Abstract
In his chapter, Gardar Arnason argues that if we accept the citizenship framework of nonhuman animal rights, as it is presented by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka in Zoopolis (2011), then we cannot be abolitionist about nonhuman animal research. To show this, Arnason outlines three further implications of the citizenship framework: (1) the interests of nonhuman citizens must be taken into account in our science policy, (2) the moral constraints on the use of nonhuman animals for research must be on par with the moral constraints on the use of humans for research, and (3) in so far as there is a duty to participate in research, that duty will apply, perhaps indirectly, to nonhuman citizens as well.
This research was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) research unit grant FOR 1847.
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Notes
- 1.
By “the radical abolitionist view”, I, following Donaldson and Kymlicka, refer to views such as Gary Francione’s (2008) abolitionism. There are less radical abolitionist views, which would allow some nonexploitative use of nonhuman animals. Most prominent of the moderate abolitionist views is that of Tom Regan (1983), which focuses the abolitionist claim on the use of nonhuman animals in agriculture, science, and sport (in particular hunting and trapping).
- 2.
Since most domestic animals cannot survive independently in the wild, there is no ethical point in liberating them. All that we could do, according to extinctionists such as Gary Francione (2008), is to make sure they do not reproduce and eventually go extinct.
- 3.
Their main target here is Gary Francione (2008), who has advocated strongly for the abolition of all use of nonhuman animals and the controlled extinction of domesticated animals.
- 4.
To be fair, Donaldson and Kymlicka note that “most of” controlled lab experiments on nonhuman animals are unethical, implying that some of them may be ethical, and that learning about nonhuman animals “through careful observation and ethical interaction” is possible (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011, p.31, n.24).
- 5.
Alasdair Cochrane (2007) comes to a similar conclusion, by way of arguing that an interest-based account of nonhuman animal rights would not provide sufficient grounds for a right to liberty for nonhuman animals.
- 6.
See also Donaldson and Kymlicka’s discussion of nonhuman animal representation in society (2011, p.154).
- 7.
- 8.
Arguments have been made to the effect that some nonhuman animals are moral agents with (limited) moral obligations (Shapiro, 2006) or at least have moral abilities, which are expressed in moral behaviour (de Waal, 1997). Still, I will assume here the more common view that nonhuman animals are not moral agents and cannot have duties.
- 9.
If participation in biomedical research is merely supererogatory, then the guardian (in both the human and nonhuman case) should only take the interests of her subject into account (and the subject’s previous wishes, if applicable). If research participation is a duty, the guardian must also consider the moral implications of not allowing the participation of her subject in research. The guardian would in that case be morally blameworthy for not allowing that participation, provided that the greater interests of the subject are not violated. I am not arguing for a duty to participate in research, but rather that if there is a good case for such a duty, then it applies to nonhuman subjects as well as human subjects.
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Arnason, G. (2017). Animal Research and the Political Theory of Animal Rights. In: Woodhall, A., Garmendia da Trindade, G. (eds) Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54549-3_14
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