Pollock on Practical Reasoning

Abstract

The American epistemologist John Pollock has implemented computationally an architecture for a rational agent which he calls OSCAR. OSCAR models both practical and theoretical (or epistemic) reasoning. I argue that Pollock’s model of practical reasoning, which has seven components, is superior not only to the two-component belief-desire model stemming from Aristotle, but also to the three-component belief-desire-intention model developed especially by the contemporary American philosopher Michael Bratman. Despite its advantages, Pollock’s model of practical reasoning is incomplete in at least three respects: it is solipsistic, it is egoistic and it is unsocial.

Bibliographical note: This chapter was previously published under the same title in Informal Logic 22 (2002), 247–256. It is a revised version of part of a longer paper entitled “John L. Pollock’s theory of rationality”, presented at Argumentation at the Century’s Turn, a conference sponsored by the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada, in May 1999. The text of the longer conference paper is available at http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1749&context=ossaarchive; accessed 2016 08 09.