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Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis pp 335–352Cite as

The EMU in the ECJ: A New Dimension of Dispute Resolution in the Process of European Integration

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Abstract

Contrary to common expectations, the importance of EU law has grown during the State debt crisis. Law is used as an argument, it may be a tool of power, it can learn and it may reach its limits. EU law scholarship must react upon this greater role of law. Influences by national traditions must be detected and simplifications in transdisciplinary discourse eliminated. There are many untenable assumptions that are taken for granted in the current debate.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. only Seidel (2015); Höpner (2015).

  2. 2.

    Cf. for historical analysis Schulz-Forberg and Stråth (2010); Schorkopf (2015).

  3. 3.

    ECJ 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos; Opinion 15 November 1994, 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property; Order 7 May 2013, Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson; Opinion 14 October 2014, 1/13, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction.

  4. 4.

    ECJ 12 March 1987, Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany; 14 July 1988, Case 90/86, Zoni; 5 October 1994, Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council; 15 December 1995, Case C-415/93, Bosman.

  5. 5.

    Cf. the seminal book by de Grauwe (2014), particularly at p. 23 et seq., and also Enderlein (2010).

  6. 6.

    Article 125, paras. 1 and 2, TFEU, 2nd half sentence, respectively: “[…] without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.”. Explanation in Smulders and Keppenne (2015), para 16.

  7. 7.

    Ruffert (2013a).

  8. 8.

    89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 155 at 204 et seq. (Maastricht) [unofficial English translation available at http://www.judicialstudies.unr.edu/JS_Summer09/JSP_Week_1/German%20ConstCourt%20Maastricht.pdf]: “Even after transition to the third stage, development of the monetary union is subject to foreseeable standards and thus to parliamentary accountability. The Maastricht Treaty governs the monetary union as a community committed to long-term stability, in particular to monetary stability. It is true that it is not possible to foresee whether it will actually be possible, using as a basis the provisions contained within the Maastricht Treaty, to maintain long-term stability for the ECU currency. The fear that the efforts to achieve stability will fail, which could then result in further concessions in terms of monetary policy on the part of the Member States, is, however, too intangible a basis upon which to claim that the Maastricht Treaty is legally vague. The Maastricht Treaty sets long-term standards which establish the goal of stability as the yardstick by which the monetary union is to be measured, which endeavour, by institutional provisions, to ensure that these objectives are fulfilled, and which finally do not stand in the way of withdrawal from the Community as a last resort if it proves impossible to achieve the stability sought. Pursuant to Art. 105, para. 1 of the EC Treaty, the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Art. 107 of the EC Treaty provides the ESCB with independence to exercise the powers and carry out the tasks and duties conferred upon it. The sixth consideration in the Preamble to the Maastricht Treaty demonstrates the Member States’ resolve to establish economic and monetary union on the basis of a stable currency. Art. 2 of the EC Treaty states that the promotion of non-inflationary growth and of a high degree of convergence of economic performance is part of the task of the European Community. Art. 3 a, para. 2 of the EC Treaty states that the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange rate policy for which the Treaty provides shall have the primary objective of maintaining price stability. Furthermore, the EC Treaty includes provisions to enable the Member States, in their economic policy, to support and promote the stability of the European currency. Art. 3 a, para. 3 of the EC Treaty specifies stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainable balance of payments as guiding principles for the activities of the Member States (see also Art. 102 a, sentence 2 of the EC Treaty). The economic policies of the Member States are declared to be a matter of common concern, and their broad guidelines are to be co-ordinated and regulated by means of a recommendation from the Council (Art. 103 of the EC Treaty). Art 104 of the EC Treaty prohibits national central banks from granting overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to bodies governed by public law or public undertakings of Member States, and from purchasing debt instruments directly from them. Except where prudential considerations are concerned, bodies governed by public law or public undertakings of Member States shall not be entitled to privileged access to financial institutions (Art. 104 a of the EC Treaty). Art. 104 b of the EC Treaty excludes the Community and any Member State from liability for and from assumption of the commitments of bodies governed by public law or of public undertakings of another Member State, which means that it is not possible for a Member State to evade the consequences of questionable financial policy. […] This concept of the monetary union as a community of stability is the basis and object of the German Act of Consent.”.

  9. 9.

    First touch of this author: Interview in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 19 of 23 January 2010, p. 19.

  10. 10.

    Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/18/us-france-lagardeidUSTRE6BH0V020101218.

  11. 11.

    Breach of Article 125 TFEU: Louis (2010), p. 977 et seq.; Kube and Reimer (2010), p. 1912 et seq.; Faßbender (2010); Palmstorfer (2012); Siekmann (2013), p. 141; Ruffert (2011a), p. 1785 et seq. No breach: Wieland (2011), p. 342; Smits (2011), p. 111; Herrmann (2010a), p. 415; Harden et al. (1997), p. 153. Cf. also the differentiated approach of Calliess (2012), p. 154 et seq., and above all Calliess (2011), p. 256 et seq., in particular p. 268 et seq. More literature provided by Häde (2016), paras. 5 et seqq.

