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The Principal Agent Model and the European Union pp 35–54Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics ((PSEUP))

Abstract

This chapter explores the normative underpinnings of the principal–agent model. These are situated in Rousseau’s analysis of the representative democracy and Weber’s study of the bureaucracy. Whereas many of their arguments still maintain their value in present-day politics, the empirical reality in which these ideas developed has changed drastically. The rise of alternative forms of public contestation, and above all, the multi-level decision-making setting of the EU, begs the question for which contemporary debates the principal–agent model still holds moral sway. We argue that—while principal–agent analyses can benefit from an explicit normative debate—the model is too reductionist to provide conclusive answers to such debates.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Gijs Jan Brandsma

  2. Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Johan Adriaensen

Authors
  1. Gijs Jan Brandsma
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  2. Johan Adriaensen
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE), Universite catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Tom Delreux

  2. Centre for European Research in Maastricht, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Johan Adriaensen

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Brandsma, G.J., Adriaensen, J. (2017). The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy. In: Delreux, T., Adriaensen, J. (eds) The Principal Agent Model and the European Union. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_2

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