Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between the Constitutional Courts and ordinary Courts in countries where both systems exist. The analysis is constructed on the basis of the Constitutional Courts of France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain and its relationship with ordinary Courts. This paper contributes to determine the necessary factors for peaceful coexistence between Constitutional Courts and ordinary Courts.
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Notes
- 1.
montesquieu, Del Espíritu de las Leyes, Edit. Altaya, Barcelona, 1996.
- 2.
Véase loewenstein, karl, Teoría de la Constitución, Edit. Ariel, Barcelona, 1979.
- 3.
schmitt, carl, La defensa de la Constitución, Edit. Labor, Barcelona, España, 1931.
- 4.
cappelletti, mauro, La jurisdicción constitucional de la libertad, con referencia a los ordenamientos alemán, suizo y austriaco, trad. Héctor Fix Zamudio, Edit. Imprenta Universitaria, México, 1961, pp. 140–141.
- 5.
ídem, p. 141.
- 6.
nogueira alcalá, humberto, “Tópicos sobre jurisdicción constitucional y Tribunales constitucionales”, en Revista de Derecho, Vol. 14, 2003, p. 45.
- 7.
cappelletti, mauro “¿Renegar de Montesquieu, la expansión y la legitimidad de la justicia constitucional?”, en Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Nº 17, pp. 12–13, 1986.
- 8.
Cfr. schmitt, carl, ob. cit.
- 9.
nogueira alcalá, h., “Tópicos sobre jurisdicción constitucional …”, ob. cit. p. 45.
- 10.
fix zamudio, héctor, “La Constitución y su defensa”, en Coloquio Internacional, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. Universidad Autónoma de México, agosto de 1982.
- 11.
garcía pelayo, manuel, “Estado Legal y Estado Constitucional de Derecho”, en El Tribunal de Garantías de Debate. Consejo Latinoamericano de Derecho y Desarrollo. Fundación Friedrich Naumann, Perú, 1982, p. 23.
- 12.
rubio llorente, francisco, “Seis tesis sobre jurisdicción constitucional en Europa”, en Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional Nº 35, 1992, p. 9 ss.
- 13.
nogueira alcalá, h., “Tópicos sobre jurisdicción constitucional…”, ob. cit. p. 46.
- 14.
The declaration of unconstitutionality by omission must be set aside for Portugal, Venezuela and Brazil, where the Constitutional Court orders compliance with constitutional law. Aragón Reyes, Manuel, “La interpretación de la Constitución y el carácter objetivado del control jurisdiccional”, en Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional Nº 17, 1986, pp. 89 ss.
- 15.
Traditionally, constitutional justice is understood as a formal concept. During much of the twentieth century, this was ‘concentrated constitutional justice’, designed, more or less, according to the Kelsen model of the 20s, originally embodied in Czech and especially in Austrian constitutions, and therefore residing in an ad hoc body, in contrast to other constitutional law models such as the diffuse North American judicial review models, sanctioned by judge Marshall since the Marbury v. Madison case in 1803, preceding from state law constitutional controls. Pérez Tremps, Pablo, “La justicia constitucional en la actualidad. Especial referencia a América Latina”, en Revista Justicia de Paz del Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura, AÑO 6 Nº 15, Vol. 1, 2003, p. 2.
- 16.
corzo sosa, edgar, “Relaciones entre el Tribunal Constitucional y el Poder Judicial en España”, en Revista Jurídica. Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, N° 78, 1993, p. 864.
- 17.
aragón reyes, nanuel, “Relaciones entre Tribunal Constitucional y Tribunal Supremo”, en Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Procesal Constitucional, N° 8, 2007, pp. 31 ss.
- 18.
bordalí salamanca, andrés, “La Justicia Constitucional”, en Revista de Derecho Valdivia, Vol. XIV, 2003, p. 285.
- 19.