  12. 12.

    ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Pringle.

  13. 13.

    Mr. Pringle’s standing under Irish law, however, was at least as questionable as Gauweiler’s standing under German constitutional law (see below Sect. 2.2).

  14. 14.

    AG Juliane Kokott, Conclusions to ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Pringle, No. 120, footnote 21. More convincing (but against the opinion taken here) Ohler (2013), paras. 13 et seq.

  15. 15.

    ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Pringle, para. 131.

  16. 16.

    ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Pringle, paras. 129 et seq. See the critical remarks by Ruffert (2013b), p. 258, and the extensive criticism by Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 126 et seq. A decisively more positive view on this point is taken by Herrmann (2015), p. 8.

  17. 17.

    Allemand (2012); de Gregorio Merino (2012), p. 1631; Heun and Thiele (2012), p. 980 et seq.; Mayer and Heidfeld (2012a), p. 131 et seq.; Mayer and Heidfeld (2012b), p. 424 et seq. A divergent view is taken by Piecha (2012). On the fund-solution, Schorkopf (2012).

  18. 18.

    The speech of former Commission Vice President Viviane Reding at the 69th Deutscher Juristentag in Munich (18 September 2012), which deals with this matter, caused a lot of debate. Cf. also Müller-Graff (2015), pp. 163 et seqq.

  19. 19.

    This legal view of the German Federal Ministry of Finance was published in a non-paper and distributed by the Green MEP Sven Giegold (available at http://www.sven-giegold.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/grexit_bundesregierung_non_paper_10_juli_2015.pdf). The same view was taken by Claudia Buch, “Expliziter Schuldenerlass für Griechenland verletzt das No-Bail-out-Prinzip”, Interview of 1 August 2015, available at http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Interviews/2015_08_01_buch_boez.html.

  20. 20.

    Some conclusion as above: Mayer (2015). Similarly, Steinbach (2015).

  21. 21.

    ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para. 126.

  22. 22.

    ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Pringle, para. 132.

  23. 23.

    Divergent opinion: Goldmann (2015).

  24. 24.

    From the enormous bulk of legal writings on the judgment cf. only Jestaedt (2009).

  25. 25.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 30 June 2009, translation available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208 en.html;jsessionid=57638495472D1C3F681DB1D1DEE5267F.2_cid370, para. 256.

  26. 26.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra, note 25, paras. 244 et seqq.

  27. 27.

    Bundesverfassungsrecht, Judgment of 7 September 2011, translation available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2011/09/rs20110907_2bvr098710en.html, para. 131. The Bundesverfassungsgericht is not the only national Court to decide on the rescue measures: cf. the overview given by Fines (2015).

  28. 28.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 12 September 2012, available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2012/09/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html, para. 222.

  29. 29.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 6 July 2010, available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2010/07/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html. Cf. Schwerdtfeger (2015), p. 301 et seq. Still critical, Ludwigs (2015).

  30. 30.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 14 January 2014, translation available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2014/01/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html, paras. 84 et seqq.

  31. 31.

    On these criteria see Sect. 2.3.

  32. 32.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra, note 25; cf. in particular para. 179: “Article 146 of the Basic Law creates a right of participation of the citizen entitled to vote. Article 146 of the Basic Law confirms the pre-constitutional right to give oneself a constitution from which constitutional authority emanates and by which it is bound.”. See the criticism in Ruffert (2011b), pp. 842 et seqq.

  33. 33.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht (supra, note 25), para. 199.

  34. 34.

    Dissenting opinions of judges Gerhardt and Lübbe-Wolff to Order of 14 January 2014 (supra, note 30). See also Ohler (2015b), p. 1006.

  35. 35.

    Cf. the strong criticism expressed by Mayer (2014), pp. 490 et seqq.

  36. 36.

    Gärditz and Hillgruber (2009), pp. 872 et seqq.

  37. 37.

    Eucken (1940), pp. 136 et seqq.

  38. 38.

    An impressive presentation of the (conditioned!) asset-purchase is provided by Beukers (2013), p. 1598 et seq., who, however, does not share the opinion in the text above. Ohler (2015a), § 4/44, at least admits that there was a deliberate purchase of bonds from single, crisis-stricken Member States, but he considers the purchase to be in conformity with EU law (Ohler 2015b, p. 1004). A similar view is adopted by Herrmann (2010b). An even more rigid position than here is taken by Schmidt (2016), § 5/75; Seidel (2010); Siekmann (2013), p. 147 et seq.

  39. 39.

    ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para. 104.

  40. 40.

    ECB Press Release of 26 July 2012, available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.

