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Epistemic Vices in Public Debate: The Case of ‘New Atheism’

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Abstract

Critics often complain that the ‘new atheists’ are arrogant, dogmatic, closed-minded and so on. Those terms denote ‘epistemic (or intellectual) vices’, or vices of the mind, so we can call those criticisms ‘vice charges’. Although they are very common, it is unclear whether they are merely rhetorical or whether they are substantive criticisms. The aim of this chapter is therefore to offer a framework for articulating and assessing these charges. I offer such a framework and consider two specific vices—arrogance and dogmatism—and ask, in each case, whether new atheists are vulnerable to a charge of vice. My conclusions are that: vice-charges are far more complex than critics appreciate; that critics can, at the least, say that certain new atheists may well be vulnerable to certain charges of epistemic vice; and that much more work needs to be done before one can charge new atheists with vices in a fair and robust way.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Battaly (2016) identifies a third position – ‘personalism’ – according to which a person can come to possess epistemic vices (and virtues) without their being responsible for doing so. If so, even if the New Atheists are epistemically vicious, they need not be responsible for being so – a consideration that those who deploy vice charges against them should carefully consider.

  2. 2.

    On the topic of ‘faith’ see Bishop (2010).

  3. 3.

    A classic defence of this claim is Feyerabend (1975).

  4. 4.

    The concept of phronesis is central to Aristotle ’s ethics; a classic statement is Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5, 1,144b.

  5. 5.

    A good example of social norms and the integrity of communities is Robert K. Merton ’s classic studies in the sociology of science—see, e.g., Merton (1938). It is interesting that his work was motivated by a sense of ‘active hostility to science’ from certain quarters of his society—the same perception that informs the New Atheists now.

  6. 6.

    I develop this problem by distinguishing the definition and the exemplification of epistemic vice in Kidd (2016, §6).

  7. 7.

    While this may seem like I am singling out Dawkins , the reader is invited to find counterpoints in the writings of other New Atheists. Indeed, this is how the claims are to be tested.

  8. 8.

    I detail some of the epistemological and phenomenological difficulties of understanding the nature of religious lives in Kidd (2013) and (2014).

  9. 9.

    I am grateful to the editors for their comments and their invitation to contribute to this volume, and to an audience at the (New) Atheism, Scientism, and Open-mindedness workshop at Lancaster in 2012, at which it was first presented.

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Kidd, I.J. (2017). Epistemic Vices in Public Debate: The Case of ‘New Atheism’. In: Cotter, C., Quadrio, P., Tuckett, J. (eds) New Atheism: Critical Perspectives and Contemporary Debates. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 21. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54964-4_4

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