On constitutional justice, see, among others, mezzetti, luca, “Sistemas y modelos de justicia constitucional a los albores del siglo XXI”, en Estudios Constitucionales, AÑO 7, Nº 2, 2009. P. 281 ss.; bordalí salamanca, a., ob. cit.; capelletti, mauro, “La justicia constitucional en Italia”, en Revista de la Facultad de Derecho, t. X, Nºs 37, 38, 39 y 40, México, 1960; cartabia, marta, “El diálogo entre tribunales a la hora del activismo constitucional del Tribunal de Justicia”, en Revista Española de Derecho Europeo, Nº 22, 2007; cea egaña, josé luis, “La justicia Constitucional en las Facultades de derecho chilenas”, en Revista de Derecho, Vol. XII, Chile, 2001; Del mismo autor “Misión cautelar de la justicia constitucional”, en Revista Chilena de Derecho, Tomo I, Vol. XX, Nº 2–3, 1993, Santiago de Chile; “La justicia constitucional y el Tribunal de la Constitución en Chile”, en Revista de Derecho, Vol. XX, Concepción, Chile, 2001; celotto, alfonso, “Evolución de la justicia constitucional en Italia”, en Urbe et Ius. Revista de opinión jurídica, Nº 5, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2006.
- 20.
See silva irarrázaval, luis alejandro, “¿Es el Tribunal Constitucional el supremo interprete de la Constitución?, en Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, N° 38, 2012, p. 573 ss. For opposite oppinions, see, among others aragón reyes, m., “Relaciones entre Tribunal Constitucional …”. cit. p. 31.
- 21.
de stefano, juan sebastián, “El control de constitucionalidad”, en Urbe et Ius. Revista de opinión jurídica, AÑO 1, Nº 7, 2005, p. 1.
- 22.
The control is carried out directly or indirectly by the Legislative or Executive Power.
- 23.
In this case attribution rests with the courts.
- 24.
Controls for constitutional issues are exercised by specialized courts, which may or may not belong to the judiciary branch.
- 25.
Here, control is generally given to the judiciary branch, regardless of venue or jurisdiction.
- 26.
Cfr. fix-zamudio, héctor, “La aportación de Piero Calamandrei al derecho procesal constitucional”, en Revista de la Facultad de México, Nº 24, 1956, p. 196.
- 27.
Sentencing in Spanish can be seen in Revista Mexicana de Derecho Público, Nº 3, 1947, p. 315 ss.
- 28.
See, among others, rubio llorente, francisco, “Sobre la relación entre Tribunal Constitucional y Poder Judicial en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional”, en Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, N° 4, Madrid, 1982, pp. 42–43.
- 29.
Cfr. cappelleti, mauro, Il controllo giudiziario di constituzionalita delle leggi nel dritto comparado, Milán, Dott. A. Giufré, 1979, p. 51.
- 30.
- 31.
According to Fix Zamudio under Mexican refuge. fix-zamudio, héctor, “El derecho de amparo en México y en España, su influencia recíproca”, en Revista de Estudios Políticos, N° 7, Madrid, 1979, pp. 245–248. Cfr. rubio llorente, f., “Sobre la relación entre …”, cit., pp. 61–62.
- 32.
According to the Portuguese Constitution of 1982, Article 204, examination of unconstitutionality corresponds to ordinary courts, to indicate that “In matters brought to trial, courts can not apply standards that contravene the Constitution or the principles enshrined therein.” In the case of Spain, this situation arises due to contradictions that may exist between the basic State legislation and autonomous region law, which could regulate other side matters, such as execution. An alternative is a state law and a regional law, which under certain conditions, only one would be applied.
- 33.
blasi, gastón federico, “Corte Constitucional Italiana”, en Revista de investigación en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales: Ley, razón y justicia, Vol. 6, Nº 9, 2005, p. 5.
- 34.
margiotta broglio, costanza, “La Corte Constituzionale Italiana e Il Modello Kelseniano”, en Quaderni Costituzionali, Vol. 20 Nº 2, 2000, p. 338.
- 35.
Cfr. Comisión para estudios sobre Reorganización del Estado, Asamblea Constituyente, Problemas Constitucionales - Organización del Estado, Vol. 1, Roma, 1956, pp. 51–66.
- 36.
martínez, temistocles, Diritto Costituzionale, Milano, Giuffre, 1997, p. 583.
- 37.
The Court deliberates in the Council Chamber with judges present at all trial hearings which are adopted by the absolute voter majority. In case of a tie, the President makes the final decision.
- 38.
The Constitutional Act No. 1 of February 9, 1948 excluded appeals to the Constitutional Court by those who denounce legal violations because they consider a law to be constitutionally illegitimate or by a public body with similar complaints. Appeals are only admitted if constitutional legitimacy controversy arises between the State and Regions or solely between Regions.
