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Is It Time to Abandon the Strong Interpretation of the Dual-Process Model in Neuroethics?

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Debates About Neuroethics

Part of the book series: Advances in Neuroethics ((AIN))

Abstract

Pioneering neuroimaging studies in the “neuroscience of ethics” (Greene et al. 2001) have led to the development of the dual-process model of moral judgment (Greene 2008). These studies have also provided the much-needed impetus for neuroethics itself, having inspired a range of empirical studies on moral judgment (see Christensen and Gomila 2012) and conceptual analyses in ethics informed by neuroscience (see Levy 2007; Racine 2010; Glannon 2007, 2011). However useful dual-process model has been in the past, mounting empirical counterevidence (Koenigs et al. 2007; Duke and Begue 2015), and the conceptual implications of fallibilism lead to a conclusion that this model should be shelved as neuroethics moves forward.

Fallibilism as a pragmatic attitude emanates from the logic and spirit of science: scientific inquiry and progress actually mean overthrowing previously established beliefs and tentatively establishing new beliefs based on science (Dewey 1929). When this is applied to the study of moral judgment, it yields a drastically different picture from the one painted by champions of the dual-system model in moral decision-making: moral beliefs are fallible (no matter how fast we might reach them), have the logical status of hypotheses, and do not provide absolute certainty. For example, utilitarian calculus, though deliberate and slow, is as open to biases as an approach using heuristics. The point is that fallibility needs to be recognized in all endeavors, whether they are guided by quick intuitive processes or by time-consuming and explicit reasoning.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    “A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save these people is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto a sidetrack, where it will run over and kill one person instead of five. Is it okay to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one?” (Greene 2008: 41–42)

  2. 2.

    “[…] a runaway trolley threatens to kill five people, but this time you are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge spanning the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. The only way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below. He will die as a result, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Is it okay to save the five people by pushing this stranger to his death?” (Greene 2008: 42)

  3. 3.

    In this paragraph, I draw and substantially expand on Dubljević 2016.

  4. 4.

    This should not be understood as denying the fact – noted by Haidt – that humans usually reach moral judgments quickly and are not always aware of the processes that led to them.

  5. 5.

    In this paragraph, I draw on Dubljević 2016.

  6. 6.

    Go/no-go task is a psychological measure in which stimuli are presented in a continuous stream and participants perform a binary decision on each stimulus. One of the outcomes requires participants to make a motor response (go), whereas the other requires participants to withhold a response (no-go).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal (IRCM); and North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, 27695, USA

    Veljko Dubljević

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  1. Veljko Dubljević
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Correspondence to Veljko Dubljević .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. IRCM, Université de Montréal, and McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada

    Eric Racine

  2. IRCM and McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada

    John Aspler

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Dubljević, V. (2017). Is It Time to Abandon the Strong Interpretation of the Dual-Process Model in Neuroethics?. In: Racine, E., Aspler, J. (eds) Debates About Neuroethics. Advances in Neuroethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54651-3_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54651-3_9

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