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The European Central Bank (ECB) and European Democracy: A Technocratic Institution to Rule All European States?

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Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis

Abstract

The crisis has shown how the financial markets move very rapidly and the reaction times of democratic institutions are too slow for preventing the negative effects of financial turmoil. In this framework, the ECB has been very active since the beginning of the crisis and its action helped the Eurozone to avoid its economic and political collapse. Nevertheless, the ECB’s action has been strongly criticised because it would appear to contravene EU rules and have probably had the effect to modify its role. The ECB would no longer be a technocratic institution, but the central hub of EU economy policy making, without any democratic effective control. This chapter intends to underline how the supposed democratic deficit can be avoided or limited by strengthening the ECB’s transparency and accountability, safeguarding its independence from political influence.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Roubini and Uzan (2005), Christodoulakis (2015), Jordà et al. (2016).

  2. 2.

    Almunia et al. (2009), Krugman (2009).

  3. 3.

    Mostacci (2009), Markan (2015).

  4. 4.

    Markan (2015).

  5. 5.

    Rosenthal (2012), Weeks (2014).

  6. 6.

    On the SGP and its functioning see Hahn (1998), and more recently Louis (2007). The SGP was fortified, expanded and supplemented by the so-called “Six Pack” (five Regulations and one Directive entered into force on 13 December 2011). See Laffan and Schlosser (2016).

  7. 7.

    Gros and Mayer (2010), Cisotta and Viterbo (2012), Napoletano (2012), Starita (2013), Viterbo (2014).

  8. 8.

    De Grauwe (2011).

  9. 9.

    De Grauwe (2010), Peel (2010).

  10. 10.

    Article 50 TEU only provides the possibility for a Member State to withdraw the EU intended as a whole.

  11. 11.

    On the admissibility of a withdrawal from the Eurozone, see Hofmeister (2011), Dammann (2013), Peroni (2015). For an opposite point of view, see Athanassiou (2009).

  12. 12.

    Goodhart (2007), Villata (2013), Gross and Gummer (2014).

  13. 13.

    These new international treaties raise interesting questions with particular reference to their compatibility with the EU law as represent a solution of the crisis that is outside the European institutional system. See De Witte (2011), Baratta (2012), Craig (2012), Rossi (2012), Tosato (2012).

  14. 14.

    Essentially characterised by a strong reduction of public sectors to finance, particularly, welfare system associated with a significant increase of taxation. See Peroni (2017).

  15. 15.

    Peroni (2013), Viterbo and Costamagna (2013), De Pasquale (2014), Fabbrini (2014).

  16. 16.

    On the legal nature, structure, functions and objectives of ECB: Malatesta (2003), de Haan (2005), Zilioli and Selmayr (2007), Harold (2012).

  17. 17.

    Price stability is mentioned in Articles 3 TEU, and 119, paras. 2 and 3, TFEU; in Article 127, para. 1, TFEU and in Article 2, para. 1, of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB. Price stability is also one of the convergence criteria for the adoption of the Euro (see Article 140, para. 1, TFEU). The mandate of ECB is essentially confined to the maintenance of price stability. Contrary to the US Federal Reserve that is also committed to support growth and employment. According to the liberal theory, see Arndt (1996), price stability can be regarded as a value that stands above democracy.

  18. 18.

    On ECB unconventional measures see Cafaro (2013), Contaldi (2014), Bassan (2015). From an economic perspective see Eser and Schwaab (2013), Szczerbowicz (2015).

  19. 19.

    Buiter and Rahbari (2012).

  20. 20.

    The SMP is a measure of monetary policy and consist of an open market operation directed to ensure liquidity in those market segments that are dysfunctional. It found its legal basis in Article 12, para. 1, Article 13, para. 1, and in particular in Article 18, para. 1, of the ESCB Statute. This is a Protocol (No. 4) to the European Treaties and has, according to Article 51 TEU, the same legal value of the EU primary rules. On the implementation of the SMP, during the development of the financial crisis for the purchase of the PIGS bonds, see Pace (2014).

  21. 21.

    It was adopted by the ECB Governing Council in 2009 to stabilize financial market and help resolve banks’ refinancing problems. It is also a programme finalised to improve the transmission of monetary policy by easing the provision of credit, and return inflation rates to levels closer to 2%; the inflation target usually fixed by ECB (see also note 29).

  22. 22.

    See ECB (2012), p. 7. Thanks to the OMT for the ECB, it is possible to purchase the sovereign bonds of specific Euro area Countries, always, on secondary markets with no set ex ante quantitative limits. The ECB Governing Council’s aim in implementing this programme is to safeguard an appropriate monetary transmission process and the singleness of monetary policy. For the purchasing of the governments bonds, the OMT programme establishes that the State in question complies with conditions specified in European Stability Mechanism, as we have seen before, that establishes a permanent emergency fund which entered in force in September 2012.

  23. 23.

    In these terms consider the famous Draghi’s phrase “The ECB within its mandate will do whatever it takes to save the euro and believe me it will be enough”, uttered during a financial conference in London in July 2012, that signed the beginning of the OMT programme of bond purchase for Eurozone States that were in a situation of financial and economic crisis. The integral Draghi’s speech can be consulted in http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press7key/date72012/html/sp120726.en.html. On the influence of Draghi’s speech on the evolution of the economic crisis in the Eurozone, see Eichegreen (2013).