- 39.
Along the same lines, see groppi, tania, “¿Hacia una justicia constitucional dúctil? Tendencias recientes de las relaciones entre la Corte Constitucional y los jueces en la experiencia italiana”, trad. Miguel Carbonell, en Cuadernos Const. de la Cátedra Fadrique Furió, Nº 38–39, Valencia 2002, p. 69 ss.
- 40.
The Judge is the keeper of the Constitutional Court, in a system devoid of direct action for citizens, such as the system in Italy. Calamandrei, Piero, La inconstitucionalidad de las leyes en el proceso civil, CEDAM, Padua, 1950, p. 12.
- 41.
In cases where there is an absence of applicable norms to these sub lite cases, with constitutionality in question, the Court does not declare the a case is unconstitutional, even with principles to support such declaration. The Court invites the judge to find the principle in the constitutional system himself. Italian Constitutional Court case No. 347/1998. Thus, in case No. 347 of 1998, the Constitutional Court denied the possibility of applying standards for the lack of good parenting due to adultery, but, contrary to original indications, rejected an additional sentence. Before the lacking legislative branch, the Court invited the judge to look at the complex legal system and find ideal balance between the various constitutional goods involved. Along the same lines, in case No. 11 of 1998, the Court asked the judge that ¨through the full exercise of legal interpretation and in accordance with the Constitution, to resolve the problem posed by the cited normative gap." The Court recognizes unconstitutional situations, and asks the judge to identify the legal solutions to the problem in order to avoid contested provisionary consequences. Judgments can be seen in case Nºs 349/1998; 283/1999; 436/1999 and 450/1998.
- 42.
The ordinary court judge, in addition to verifying the general proposals that question constitutionality, mandated by the proper Constitutional Court, has an obligation to try to find an interpretation of constitutionality, the possibility of a proper interpretation, that is to say, more in accordance with the Constitution, thus resolving constitutionality doubts.
- 43.
In this respect, the Court ruled, stating that “(…) judges cannot decide on the constitutionality of a law, asserting an interpretation of one law with respect to another.” See, among others, Constitutional Italian Court case No. 101, 266, 405 and 436/1996; 258 and 360/1997; 280/1998.
- 44.
Common judges not only play an important role in the ascending phase in which the constitutional question arises, but also in the downturn, not only in the implementation of court decisions, but also the Constitution. The Court has called them to directly exercise control over law constitutionality, with the only limit being to directly disengage unconstitutional law. This is without resorting to GROPPI, T., op. cit. p. 82 ss.
- 45.
According to Constitutional Court jurisprudence, judges must use their interpretive powers to assess if it is possible to remove constitutionality doubts under a proper interpretation of regulatory requirements that are consistent with constitutional principles. “(…) law is unconstitutional not because it is possible to give an unconstitutional interpretation, but because it is impossible to give it a constitutional interpretation.” Italian Constitutional Court case No. 350/1997.
- 46.
Among the possible interpretations, ordinary judges should decide on one that is more conclusive with constitutional principles, thus avoiding objections. See among others, Italian Constitutional Court case Nºs 31, 44, 364, 389, 421 y 436/1996; 290, 299, 350, 354 y 361/1997; 7,39 y 147/1998.
- 47.
Italian Constitutional court case No. 426/1996—134 y 187/1998.
- 48.
romboli, roberto, “El control de constitucionalidad de las leyes en Italia”, trad. Enrique Expósito Gómez Universidad de Barcelona, en Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, UNED, Nº 4, 1999, p. 182.
- 49.
The ordinary judge plays a decisive role in the interpretation and direct application of the Constitution. In this regard, I share the words of Professor Roberto Romboli, “(…) The Court has rejected, in the absence of living law, the possibility of submitting a simple interpretative doubt or contest to a particular provisionary interpretation that is not shared. Legal interpretation is a question of ordinary court jurisdiction, oblivious to constitutionality, which, on the contrary, is aimed at eliminating legal flaws and not promoting uncertainty regarding applicability” Romboli, R., ob. cit. p. 182.
- 50.
Italian Constitutional Court Case Nº 237/1997.
- 51.
“The Weimar Constitutional Court was very active and contributed to adjusting conflicts of illegal cover-ups of a political nature.” LOEWEINSTEIN, KARL, Teoría de la Constitución, trad. Alfredo Gallego Anabitarte, 2ª edic., Edit. Ariel, España, 1969, p. 322.