  41. 41.

    ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, paras. 18 et seqq. As far as can be seen, this is not treated in the impressive Special Issue of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 23 (2016) on “The European Court of Justice, the European Central Bank, and the Supremacy of EU Law”.

  42. 42.

    ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, paras. 34 et seqq., 66 et seqq., 93 et seqq. On this, Ohler (2015b), p. 1004 et seq., as well as Sauer (2015), p. 981.

  43. 43.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 14 January 2014, supra, note 30, para. 100. Meanwhile, the Bundesverfassungsgericht decided this way: Judgment of 21 June 2016 - 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13, available at www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de.

  44. 44.

    See Ohler (2015b), p. 1005, on remaining divergences. Sometimes, authors exaggerate in saying that the Bundesverfassunsgericht was dictating its result to the ECJ; cf. e.g. Anagnostaras (2015), p. 757 et seq.

  45. 45.

    ECB, Economic Bulletin No. 1/2015, pp. 15 et seqq.; Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, OJEU L121, 14 May 2015, pp. 20 et seqq. Cf. van den End et al. (2015).

  46. 46.

    Thiele (2015), pp. 304 et seqq.; Lammers (2015), pp. 215 et seqq. However, a constitutional complaint is pending against the programme: https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb01/lehrstuehle/oeffrecht/horn/horn_dateien/vfb.pdf.

  47. 47.

    Ohler (2015a), § 3/12.

  48. 48.

    Cf. Müller-Graff (2015), pp. 164 et seqq., also to other factual consequences.

  49. 49.

    In 2012/13 €41,3 bn were spent for the Spanish banking sector; this measure is completed. The current aid for Cyprus is roughly €9 bn. Cf. http://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/index.htm.

  50. 50.

    Cf. Ohler (2015a), § 4/56.

  51. 51.

    European Commission, Debt sustainability analysis, Bundestagsdrucksache 18/5780, Anlage 4 zum BMF-Beschlußantrag, p. 3, also available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/pdf/debt_sustainability_analysis_en.pdf.

  52. 52.

    Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, pp. 1 et seqq.), which belongs to the “Two Pack”, also demands for reticence: “The assessment of the sustainability of the government debt shall be based on the most likely macroeconomic scenario or a more prudent scenario and budgetary forecasts using the most up-to-date information and taking proper account of the outcome of the reporting […] as well as any supervisory task exercised in accordance with point (b) of Article 3(3). The Commission shall also assess the impact of macroeconomic and financial shocks and adverse developments on the sustainability of government debt.”. On this see Ohler (2015a), § 4/56.

  53. 53.

    ESM Press Release of 17 July 2015, available at http://esm.europa.eu/press/releases/esm-board-of-governors-approves-decision-to-grant,-in-principle,-stability-support-to-greece.htm.

  54. 54.

    On this procedure, Häde (2014), § 17/20.

  55. 55.

    Council Regulation (EU) No. 2015/1360 of 4 August 2015 amending Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, OJEU L 210, 7 August 2015, pp. 1 et seqq.; Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1181 of 17 July 2015 on granting short-term Union financial assistance to Greece, OJEU L 192, 18 July 2015, pp. 15 et seqq.; Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1182 of 17 July 2015 approving the adjustment programme of Greece, OJEU L 192, 18 July 2015, pp. 19 et seqq.

  56. 56.

    There are few if any writings on this, polemical articles that are not very helpful (and not very scientific) set aside: Prieto (2015).

  57. 57.

    International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 15/186 of 14 July 2015.

  58. 58.

    Elaborated by Tryantafyllou (2014). Similarly, Dawson and de Witte (2016), p. 220.

  59. 59.

    On this and the following, Ruffert (2015).

  60. 60.

    Explained and analysed in terms of history by Huber (2014).

  61. 61.

    This is the general approach of Fabbrini (2016), p. 10. However, he does not constantly follow this line (see Ruffert 2016).

  62. 62.

    Cf. e.g. Adalid (2015); Nicol (2015); Wilkinson (2015); Dawson and de Witte (2016), pp. 213, 214 and 223 in particular—and many more authors.

  63. 63.

    Müller (2015), p. 159: “not all countries can become ‘more competitive’ at the same time”—the contrary of this is Ricardo’s central point.

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  1. Department of Public Law and European Law, Humboldt-University, Berlin, Germany

    Matthias Ruffert

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  1. Matthias Ruffert
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  1. Department of Public Law, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Rome, Italy

    Luigi Daniele

  2. Department of Public Law, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Rome, Italy

    Pierluigi Simone

  3. Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome, Italy

    Roberto Cisotta

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Ruffert, M. (2017). The EMU in the ECJ: A New Dimension of Dispute Resolution in the Process of European Integration. In: Daniele, L., Simone, P., Cisotta, R. (eds) Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53895-2_18

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