  24. 24.

    Kontochristou and Masha (2014), Closa and Maatsch (2014), Peroni (2016).

  25. 25.

    The above mentioned three prohibitions are linked with the obligation of Member States under Article 126 TFEU to avoid excessive deficits and with correlated SGP.

  26. 26.

    The States have to finance themselves, if necessary, on the Market and at the conditions set by the Market. The Market is the “Judge” of their financial health. A Member State must borrow on the financial markets in the same way as, and in competition with, other borrowers, including large corporations. See Townsed (2007).

  27. 27.

    According to Mankiw (2007) moral hazard is “the tendency of a person or entity that is imperfectly monitored to engage in undesirable behaviour.”.

  28. 28.

    This could be the risk if the ECB guarantees that money will always be obtainable to pay out sovereign bond holders, it could lead Governments to issue too much debt. See De Grauwe (2011).

  29. 29.

    While the Treaty clearly establishes the fundamental objective of the Eurotower, it does not give a quantitative definition of what is meant by price stability. The ECB’s Governing Council announced a quantitative definition of price stability in these terms: “Price stability is defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%.”. See ECB (2003).

  30. 30.

    De Grauwe (2009), Buiter and Rahbari (2012), Peroni (2012), Quadrio Curzio (2012), De Sousa, Papadia (2013).

  31. 31.

    Torres (2013), Wilsher (2014), Braun (2015), Fontan (2014), Giannone (2015), Lombardi and Moschella (2016).

  32. 32.

    Conditionality makes reference to the commitments contained within loan or grant contract that Countries in financial difficulty must adhere to if they are to receive all or part of the financial aid requested. In the case of Greek crisis, we assist to two different types of macroeconomic conditions: quantitative conditions and structural conditions. The first involved a set of economic targets influencing the level of fiscal deficit or public debt that a Government is allowed to go into. Structural conditions implied institutional and legislative reforms including deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation. See Featherstone (2015).

  33. 33.

    Democratic control usually consists of monitoring and checking that the people exercise over their representatives and institutions to verify how they get and use the delegated power. In the recent years, the democratic control of the Union governance has received particular attention because it is functional to guarantee the legitimacy of the acts of the EU institutions; in other words, the justification, the acceptance of authorities and of their exercising power. On this topic, see Crum (2013).

  34. 34.

    Giannone (2015).

  35. 35.

    Bredt (2011), Majone (2014).

  36. 36.

    Tremonti (2013).

  37. 37.

    Secondary markets are markets where Government securities are traded after they have been issued or sold on primary market. The secondary market is an important source of price signals and is therefore essential for the orderly funding of Government financing requirements, especially in less-developed. On the contrary, the primary market is the market where Government securities are first issued and sold, typically by means of some form of tender or auction process.

  38. 38.

    See supra, note 14.

  39. 39.

    With reference to the validity of European Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 TFEU with regard to the introduction of ESM, see ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland.

  40. 40.

    See in particular way ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62-14, Peter Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag. In that occasion, the Court of Justice confirmed the legality of the OMT. Consider also that on 7 October 7 2015, the General Court of the EU issued its decision in the case of Alessandro Accorinti and Others v. ECB, and ruled that the Eurotower was not responsible for the losses of private investors resulting from the restructuring plan of Greece’s public debt.

  41. 41.

    We make reference, in particular way, to hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, rating agencies. See, respectively, Paredes (2006), Bassan (2011), Gigante and Ligustro (2010).

  42. 42.

    See Strengthening Economic Governance in the EU, Report of the Task Force to the European Council, 21 October 2010; Blanke (2011).

  43. 43.

    Gari (2014).

  44. 44.

    See Law 28 June 2012, No. 92 (“Disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva di crescita”), GURI No. 153, 3 July 2012.

  45. 45.

    According to Article 263 TFEU “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts […] of the European Central Bank intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.”.

  46. 46.

    On the legal effects depending on State’s default, see Malaguti (2011), Frigo (2012), Tanzi (2012).

  47. 47.

    On the independence of ECB, see Hayat, Farvaque (2012), Beukers (2013).

  48. 48.

    It is a common opinion that central banks need to be credible in front the market players to carry out effectively their function. Fort this reason, the said credibility is best achieved trough transparency of its actions and independence from Governments.

  49. 49.

    In said terms, see Gormley and de Hann (1996), Majone (2010).

  50. 50.

    On the profile of accountability applied to the ECB, see Kaltenthaler and Miller (2010), Mény (2014), Wandersman (2014).

  51. 51.

    See the Report “Transparency International. The global coalition against corruption. Improving the accountability and transparency of the European Central Bank”, available at www.transaprencyinetrnational.eu.

  52. 52.

    See Dai (2016).

  53. 53.

    For a different perspective, see Bini Smaghi and Gros (2001).

  54. 54.

    Amtenbrink and van Duin (2009).

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  1. Department of Italian and Supranational Pubic Law, University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Giulio Peroni

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  1. Department of Public Law, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Rome, Italy

    Luigi Daniele

  2. Department of Public Law, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Rome, Italy

    Pierluigi Simone

  3. Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome, Italy

    Roberto Cisotta

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Peroni, G. (2017). The European Central Bank (ECB) and European Democracy: A Technocratic Institution to Rule All European States?. In: Daniele, L., Simone, P., Cisotta, R. (eds) Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53895-2_13

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