- 52.
Under this system, a constitutional complaint is brought before the Federal Constitutional Court by citizens for fundamental rights violations by public authorities. This approach involves a high percentage of German Constitutional Court resources. For a deeper amparo analysis before Federal Constitutional Courts, see Haberle, Peter, “El Recurso de Amparo en el Sistema Germano – Federal de Jurisdicción Constitucional”, en D. García Belaunde y F. Fernández Segado (Coords.), La Jurisdicción Constitucional Iberoamericana, p. 231 ss.
- 53.
The organization of the German judicial system is linked to the hierarchical model, both vertically and horizontally. Vertically for each subject it is distinguished by a trial judge, a court of appeals and a supreme court. Horizontally, in terms of powers, the judicial structure consists of ordinary courts, whether civil or criminal, administrative, finance, labor, and social security courts. Only Federal Courts are supreme, their respective decisions dealing with facts and law and having significant authority over other judges; however, it has not embraced the idea of precedent jurisprudence. Magnotta, María Rita, “La Organización del Poder Judicial y las relaciones entre jueces Ordinarios y Tribunal Constitucional en los Estados Miembros de la Unión Europea”, trad. Francisco Javier Duran Ruiz, en Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, N° 17, 2012, p. 261 ss.
- 54.
In relation to other judges, it must be remembered that the five Federal Supreme Courts pursue a common goal, namely, jurisdictional unity. In order to respect this unity on key issues of public interest, the existence of a team of Constitutional court judges is designed for preliminary rulings and appeals, in a different sense, on the same issue.
- 55.
Fundamental Law Article 100.
- 56.
The constitutional history of the Fundamental Law is, in large part, a history of fundamental rights, and the German Federal Constitutional Court has always found new areas for fundamental rights as to refine fundamental rights ideas. Without the possibilities offered by the “constitutinal complaint”, constitutional protection would hardly lead to a productive dialogue-recognized by other European countries—including fundamental rights sciences and practice of these by German Federal Constitutional Courts. Alemán. Haberle, P., ob. cit. p. 256.
- 57.
Fundamental Law article 93 Nº 1.4 a y 19.3.
- 58.
haberle, p., ob. cit. pp. 251–252.
- 59.
In France, constitutionality of bills, international treaties, parliamentary rules and certain issues concerning the operation of public authorities corresponds to the Constitutional Council. Considering the nature of judicial decisions and the procedure used to arrive at this decision, the French system is generally characterized by having objective and abstract proceedings. Mezzetti, L., ob. cit., pp. 288–289.
- 60.
It should be noted that, unlike many countries, in the French system, no judicial review is performed by a body that is located at the apex of the judicial system. In addition, the constitutionality of laws is evaluated before they come into force, except in the case of the new Article, 61.1, of the Constitution. Therefore, in judicial evaluation, conflicts arising between ordinary courts and the Constitutional Council (the apex Supreme Court of Cassation and administrative judges, where the State Council occupies a prevalent position) are analyzed. Currently the constitutional control model has undergone substantial changes after the constitutional reform of 2008. The main characteristic of the new French model, which distinguishes it from other European constitutional justice models, is that it is only take precedence over those laws that violate rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. In the words of Pierre Bon, constitutional priority issues are not a technique that ensures Constitutional supremacy as a whole, but only a technique for protecting the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the French Constitution. This model implies that the theory of law screen disappears for everything that concerns fundamental rights protection and remains for other reasons which is no minor issue. Bon, Pierre “La justicia constitucional en Francia”, Conferencia dictada ante el Tribunal Constitucional Chileno, 10 de diciembre de 2012.
- 61.
ídem.
- 62.
Following Pierre Bon are four dates that mark the history of constitutional justice in France. 1958 with the creation of the Constitutional Council in Title VII of the Constitution of the V Republic. 1971 with the incorporation of fundamental rights within the constitutional corpus. 1974 with the extension of persons entitled to submit an abstract control case. Originally the only people authorized to request the Constitutional Council were the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly and the Senate President. For fifteen years, from 1959 to 1974, there were only seven requests by the Prime Minister and three by the Senate president. The reform enabled sixty congressmen or sixty senators to make requests. Also, for a period of fifteen years, 1975–1990, there were 166 requests. 2008 with the implementation of a concrete control by virtue of priority constitutional issues. However, only after the constitutional reform of July 23, 2008 could it be said that constitutional justice exists in France, with a real Constitutional Court that ensures Constitutional supremacy. idem.
