Abstract
This chapter aims to analyse the recent shift in the allocation of powers within the EMU institutional framework. In the words of Angela Merkel, a new Union method is emerging from the Lisbon Treaty. The management of the subprime crisis and sovereign debt crisis gave rise to practical institutional arrangements and the adoption of new secondary law whereby the European Council, as well as the Euro Summit were conferred on new political responsibilities. However, as we argue, this development in intergovernmental cooperation takes place with proper regard for the institutional balance and the complex system for the balancing of powers within the EMU. Following all the crises and reforms, EMU governance is neither more supranational nor more intergovernmental. It is both at once. To our way of thinking, to try to set the two approaches against each other would be a sterile exercise. EMU governance—and, in a broader sense, EU governance—is intergovernmental and supranational. It cannot be otherwise, so long as the EU bears the imprint of a twofold requirement: to achieve unity while respecting diversity.
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Notes
- 1.
“As Nationalism Rises, Will the European Union Fall?”, in Washington Post, 29 August 2010.
- 2.
Penultimate recital of the Preamble and Article 1, para. 2, TEU.
- 3.
This expression, which was removed during the discussions in the Convention, was brought back in by chance by the IGC lawyers in the summer of 2007. The new agreement for the United Kingdom in the EU approved by the European Council of 18 and 19 February 2016 made Article 1 TEU entirely devoid of application to the United Kingdom.
- 4.
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 12 October 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92, M. B. v. the law of 28 December 1992 on the Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992 (known as the “Maastricht judgment”); and cited in the judgment on the Lisbon Treaty on 30 June 2009 (joined cases 2 BvE 2/08 and others).
- 5.
Article 1, subpara. 1, TEU.
- 6.
Article 5, subpara. 1, TEC lays down that “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein”. The replacement of the words “this Treaty” by “the Member States” is telling. Article 2 TFEU, in paras. 1 and 2, says: “When the Treaties confer on the Union [...]”. The point of the difference is to emphasise that the EU rests on a double foundation: the wish of the Member States, from which all power derives, and the Treaties.
- 7.
Hanf (2009).
- 8.
Simon (2001).
- 9.
- 10.
The only amendment to be mentioned is to Article 136 TFEU, to which a new paragraph was added by decision of the European Council of 25 March 2011. OJEU L 91, 6 April 2011, p. 1.
- 11.
- 12.
We might also add the migration crisis since summer 2014.
- 13.
- 14.
Majone (2005).
- 15.
Novak (2014).
- 16.
ECJ 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos; 15 July 1964, Case 6/64 Costa v. E.N.E.L.
- 17.
Permanent Court of International Justice, 3 March 1928, Consultative opinion on the powers of the Danzig courts (Series B, Opinion No. 15, pp. 17–18).
- 18.
Ortega y Gasset (2010).
- 19.
Durand (1947).
- 20.
See, on this point, the serious charge of “despotic bureaucratism” levelled at Europe by Siedentop (2000).
- 21.
Article 5 TEU.
- 22.
Simon (2001).
- 23.
Article 13, para. 2, TEU.
- 24.
Articles 14, para. 1, and 16, para. 1, TEU.
- 25.
Article 14, para. 2, TEU.
- 26.
ECJ 13 March 1992, Case C-282/90, Industrie- en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil BV v. Commission, para. 20.
- 27.
Schmitter (1993).
- 28.
Ganshof Van der Meersch (1975).
- 29.
Simon (1991).
- 30.
Louis and Ronse (2006).
- 31.
Article 15, para. 1, TEU.
- 32.
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Presentation of the draft European Constitution to the Thessaloniki European Council, 20 June 2003, quoted by Ponzano (2007); see also European Parliament, Resolution of 7 May 2009 on the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the development of the institutional balance of the European Union. OJEU C 212 E, 5 August 2010, p. 82.
- 33.
Commission, Opinion of 15 February 2011 on the draft European Council Decision amending Article 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro. Brussels, COM(2011) 70 final, recital (12); European Parliament, Resolution of 23 March 2011 on the draft European Council Decision amending Article 136 TFEU, P7_TA(2011)0103, paragraph 19.
- 34.
Commission, Opinion of 15 February 2011, recital (14), European Parliament, Resolution of 23 March 2011, recital G.
- 35.
Commission, Opinion of 17 February 2011, recital (14).
- 36.
ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, para. 158.
- 37.
Ibid., para. 165.
- 38.
Article 2, para. 2, TSCG.
- 39.
