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The Economic Dialogue: An Effective Accountability Mechanism?

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Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis

Abstract

The economic dialogue was created in 2011 in order to increase the European Parliament’s scrutiny powers in the framework of the new European economic governance. With this new mechanism, Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs can invite top officials from other EU institutions to take part in an exchange of views, increasing the accountability of the decisions taken and ultimately reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

A legal analysis suggests that Parliament’s limited powers as well as the shortcomings in the economic dialogue provisions are at odds with the ambitions of this mechanism. Practical evidence however shows that the dialogue has proved remarkably adaptable to the new reality of EMU, leading to the development of a forum for regular public exchanges between Parliament and the key players in the new European economic governance. Nevertheless, the superficiality of the debates, demands by MEPs for visibility and Parliament’s marginal powers remain major obstacles for a real exercise in accountability.

A previous version of this paper was presented at the NIAS/EURO-CEFG workshop “EU Decision-Making and Challenges to Economic and Financial Governance” held in Wassenaar (Netherlands) in December 2015. I would like to thank all participants for their useful comments. My thanks also go to the CVCE team for their valuable advice. All remaining errors are mine.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See the contribution by F. Allemand in this volume.

  2. 2.

    Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the Euro area, OJEU L 306, 23 November 2011, pp. 1 et seqq.; Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area, OJEU L 306, 23 November 2011, pp. 8 et seqq.; Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJEU L 306, 23 November 2011, pp. 12 et seqq.; Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJEU L 306, 23 November 2011, pp. 25 et seqq.; Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJEU L 306, 23 November 2011, pp. 33 et seqq.

  3. 3.

    Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the Euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, pp. 1 et seqq.; Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the Euro area, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, pp. 11 et seqq.

  4. 4.

    Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011.

  5. 5.

    The Commission gives the topic only a brief mention in its review of the new economic governance framework. See European Commission (2014).

  6. 6.

    For this purpose, the video recordings of the meetings available on Parliament’s website have been used.

  7. 7.

    The interview (hereafter “interview 1”) was held in Brussels on 23 September 2015.

  8. 8.

    de Witte et al. (2010), p. 26.

  9. 9.

    Article 127 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

  10. 10.

    Articles 121, 122 and 126 TFEU.

  11. 11.

    Article 284, para. 3, TFEU.

  12. 12.

    Article 121, para. 2, TFEU.

  13. 13.

    Article 121, para. 5, TFEU.

  14. 14.

    Article 122, para. 2, TFEU.

  15. 15.

    Article 126, para. 11, TFEU.

  16. 16.

    Article 121, para. 6, TFEU.

  17. 17.

    Article 129, para. 3, TFEU.

  18. 18.

    Article 133 TFEU.

  19. 19.

    Allemand (2013); Fasone (2014), p. 173; Majone (2014).

  20. 20.

    Menéndez (2014) and Tuori and Tuori (2014).

  21. 21.

    Dawson and de Witte (2013).

  22. 22.

    Article 10 TFEU.

  23. 23.

    Maurer (2013), p. 5.

  24. 24.

    Van Rompuy et al. (2012), p. 16.

  25. 25.

    Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, OJEU L 118, 12 May 2010, pp. 1 et seqq.

  26. 26.

    EFSF Framework Agreement, available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu.

  27. 27.

    Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and Convergence Programmes, Consolidated version, endorsed by the ECOFIN Council on 7 September 2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/2010-09-07_code_of_conduct_%28consolidated%29_en.pdf.

  28. 28.

    European Council Decision amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the Euro, OJEU L 91, 6 April 2011, pp. 1–2.

  29. 29.

    European Parliament (2010a, b, 2011b).

  30. 30.

    See supra, note 2.

  31. 31.

    See supra, note 3.

  32. 32.

    O’Keeffe et al. (2016), p. 226.

  33. 33.

    European Parliament (2011a), recital 2, h.

  34. 34.

    Article 121, para. 1, TFEU.

  35. 35.

    On the monetary dialogue, see Eijffinger and Mujagic (2004), Amtenbrink and van Duin (2009) and Claeys et al. (2014).

  36. 36.

    Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011; Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011; Article 2, a-b, of Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011; Article 14, para. 1, of Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011; Article 2, a, of Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011; Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013. See also Articles 3, para. 9, 7, paras. 1, 4 and 10, and 18, of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Article 3, para. 9, of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.

  39. 39.

    Articles 14 of Regulations (EU) Nos. 1175/2011 and 1176/2011.

  40. 40.

    Articles 14 of Regulations (EU) Nos. 1175/2011 and 1176/2011.

  41. 41.

    Articles 14 of Regulations (EU) Nos. 1175/2011 and 1176/2011.

  42. 42.

    Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011; Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011.

  43. 43.

    Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011.

  44. 44.

    Articles 7, para. 3, and 15, paras. 1 and 3, of Regulation (EU) No. Reg. 473/2013.

  45. 45.

    Article 3, para. 9, of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.

  46. 46.

    Article 7, paras. 1, 4 and 10, of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.

  47. 47.

    Article 2, a-b, of Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011; Article 2, a, of Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 as amended by Article 2, a, of Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011.