- 63.
“(…) France has suffered, since 1789, great constitutional instability that has only been compensated by the existence of a professional civil service that has kept state observation above seizures occurring at the apex of the legal system, in government and for Head of state. French instability has been explained in many ways, but what is clear is that constitutions from the revolutionary period in a strict sense, the Napoleonic, monarchical and republican, came and went. Some of them have had great significance and not only in the history of constitutional law. In this regard, it should be noted that: a. the Constitution came into effect on September 3, 1791, led by the Declaration of Human rights in 1789. b. In 1793 a constitution was approved but because of war it did not take effect, it later went on to become the classic example of conventional constitutionalism assembly (or, if you will, ultra-democrátic). c. Year III Constitution or directorial, marked by conservatism and excessive preoccupation with principles of division of power, also coins a model that will become a classic form of government for a considerable part of the doctrine”. Cfr.Tenorio SÁnchez, Pedro J., Introducción al Derecho Constitucional Comparado, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1998, p. 95.
- 64.
In France, judicial review is primarily abstract anda priori, and only after the constitutional reform of 2008 does it gain concrete control a posteriori.
- 65.
tenorio sÁnchez, pedro j., ob. cit., p. 107.
- 66.
The French judiciary has a temporal origin that dates back in history. The division of the Republic s in the first few years begins between administrative officials and the judiciary which later joins the top two institutions, which up to date are represented by the Supreme Court and the State Council, which in 1872 added a Tribunal court to settle conflicts, in order to settle disputes between ordinary and special judges.
- 67.
Constitutional Council jurisprudence has given constitutional status to principles of independence from administrative courts, from the time that the Council had concluded that neither Government nor legislators can censor their sentences, give indications or replace processes. Litigation judges constitute a separate order. Despite reforms, their status does not seem to coincide with ordinary courts, being more tied to the executive branch. Despite the creation of the Administrative Supreme Court Council and the Courts of Appeals in 1987. However, it is the State Council that by tradition and authority plays a more important role, both in jurisdiction and in advisory activity for the Government. However not having been established the principle of tenure for administrative judges, the French State Council shows a high degree of government autonomy.
- 68.
Determination of whether norms are Constitutional or not, because of how they affect rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Supreme Law of the land, acts as a true constitutional judge. Therefore, ordinary judges, the State Council and the Court of Cassation are bodies authorized to carry out constitutionality control processes. However, they cannot declare laws unconstitutional, since that is a sole and exclusive authority of the Constitutional Council.
- 69.
With regard to these rights, and regarding priority issues, coexistence between the two judiciaries can be seen as interaction between them. As with other control systems, such as Spain, Italy and Germany, this coexistence is anything but peaceful, rather it is controversial. While the constitutional reform of 2008 established a double filter for the priority issue of constitutionality (the pending judge, the State Council and the Court of Cassation), the two supreme ordinary judges could develop their own constitutional interpretation, which will not necessarily be in line with that of the Constitutional Council. This could certainly lead to tensions between ordinary courts and the constitutional judiciary. There would have to be a lot of vigilance regarding the jurisprudence on the subject, both by the State Council and the Court of Cassation, and of course to that established by the constitutional judiciary in the hands of the Constitutional Council, regarding priority constitutionality issues.
- 70.
However, the historical origin of the Constitutional Court dates back seventy years. Indeed, with the passage of constitutional monarchy to a republic, the principle of judicial review was for the first time in Portuguese Constitutional law established in Article 63 of the 1911 Constitution, which in effect stated: “The Judicial Branch, in the event that with motives and facts submitted to a case, any of the parties challenge the validity of laws, or diplomas issued by the executive branch or corporations with public authority, which have been invoked, will appreciate constitutional legitimacy according to the Constitution and principles set forth in it.”
- 71.
As an antecedent to the Constitutional Court is the Constitutional Commission. This was composed of jurists who elaborated mandatory reports to the Revolutionary Council in all matters relating to constitutional issues. It played an important role in ensuring control, concentrated on constitutional norms in Portugal.