In the course of the discussions in the 1970s about the establishment of a European Union, the Commission therefore proposed that there be a reorganisation of powers on the lines advocated by Montesquieu (one body, one function) and that it itself should disappear, to make way for a permanent “European Government” which would hold combined executive and administrative powers. See Commission, Report on European Union. Bull. EC 1975, Suppl. 5/75, p. 31, esp. point 98.
- 40.
For example: Commission, Report of the Working Party examining the problem of the extension of the powers of the European Parliament [Vedel Report]. Bull. EC, Suppl. 4/72, p. 75; Commission, Communication of 7 October 1981, The institutional system of the Community. Restoring the balance. Brussels, COM(81) 581. Bull. EC, Suppl. 3/82, p. 7.
- 41.
Lutton (1985).
- 42.
Monar (2011).
- 43.
Schwarzer (2012).
- 44.
Doutriaux (1992).
- 45.
Balleix-Banerjee and Portelli (1997).
- 46.
See especially Louis (1995).
- 47.
- 48.
- 49.
Noël (1990).
- 50.
Louis (2000).
- 51.
Article 127 TFEU.
- 52.
Article 130 TFEU and Article 7 of the Statutes of the ESCB and the ECB.
- 53.
Article 219 TFEU.
- 54.
Article 120 TFEU.
- 55.
Article 121, para. 2, TFEU.
- 56.
Article 140, para. 2, TFEU.
- 57.
Article 148, paras. 1 and 2, TFEU.
- 58.
Article 16, para. 1, TEU and Article 1 TFEU; conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council, 13 December 1997, DOC C/97/400, para. 44.
- 59.
Louis (1993).
- 60.
Article 125, para. 2, TFEU.
- 61.
Articles 121, para. 6, 129, para. 3, and 133 TEU. However, there are some useful adjustments to the ordinary legislative procedure in the monetary field: consultation of the ECB is allowed for, or the procedure can be initiated by the ECB through the adoption of a recommendation sent to the Council. In the latter case, the Commission is consulted.
- 62.
Article 136, para. 1, TFEU.
- 63.
Article 121, para. 4, TFEU.
- 64.
Articles 127, para. 6, 129, paras. 2 and 3, and 132, para. 3, TFEU.
- 65.
Quermonne (2001).
- 66.
On this question, Jean-Paul Jacqué points out that institutional balance is developing in an uncontrolled way. “It has taken place without prior reflection, simply pulled along by the strongest current.” See Jacqué (2004).
- 67.
Monnet (1976).
- 68.
Allemand (2009).
- 69.
At the same time, we remember President Nicolas Sarkozy coming to the Ecofin Council of 10 July 2007 to argue the case for the tax shield and defend a postponement of the date for returning to balanced budgets—thus going back on the pledge given by the preceding Government when the Berlin agreement of April 2007 was approved.
- 70.
On this point, see the firm position in favour of a clear and detailed political dialogue for which Jean-Claude Juncker made a fervent case during the debate on economic governance in the European Parliament on 16 November 2011: “We are not a government if we fail to nurture meaningful debate amongst ourselves [the Heads of State or Government] on the key points of political choices which together we will make but which we will have to apply individually in our different countries.” (Jean-Claude Juncker, Speech on the occasion of a priority debate on economic governance at a plenary sitting of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 16 November 2011).
- 71.
Allemand (2009).
- 72.
Fabbrini (2013).
- 73.
Schwarzer (2012).
- 74.
Council (Ecofin) press release, 2,857th session, 4 March 2008, 7192/08, p. 7.
- 75.
The link between the European Council’s strategic function and the increased part it is called upon to play in implementing the multilateral surveillance procedure is stressed in recital (14) to Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97. OJEU L 306, 23 November 2011, p. 12.
- 76.
Articles 2, a and b, and 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97, as amended in 2011.
- 77.
Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council cited above, and Article 4, para. 2, of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97, as amended in 2011.
- 78.
See, in particular, Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area. OJEU L 306, 23 November 2011, p. 1; Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. OJEU L 306, 23 November 2011, p. 8.
- 79.
Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 21 October 2008. [Online] URL: http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/discours/2008/allocution-devant-le-parlement-europeen.5193.html; and speech by the President of the Republic, Toulon, 11 December 2011. The European Parliament backed the initiative as soon as the first meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro area was held on 12 October 2008. See European Parliament resolution of 22 October 2008 on the European Council of 15 and 16 October 2008, P6_TA(2008)0506, para. 4. For an analysis, see Dyson and Marcussen (2010).
- 80.
