Abstract
This chapter presents the theoretical basis of introducing resolution—a procedure designed as the answer to deposit guarantee scheme weaknesses—in the EU. Key goals and conditions related to the procedure, as well as administrative instruments designed for the elimination of large financial institutions, were hereby described. Special attention was paid to financing resolution, because means of the financial sector (not public resources) are determinants for the effectiveness of the procedure. The role of deposit insurance agencies in the procedures was also described, with special emphasis on the high level of freedom in institutional shaping of EU financial safety in the aftermath of the crisis. Instruments applied in resolution were also scrutinized, and their weaknesses and little practical experience were brought to light.
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Kerlin, J. (2017). The Concept of Resolution of Financial Institutions. In: The Role of Deposit Guarantee Schemes as a Financial Safety Net in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54163-1_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54163-1_5
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