- 72.
The reason why a Constitutional Court was introduced in Portugal coincides with the reason that determined the same option in Italy in the late 40s. This was a new constitution based on traditional democratic constitutionalism principles, but incorporating various different ideological contributions, with even more contrasts, by venture, than the contributions that led to the 1948 Italian Constitution. The Constitution imposed the need for a body that would guarantee compliance and enforcement of its laws and principles. Moreira Cardoso da Costa, José Manuel, “Tópicos sobre competencias e integración del Tribunal Constitucional de Portugal”, en Ius et Praxis, Vol. 8 Nº 1, 2002, p. 327.
- 73.
A mixed system was opted for, basically for two main reasons of a historical character. The diffuse oversight system had a history in Portugal, as opposed to what is habitual in southern European countries. Portugal was the first country in Europe to integrate the diffuse oversight system in 1911 with the first republican constitution, influenced by the Brazilian Constitution of 1891, which had been influenced in turn by the US. The second reason for not removing this responsibility from judges is due to the fact that ordinary judges should reject the application of unconstitutional law. Nunes de Almeida, Luis Manuel Cesar, “Los ámbitos y formas de Control Constitucional por el Tribunal Constitucional en Portugal”, en Ius et Praxis, Vol. 8 Nº 1, 2002, p. 334.
- 74.
rodríguez canotliho, mariana, “El Sistema Constitucional de Portugal”, en Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, AÑO 7; Nº 14, 2010, p. 122.
- 75.
The Portuguese constitutional doctrine, since its inception, has clearly distinguished between constitutional law and ordinary law, and the supremacy of the former over the latter. However, such a distinction and corresponding constitutional norm primacy were not always clear to the legal thinking of early nineteenth century Europeans along the constitutional line. However, Portuguese literature of the period showed awareness, which can be seen in constitutional monarchist texts themselves, in particular the Constitutional Charter of 1826, which was the base text in the mid-nineteenth century from which the Parliamentary Monarchy was structured. Moreira Cardoso da Costa, José Manuel, “El Tribunal Constitucional Portugués: Origen Histórico”, en Revista Estudios Políticos Nueva Época, Nºs 60–61, 1988, Centro Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, p. 832. pp. 831–840; Nunes de Almeida, L. M., ob. cit. pp. 333–336.
- 76.
See, among others, moreira cardoso da costa, j., “El Tribunal Constitucional…”, cit. pp. 831 ss. Del mismo autor; “Tópicos sobre competencia e integración del Tribunal Constitucional de Portugal”, en Ius et Praxis, Vol. 8 Nº 1, Talca, 2002. rodríguez canotliho, m., ob. cit.; nunes de almeida, luis, “El Tribunal Constitucional y el contenido, vinculatoriedad y efectos de sus decisiones”, en Revista de Estudios Políticos, Nueva Época, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Nºs 60–61, Madrid, 1988.
- 77.
ferreira da cunha, paulo, Direito Constitucional Anotado, Quid Juris Sociedad Editora, Lisboa, 2008, p. 447 ss.
- 78.
The case again returns to the Constitutional Court, since there is always the possibility of new appeals based on res judicata violations, given that the decision of the Court in constitutional matters produce res judicata effect.
- 79.
toniatti, roberto y magrassi, mattia, Magistratura, giurisdizione ed equilibri istituzionali. Dinamiche e Confronti Europei e Comparati, Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, 2011.
- 80.
ferreira da cunha, p., ob. cit. p. 521 ss.
- 81.
“(…) In the Portuguese system, the Constitutional Court appreciates the decisions taken by the ordinary courts concerning constitutionality issues. This can be explained because the institution of autonomous constitutional justice found that the principle of giving courts direct authority to matters related to the Constitution was sacred in Portuguese law, competing consequently and depriving them from setting new constitutionality standards and refusing the application of norms that deemed them unconstitutional. The creation of the Constitutional Court does not, break that tradition, but on the contrary, results in coronation”. Moreira Cardoso da Costa, J., “El Tribunal Constitucional…”, cit., p. 840.
- 82.