In February 2010 Chancellor Angela Merkel said: “Deshalb ist es für mich auch wichtig, dass wir uns im Sinne einer wirklichen Wirtschaftsregierung als Rat aller 27 europäischen Mitgliedstaaten verstehen” (“To our way of thinking, we see the Council as an economic government of the 27 Member States.” Translation taken from a French version produced by the Elysée.) Joint press conference, Paris, 4 February 2010. [Online] URL: http://www.archives.elysee.fr.
- 81.
With the notable exceptions of the United Kingdom and Denmark, which have an opt-out clause.
- 82.
Capotorti (1987).
- 83.
The ambiguity arises from the difference of approach as between France and Germany with regard to the final aim of these summits, as a comparison of the French and German versions of the joint letter sent by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy to the President of the Council on 17 August 2011 suggests. Paris describes the Euro Summits as “la pierre angulaire du nouveau gouvernement économique de la zone euro”. Berlin sees them only “als Eckpfeiler der verbesserten wirtschaftlichen Steuerung des Euro-Währungsgebiet.” (our emphasis). The German concept of Steuerung refers to the ability to guide, to stimulate, not to lead or govern (Regierung). It is worth pointing out, in particular, that two years of crisis had evidently not narrowed the conceptual gap between the two banks of the Rhine, as that linguistic subtlety was already to be found in the statement by the Heads of State or Government of the Euro area of 25 March 2010.
- 84.
For a discussion of the responsibilities conferred on the Euro Summit, see below, and also Louis (2012).
- 85.
The same applies to the debate on the order of precedence as between the Euro Summit and the European Council. The Euro Summit Statement of 26 October 2011 stated that its meetings were held after those of the European Council (see Euro Summit Statement, Annex I, Ten measures to improve the governance of the Euro area, para. 1). The TSCG leaves the question open.
- 86.
A stipulation which is not found in Protocol (No. 14) on the Eurogroup but which still lies behind the Resolution of the European Council on economic policy coordination in stage 3 of EMU and on Treaty Articles 109 and 109b (European Council Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12 and 13 December 1997, C/97/400, Annex I, para. 6): “Whenever matters of common interest are concerned they will be discussed by Ministers of all Member States.”
- 87.
Article 12, para. 3, TSCG. This keenness to open out to the Member States outside the Euro area led to this provision being the only one to apply to all the contracting States as soon as the TSCG entered into force, including those which had not yet ratified the text (Article 14, para. 4, TSCG).
- 88.
In its conclusions, the European Council of 23 October 2011 laid down the principles governing the link between the two posts of President; it was also noted that, pending the election of the President of the Euro Summit, the President of the European Council (Herman van Rompuy at the time) would also hold that post in the Euro area.
- 89.
Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties to the TSCG whose currency is the euro appointing the President of the Euro Summit. Brussels, 30 August 2014, 11949/14.
- 90.
de Charentenay (2010), p. 590.
- 91.
Among the criticisms, there was the firm stand taken by Belgian Commissioner Karel de Gucht in December 2011: “If France and Germany want to concert their positions, that’s their right. But Europe cannot function on the basis of an executive board. That has never worked and it never will!” See “L’Europe ne peut pas fonctionner sur la base d’un directoire franco-allemand!”, in Levif.be, 7 December 2011.
- 92.
Novak (2014).
- 93.
Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, 26 October 2011, in Annex I, “Ten measures to improve the governance of the euro area”, para. 7. The setting up of this working group was referred to in Article 1 of Protocol (No. 14) on the Eurogroup. The Euro Summit Statement laid down that the President of the Working Group will “In principle [...] be elected at the same time as the chair of the Economic and Financial Committee.” It did not define the procedure for appointing its President. Considering the close ties between the Working Group and the EFC, it may be supposed that the rule for appointing the President of the EFC (a majority of its members) would be adopted. The EFC statute revised in 2012 (Council Decision of 26 April 2012. OJEU L 121, 8 May 2012, p. 22) throws light on relations between the Presidents of the EFC and of the Eurogroup Working Group: the President of the latter is among the figures who may be elected to the post of President of the EFC.
- 94.
Articles 16 TEU and 5 TFEU.
- 95.
Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, 26 October 2011, para. 32.
- 96.
Symptomatically, the European Council Conclusions and Euro Summit Statements regularly called for the involvement of all configurations of the Council, without there being any special mention of the Ecofin Council. See, for example, the Euro Plus Pact annexed to the conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro area, Brussels, 11 March 2011, and Jean-Claude Juncker, Speech on the occasion of a priority debate [...], cited above.
- 97.
- 98.
Communications from the European Commission, Reinforcing economic policy coordination. Brussels, 12 May 2010, COM(2010) 250 final; Enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs—Tools for stronger EU economic governance. Brussels, 30 June 2016, COM(2010) 367 final.
