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Process-Tracing as a Tool to Analyse Discretion

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The Principal Agent Model and the European Union

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics ((PSEUP))

Abstract

Despite the decades of theorization, the causal processes in-between acts of delegation and agency discretion and autonomy are still not developed theoretically, with much ambiguity about how the model’s elements are causally connected. This chapter shows that process-tracing is a useful methodological tool for improving our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causal processes underlying the PA model. Process-tracing, as a case-study method, requires explicitly theorizing the causal mechanism that connects delegation to agency costs and forces the analyst to unpack the process empirically. The added-value of process-tracing is illustrated on the example of the Council Secretariat’s facilitating leadership in intergovernmental negotiations. It is claimed that process-tracing confronts the principal–agent model to closer logical scrutiny, ultimately leading to stronger causal claims and better theorization.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Yf Reykers

  2. University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark

    Derek Beach

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  1. Yf Reykers
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  2. Derek Beach
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE), Universite catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Tom Delreux

  2. Centre for European Research in Maastricht, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Johan Adriaensen

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Reykers, Y., Beach, D. (2017). Process-Tracing as a Tool to Analyse Discretion. In: Delreux, T., Adriaensen, J. (eds) The Principal Agent Model and the European Union. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_11

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