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Part of the book series: New Security Challenges ((NSECH))

Abstract

Chapter 5 emphasizes PMSC labour-centric stances in its focus on sea power. With the conventional forces norm in mind, this chapter identifies the milieu in which PMSCs are injected, one that favours expensive and sophisticated technology for decisive effect, for replacing personnel on land, and for augmenting state prestige. The result is that there is a space for a PMSC presence, but one should note a difference in kind because PMSCs do not and cannot access the marketplace for sophisticated naval machines. For the PMSC industry, this is not necessarily a bad thing because rather than replicate the characteristics and limitations of state forces, PMSCs instead compensate for the qualitative and quantitative challenges that these forces confront. This chapter makes this plain in its extended consideration of PMSCs countering Somali pirates, an endeavour that has been both largely labour-centric and framed by states and others in a defensive mode.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is not to say that states have not tried to disguise their activities using merchant-type vessels. The 1907 Hague Convention offers a number of articles on the subject: “Article 1. No merchant ship transformed into a war vessel can have the rights and obligations attaching to this condition unless it is placed under the direct authority, the immediate control and the responsibility of the power whose flag it carries. Article 2. Merchant ships transformed into war vessels must bear the distinctive external signs of war vessels of their nationality. Article 3. The officer commanding must be in the service of the state, and properly commissioned by the competent authorities. His name must appear in the list of officers of the combatant fleet. Article 4. The crew must be subject to the rules of military discipline. Article 5. Every merchant ship transformed into a war vessel is bound to conform, in its operation, to the laws and customs of war. Article 6. The belligerent who transforms a merchant ship into a war vessel must, as soon as possible, mention this transformation on the list of vessels belonging to its combatant fleet”. In this regard, during the two world wars, the United Kingdom utilized Q-ships, heavily armed merchant vessels meant to lure German submarines to the surface in hopes of an easy sinking (Hutchins 2011, p. 860 note 257; Morison 1960, p. 281). As for Germany, it had a long history of using auxiliary cruisers to sneak up on legitimate merchant vessels and then “hoist the flag at the last moment” (van Creveld 2006, p. 59. See also Duffy 2001; Schmalenbach 1979; Muggenthaler 1977).

  2. 2.

    For instance, the Maersk Alabama was part of the US government’s Maritime Security Program Fleet when Somali pirates seized her on April 8, 2009. At the time, the vessel was carrying 400 containers of food aid destined for Uganda and Somalia.

  3. 3.

    This is applicable unless a vessel is working in tandem with another vessel not only possessing these capabilities but also able to assist and provide for those with lesser means.

  4. 4.

    One might contrast this comment with Ferris’ observation about armies as eggshells noted in Chapters 2 and 4.

  5. 5.

    Other analysts have expanded upon these observations (Cable 1994, p. 93; Le Miere, 2011, p. 64; Germond 2008, p. 185).

  6. 6.

    The most prominent of these events was the October 1993 Blackhawk Down incident in Mogadishu that claimed the lives of 18 US military personnel.

  7. 7.

    This runs counter to Till’s assertions offered earlier in the chapter regarding the ease of changing a state naval force’s posture.

  8. 8.

    For instance, laws in Djibouti, Oman, Sri Lanka, and the United Arab Emirates are relatively permissive. Sri Lanka, in fact, has helped to facilitate arsenal ships. In contrast, laws in Egypt (especially vis-à-vis the Suez Canal) and Kenya are more restrictive. In some instances, PMSCs have dumped weaponry at sea in order to be legally compliant upon arrival in port.

  9. 9.

    Some estimates were as high as 70 percent, though this seems excessive (Economist 2012; West 2012). PMSC coverage is less likely for regional transits, small cabotage, and dhow shipping.

  10. 10.

    Note that pirates have been successful, on at least one occasion, of seizing a vessel with unarmed PMSC personnel.

  11. 11.

    A partial exception to this would be the Spanish government’s policy of offering a 25–50 percent subsidy to facilitate PMSC operations aboard Spanish-flagged tuna fishing boats in the Indian Ocean (Murias 2011).

  12. 12.

    Some assessments indicate that only 10–15 vessels have been used on a regular basis (Pitney and Levin 2014, p. 58).

  13. 13.

    Relatively speaking and at least in comparison with more sophisticated vessels, the less complex the technology, the less expensive the maintenance costs (Smith 1994, p. 47).

  14. 14.

    If anything, PMSCs have advertised that they employ former navy vessels, perhaps as a matter of cachet and despite the differing levels regarding sophistication and capabilities (Naval Guards 2010).

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Spearin, C. (2017). Sea Power and PMSCs. In: Private Military and Security Companies and States . New Security Challenges. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54903-3_5

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