- 99.
Report of the Task Force to the European Council, Strengthening economic governance in the EU. Brussels, 21 October 2010. At the same time, the Commission emphasised in the explanatory statement on its legislative proposals that a constructive relationship had been established between the Commission and the working group. It added that the working group had based the bulk of its contributions on the Commission’s work.
- 100.
Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the Euro area and the EU institutions, Brussels, 21 July 2011, para. 16.
- 101.
Conclusions of the European Council, Brussels, 23 October 2011, para. 7; Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, 26 October 2011 (dated 8 November 2011), para. 35.
- 102.
Conclusions of the European Council, Brussels, 28 and 29 June 2012, EUCO 76/12, para. 4. Although this had not been provided for in October 2011, the President of the ECB was included in the discussions led by the President of the European Council.
- 103.
Communication from the Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union. Launching a European Debate, Brussels, 30 November 2012, COM(2012) 777 final/2.
- 104.
Herman van Rompuy, Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, Brussels, 5 December 2012.
- 105.
Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, 24 October 2014.
- 106.
Juncker et al. (2015), p. 5.
- 107.
Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area. OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, p. 11.
- 108.
This growing awareness was mentioned in the recitals to the five regulatory texts which comprised the Six Pack. This point was not in the original legislative proposals and was the result of amendments tabled by the European Parliament.
- 109.
Noël (1962).
- 110.
Ibid.
- 111.
Recital (10) of Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011; also: recitals (7) of Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council and (12) of Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
- 112.
Article 6, para. 6, third indent, Article 10, para. 2, second indent of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97; Article 3, para. 3, of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97; Article 7, para. 2, of Regulation No. 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
- 113.
Article 3 of Council Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.
- 114.
The Court of Justice confirmed that these tasks were lawfully conferred in the judgment of 27 November 2012 in Pringle, cited above, paras. 155 et seq.
- 115.
Article 7, para. 4, of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013, cited above.
- 116.
Commission. Press Release. Olli Rehn appointed Vice-President with additional instruments, Algirda Semeta responsible for Eurostat, Brussels, 27 October 2011, IP/11/1284.
- 117.
Ibid.
- 118.
Conclusions of the European Council, Brussels, 23 October 2011, EUCO 52/11.
- 119.
DG ECFIN had a staff of 619 in February 2016. See Commission, Statistical Bulletin on 01/02/2016. Distribution of staff by employment type and directorate-general. [Online]. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/europa_sp2_bs_dist_staff_en.pdf.
- 120.
Article 2, a and b, of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 and Article 2, a, 1, of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97.
- 121.
Communication from the Commission, Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Brussels, 13 January 2015, COM(2015) 12 final.
- 122.
Council, Legal Service, Opinion of the Legal Service. Communication from the Commission, Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of SGP—Legal remarks, Brussels, 7 April 2015, 7739/15, para. 14.
- 123.
“EU Ministers, Commission to agree on flexibility in budget rules this year”, in Reuters, 12 May 2015. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-budget-rules-idUSL5N0Y33MW20150512.
- 124.
This twofold association of the Council and the Commission applied mainly to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97. The number of occurrences of the words “The Council and the Commission” went up from one to 22! In the case of Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97, this type of amendment had been made in the 2005 reform.
- 125.
Sidjanksi (1961).
- 126.
Lutton (1985).
- 127.
Mehdi (2000).
- 128.
In a recent contribution, Erik Jones, R. Daniel Kelemen and Sophie Meunier refer to the merging of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. See Jones et al. (2015).
- 129.
Croisat and Quermonne (1999).
- 130.
Boyer and Dehove (2001).
- 131.
Quermonne (2001).
- 132.
Blanquet (2004).
- 133.
Ibid.
- 134.
Angela Merkel, Address at the opening ceremony for the 61st academic year at the College of Europe, Bruges, 2 November 2010. Available at: https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/EN/Archiv17/Reden/2010/2010-11-02-merkel-bruegge.html.
- 135.
Angela Merkel, cited above.
- 136.
Ibid.
- 137.
Nicolas Sarkozy. Speech by the President of the Republic. Toulon, 1 December 2011.
- 138.
Ponzano (2011).
- 139.
European Parliament Resolution of 7 May 2009 on the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the development of the institutional balance of the European Union. P6_TA(2009)038.
- 140.
Ibid.
- 141.
Repasi (2016).
- 142.
Article 13 TSCG.
- 143.
Juncker et al. (2015), p. 17.
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Allemand, F. (2017). More or Less Intergovernmental Cooperation Within the New EMU?. In: Daniele, L., Simone, P., Cisotta, R. (eds) Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53895-2_4
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