Exaptation of Institutes of Development and Formation of Institutional Traps in the Russian Labor Market

  • Marina A. KatkovaEmail author
  • Nalalia V. Mityaeva
  • Irina N. Pchelintseva
  • Larisa V. Sankova
  • Elena V. Yanchenko
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


The article analyzes one of the methods of institutional effectiveness increase—creation of development institutes. The authors’ classification of development institutes is prepared: according to the level of creation and realization and potential functions. Problems of their formation, development, and functioning are determined. The hypothesis of exaptation of development institutes is offered and proved—it supposes that institutes of development perform new functions or lose (partially or fully) their primary functions. The idea of direct dependence between depth and width of forms of exaptation manifestation and level of conservatism of formal and information institutes, as well as character of institutional changes, is offered. The forms of exaptation manifestation are distinguished: institutional and organizational and technical. A completely new approach to activation of the role of development institutes in economy is developed, based on the following principles: target orientation, integrity, flexibility, partnership, riskiness, and efficiency. The fact of emergence and strengthening of exaptation of the institutes is analyzed by the example of the Russian labor market. It is proved that exaptation of institutes is expressed in emergence of institutional traps in the labor market: traps of organization and labor payment, traps of management rules, and traps of protection of rights and negotiation rules.


Institutional structure Institutional forms Transaction and transformation costs Institutes of development Exaptation of institutes Labor market Institutional traps 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marina A. Katkova
    • 1
    Email author
  • Nalalia V. Mityaeva
    • 2
  • Irina N. Pchelintseva
    • 1
  • Larisa V. Sankova
    • 1
  • Elena V. Yanchenko
    • 1
  1. 1.Yuri Gagarin State Technical University of SaratovSaratovRussia
  2. 2.Plekhanov Russian University of EconomicsMoscowRussia

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