe sinnliche Gegenstände, wie Dinge, die für das Subjekt da sind, aber ‘wertfrei’ da sind, sind Abstraktionen. Es kann nichts geben, was nicht das Gemüt berührt, und das Gleichgültige ist nun ein Zwischenstadium zwischen Lust und Unlust […]” (Ms A VI 26, 42a). James R. Mensch makes the following comment on given things: “Insofar as their original givenness is correlated to our instinctive striving, value is co-given with their initial presence” (2010, 228).

  12. 12.

    “Theoretische Vernunft ist Theorie von praktischer Vernunft und ist selbst Komponent der aktuellen praktischen Vernunft” (Ms E III 7, 8b). Steven Crowell observes that “the relation between reason and will takes a significant turn. For if perceiving, feeling, and willing each has its own normative telos, they are nevertheless unified practically […]” (2012, 262).

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Walton, R. (2017). Horizonality and Legitimation in Perception, Affectivity, and Volition. In: Walton, R., Taguchi, S., Rubio, R. (eds) Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Phaenomenologica, vol 222. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55340-5_1

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