  48. 48.

    Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011; Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011; Article 12 bis of Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011; Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011; Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011; Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013; Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No. reg. 473/2013.

  49. 49.

    These include “structured dialogues” with the Commission, the “monetary dialogue” with the European Central Bank and the regular dialogues with the ECOFIN Council President at the beginning and the end of each six-monthly Council presidency. Cf. Bourgault (2014).

  50. 50.

    Bovens et al. (2010).

  51. 51.

    The wording of the provisions is very careful indeed: “the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite, where appropriate, etc.” (Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011).

  52. 52.

    Article 14, para. 1, TEU.

  53. 53.

    Article 230 TFEU. In the case of multilateral surveillance, this control is also foreseen by Article 121, para. 5, TFEU.

  54. 54.

    von der Groeben et al. (2015), p. 211.

  55. 55.

    Article 17, para. 8, TEU.

  56. 56.

    Article 17, para. 8, TEU and Article 234 TFEU.

  57. 57.

    von der Groeben et al. (2015), p. 210.

  58. 58.

    Article 230, para. 3, TFEU. See also Article 26 of the Council Rules of Procedure and Article 5 of the European Council Rules of Procedure, which define the issue of representation.

  59. 59.

    Article 121, para. 5, TFEU.

  60. 60.

    Article 265 TFEU.

  61. 61.

    Article 13, para. 2, TEU.

  62. 62.

    Article 137 TFEU; Protocol No. 14 on the Eurogroup.

  63. 63.

    More precisely, in the case of the Eurogroup the dialogue provisions also formalise an already existing practice of regular exchanges with the ECON Committee.

  64. 64.

    Article 1 of Protocol No. 14.

  65. 65.

    Article 3, para. 9, of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.

  66. 66.

    Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.

  67. 67.

    Article 2, a-b, of Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011.

  68. 68.

    Article 15, para. 1, of Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013.

  69. 69.

    Article 1, para. 3, of Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011.

  70. 70.

    Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011.

  71. 71.

    Article 15, para. 1, d, of Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013.

  72. 72.

    Article 2, a-b, of Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011.

  73. 73.

    Article 7, para. 10, of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.

  74. 74.

    Article 7, paras. 1 and 4, of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.

  75. 75.

    Amtenbrink and van Duin (2009), p. 569.

  76. 76.

    Fasone (2014), p. 173.

  77. 77.

    Some of these meetings, however, lacking a relevant legal basis, should be formally labelled as mere “exchanges of views”. They have nonetheless been considered since in practice there is no difference between these and the economic dialogues.

  78. 78.

    The Commissioner in charge of Employment and Social Affairs is also sometimes invited. See below.

  79. 79.

    Interview 1.

  80. 80.

    Interview 1.

  81. 81.

    The European Semester is considered in its “broad format”, that is including the 2013 provisions of the Two-Pack.

  82. 82.

    ECON Committee meetings, 14 April 2015, 15 September 2015 and 1 December 2015.

  83. 83.

    ECON Committee meeting, 23 May 2015.

  84. 84.

    Articles 120 and 121 TFEU.

  85. 85.

    Indeed, the “comply or explain” clause of the economic dialogue did not raise much interest: the Council usually submits its explanation in written form, which is largely unobserved.

  86. 86.

    ECON Committee meetings, 17 December 2013 and 22 January 2014.

  87. 87.

    ECON Committee meetings, 7 May 2013 and 10 November 2015.

  88. 88.

    Article 5, para. 2, of the ESM Treaty.

  89. 89.

    ECON Committee meetings, 28 January 2014, 2 December 2014 and 7 May 2015.

  90. 90.

    European Commission (2012) and European Parliament (2013).

  91. 91.

    Martin (2011), p. 261.

  92. 92.

    Martin (2011), p. 267; Sánchez de Dios and Wiberg (2011), pp. 360 and 362.

  93. 93.

    Bovens (2007), p. 451; Sánchez de Dios and Wiberg (2011), p. 360.

  94. 94.

    This was the case with the ad hoc dialogue on the third Greek bailout programme, initially scheduled for September 2015 and then postponed to November, some four months after the agreement between the Greek Government and the Eurogroup.

  95. 95.

    ECON Committee meeting, 24 February 2015.

  96. 96.

    ECON Committee meeting, 4 September 2014.

  97. 97.

    As is always the case when asked about Member States’ positions within the Eurogroup.

  98. 98.

    His attitude is actually consistent as he strongly believes that ESM accountability is a matter for national Parliaments, each of them holding its minister to account. See Rittberger (2014), pp. 1178–1179.

  99. 99.

    European Commission (2015).

  100. 100.

    Juncker et al. (2015), p. 14.

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  1. Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, Sanem, Luxembourg

    Sergio De la Parra

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    Luigi Daniele

  2. Department of Public Law, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Rome, Italy

    Pierluigi Simone

  3. Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome, Italy

    Roberto Cisotta

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De la Parra, S. (2017). The Economic Dialogue: An Effective Accountability Mechanism?. In: Daniele, L., Simone, P., Cisotta, R. (eds) Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53895-2_5

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