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Building Bridges with the Right Tools: Modality and the Standard Model

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EPSA15 Selected Papers

Part of the book series: European Studies in Philosophy of Science ((ESPS,volume 5))

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Abstract

The current state of the relationship between metaphysics and the philosophy of science might appear to be one best described as ‘hostility on both sides’. In an attempt to bridge this gap, French and McKenzie (Eur J Analytic Philos 8:42–59, 2012) have suggested a twofold strategy: on the one hand, if metaphysics is to be taken to have something direct to say about reality, the implications of physics need to be properly appreciated; on the other, one does not have to agree with the claim that a prioristic metaphysics should be dismissed or even discontinued, since we should value scientifically disinterested metaphysics as a ‘toolbox’ for philosophers of science. It is in the context of this strategy that I want to approach the issue of understanding the symmetry principles that feature in the Standard Model of modern physics. I shall suggest that the dispositional analysis of laws is incapable of accommodating such principles. However, there are other tools in the metaphysical toolbox that one can draw upon to help capture the nature of such symmetries corresponding to the second part of the above strategy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As is now well-known, it was suggested that quarks obey a form of the former, before it was shown that their statistical behaviour could be equally well represented via the introduction of a further parameter that came to be called ‘colour’. The speculation that the choice between applying parastatistics and introducing a new property is in certain respects conventional has been firmed up by Baker et al. 2015. This might be viewed as adding further heft to the Vetterian approach.

  2. 2.

    There is some debate as to whether anyons should be considered mere mathematical artefacts or ‘real’ and possibly manipulable entities. In view of what I shall say below, one might question this distinction.

  3. 3.

    Although if one accepts Baker et al.’s result that there is a certain conventionality that holds between conceiving of quarks as parafermions of order 3 and as possessing colour, then one might suggest that other representations are in fact manifested in this world as well.

  4. 4.

    This obviously also involves shifting the locus of potentiality from objects and their properties to the relevant laws and symmetries, with all the attendant consequences regarding how we should understand possible worlds, counterfactuals, counterlegals etc. I don’t have space to discuss such issues here.

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Correspondence to Steven French .

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French, S. (2017). Building Bridges with the Right Tools: Modality and the Standard Model. In: Massimi, M., Romeijn, JW., Schurz, G. (eds) EPSA15 Selected Papers. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53730-6_4

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