The analysis presented in this book concludes with a claim that economics should be a humble science which does not pretend to explain by formulating all-encompassing and universal laws of nature. The very existence of such laws is quite problematic if simply not possible. It is better to have economics with more metaphysically rich concepts as the ones of tendencies and capacities. Such concepts should be at the centre of the new philosophy of economics.
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