Abstract
This chapter scrutinizes Stoic cosmopolitanism from the point of view of gender and shows that this theory provides a powerful argument for equality of men and women. This chapter shows that Hierocles’ famous argument of extending circles proposes that men and women are equally valuable both as subjects and objects of ethical action. Similarly, Cicero’s and Marcus Aurelius’ versions of the cosmopolitan argument emphasize common and shared humanity. This chapter also proposes that the close human relations have an outmost importance in Stoicism since they provide a model for expanding the sphere of ethics to cover the entire human kind. Nevertheless, one’s spouse and family form the privileged sphere for exercising virtue. This chapter analyzes the importance of this idea in the light of contemporary feminist thinkers who have emphasized the philosophical importance of private spheres of life, family, and intimate relationships.
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Hierocles’ account is not unproblematic, however. For a critical analysis of his demand for impartiality, see Julia Annas (1993: 267–276). Hierocles’ argument of extending circles is often quoted in Stoic scholarship. However, the passage continues, but with the exception of Annas (1993), the latter part has attracted much less attention. The second part of the argument discusses how different family members should be treated. This account seems to be, in many ways, incompatible with the argument of the extending circles because here Hierocles calls for different, not same treatment: he proposes, for example, that one should show more love for one’s mother and the relatives on her side, and more honor with respect to one’s father and the relatives on his side. However, the two views, that all people are circumscribed in extending circles, and that there should be different treatment for different relatives, do not seem consistent and they seem to have been placed after each other somewhat randomly. Indeed, neither of these arguments depends on the other, and one could perfectly well deny the latter but still support the former. For this reason, I also limit my discussion of the second passage to this footnote (Hierocles, How Should One Behave toward One’s Relatives?; Stob. Anth. 4.84.23, transl. David Konstan).
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This would also be in line with Epictetus’ idea quoted above according to which, as I read it, it is not a case that one man would belong to one woman. But even if we consider monogamy a practical arrangement (rather than, say, a law of nature), one should still be true to one’s own spouse, just as one does not grab another man’s pork at the dinner party (Discourses, II.iv.8–11, 235–7; cf. Chap. 12).
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For example, it is one of the main arguments in Susan Moller Okin’s work Justice, Gender, and the Family that the family has not traditionally been seen as politically or even ethically important, that not even theories of justice have taken into account its importance, and that family as a social institution is significantly gendered. The sphere of the home, she claims, is typically considered unimportant and uninteresting. Okin herself, in contrast, stresses the importance of the family in any relevant theory of justice, first, because one cannot talk about an equal society if wives are not equal to their husbands inside marriage, and second, because the family is an essential environment in which children learn about justice (1989: 6–24). There is a similar focus on the family in Martha Nussbaum’s well-established feminist work Women and Human Development. She analyzes several particular problems women have traditionally faced, and still face, when family life is left outside of ethical and political concerns, such as domestic violence (2000: 1–33).
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Cf. Plato’s story of the ring of Gyge, the point of which is to illustrate the temptation of doing whatever one pleases if one could do so protected by a ring that makes one invisible and thus without running the risk of being caught (Rep. 359b–360d).
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See Musonius’ lecture “What is the chief end of marriage?” (in King 2011: 57).
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According to Martha Nussbaum, the focus on the private sphere in Seneca’s De Ira has important consequences for public action: “In a world in which emperors mutilate their enemies for fun, looking into oneself is an act of public courage, and of humanity.” (1994: 426).
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Moller Okin, Susan. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. BasicBooks.
Nussbaum, Martha. 1994. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. Women and Human Development—Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Appendix
Appendix
Aurelius, Marcus
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Tôn Eis Heauton
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Marcus Antonius Imperator Ad Se Ipsum. Jan Hendrik Leopold (ed.). Leipzig: B. G. Teubneri, 1908.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius
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De officiis. M. Winterbottom (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
Epictetus
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Discourses (Disc.)
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Discourses and Selected Writings. Christopher Gill (ed.). Robin Hard (transl.). London: J.M. Dent & Vermont, Tuttle/Everyman, 1995.
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Discourses, Books I–IV. W.A. Oldfather (transl.). Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2000.
Hierocles
- Êthikê stoikheiôsis :
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(Elements of Ethics)
- Ek tou pôs patridi khrêsteon :
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(How Should One Behave toward One’s Country?)
- Ek tou pôs syngenesi khrêsteon :
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(How Should One Behave toward One’s Relatives?)
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Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini. Vol. 1 and 4. Guido Bastiani and Anthony Long (eds.). Firenze: Olschcki, 1992. (CPF)
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Etische Elementarlehre (Papyrus 9780): Nebst den bei Stobaios erhaltenen etischen Exzerpten aus Hierokles. Hans Friedrich August von Arnim (ed.). Berlin: Berliner Klassikertexte 4, Weidmann, 1906.
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Hierocles the Stoic, Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts. Ilaria Ramelli (ed.). David Konstan (transl.). Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009.
Plato
- Rep. :
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Republic
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Plato in Twelve Volumes. Vol. 5–6, The Republic. Paul Shorey (transl.). London: Heinemann, 1969.
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus
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De Ira (On Anger).
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Opera Philosophica. Louis Delatte (ed.). Olm, Hildesheim, 1981.
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Moral Essays. Vol. I. John W. Basore (transl.). Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1928.
Stobaeus
- Anth. :
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Anthology
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Anthologium, Ioannis Stobaeus. Otto Hense and Curtius Wachsmuth (eds.). Weidman: Berolini, 1884–1909.
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Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics. Arthur J. Pomeroy (ed. and transl.). Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999.
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Grahn-Wilder, M. (2018). Gender and Stoic Cosmopolitanism. In: Gender and Sexuality in Stoic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53694-1_14
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