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Smart Markets for Water Quality, Sediment, and Impervious Cover

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Smart Markets for Water Resources

Part of the book series: Global Issues in Water Policy ((GLOB,volume 12))

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Abstract

This chapter discusses smart markets for water quality, sediment, and impervious cover. The market designs for these resources are similar to the design for a water quantity market. Implementers must work through prerequisites, including setting initial allocations, which may need to be subject to scaling of some kind for revenue neutrality. But the designs differ in important ways from the water market design. Briefly, users cannot precisely know and control their run-off or groundwater recharge quality; they can control only their use of the land. Thus, implementers must design the bid structure to allow users to buy and sell the right to change their land use, not to buy and sell the water resource impact.

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Raffensperger, J.F., Milke, M.W. (2017). Smart Markets for Water Quality, Sediment, and Impervious Cover. In: Smart Markets for Water Resources. Global Issues in Water Policy, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55008-4_12

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