The appeal is decided by a Court Chamber, not by the House. Each room is composed of five judges. For this reason, decisions made in concrete control have inter partes effect and not erga omnes. However, if the Court declares a norm unconstitutional in three specific cases, the public prosecutor or representative thereof may request the Constitutional Court to declare the ruling unconstitutional, generally binding, with the erga omnes effect through an abstract control procedure and short called “generalization”. Thereupon, when a question of constitutionality is raised in front of an ordinary court, it is always possible, and in some cases it is mandatory that an appeal be made to the Constitutional Court. Nunes de Almeida, L. M., ob. cit. p. 335.
- 83.
In this regard, see, nunes de almeida, l. m., ob. cit.; rodríguez canotliho, m., ob. cit.; moreira cardoso da costa, j., ob. cit.
- 84.
nunes de almeida, l. m., ob. cit. p. 334.
- 85.
All judges, whether from primary courts, the court of appeals, Supreme Court, judiciary court or the administrative court, may reject unconstitutional rulings. However, the final say on constitutional judgment lies with the Constitutional Court. When the ordinary judge rejects the application of a legal standard based on its unconstitutionality, there is the possibility but also the obligation for the prosecution to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court. This will ultimately decide whether or not this norm should be applied to the case. If an appeal is raised by a party before the trial judge and the aforementioned judge applys the norm whose constitutionality is questioned, it can also be appealed to the Court. Ferreira Da Cunha, P., ob. cit. p. 525 ss.
- 86.
The appeal is decided by a Court Chamber, not by the House. Each room is composed of five judges. For this reason, decisions made in concrete control have an inter partes effect and not erga omnes. However, if the Court declares a norm unconstitutional in three specific cases, the public prosecutor or representative thereof may request that the Constitutional Court declare the ruling unconstitutional, generally binding, with the erga omnes effect through an abstract control procedure and short called “generalization”. Thereupon, when a question of constitutionality is raised in front of an ordinary court, it is always possible, and in some cases it is mandatory that an appeal be made to the Constitutional Court. Nunes de Almeida, L. M., ob. cit. p. 335.
- 87.
However, the American model does not consider invalidation of norms. The decisions of American judges have inter partes effects, but the decisions of the US Supreme Court, through the rule of stare decisis, is binding on all lower courts, maintaining norms declared unconstitutional and not expunging them from the legal system. It remains at a status quo until the precedent is changed.
- 88.
Along the same lines, see, among others, pereira menaut, antonio carlos, “A Constituicao como Direito: A supremacía das normas constitucionais em Espanha e nos EUA. Sobre a relacao entre o direito constitucional e o direito ordinario nas constituicioes americana e española”, en Boletín de la Facultad de Direito, Vol. 75, Coimbra, 1999, pp. 221 ss.; rubio llorente, f., “Sobre la relación entre…”, cit., p. 4.
- 89.
The doctrine, denominates the possibility that once amparo is realized, that the law in question be subject to judicial review by the same court.
- 90.
See santamaría pastor, juan alfonso, Fundamentos de derecho administrativo, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Areces, Madrid, 1988, pp. 592–599 y 616–625.
- 91.
Unconstitutionality causes a direct relationship between ordinary courts and the constitutional judiciary. In effect, according to Article 163 of the EC, when a court considers that the judgment of a case depends on the validity of a legal norm that may be contrary to the Constitution, then this issue should be raised before the Constitutional Court. In the words of TCE, it is all about an appropriate instrument for resolving the big dilemma for the judge when facing a law that must be applied under the same ruling and in contradiction of this law with the Constitution, this norm being superior both formally and materially. In the absence of this procedural instrument, the judge could easily not apply a certain law whose unconstitutionality comes in question, which would ultimately lead to legal uncertainty, since any judge or court under the pretext of complying with the Constitution could simply not apply laws. Spanish Constitutional Court ruling 17/81.
- 92.
rubio llorente, f., “Sobre la relación entre…”, cit., p. 58.
- 93.
Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial Español, artículo 5.3 “Procederá el planteamiento de la cuestión de inconstitucionalidad cuando por vía interpretativa no sea posible la acomodación de la norma al ordenamiento constitucional”.
- 94.
Spanish Constitutional Court ruling 19/88.
- 95.
Spanish Constitutional Court ruling 105/88.
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Campillay, E.A.G. (2017). Constitution and Judicial Review: Comparative Analysis. In: Arnold, R., Martínez-Estay, J. (eds) Rule of Law, Human Rights and Judicial Control of Power. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 61. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55186-9_1
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