Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to show that many existing doctrinal disciplines can be upgraded into scientific disciplines if you use the scientific framework of User-friendly Legal Science. Moreover, User-friendly Legal Science can help to address some anomalies of normal legal science. This chapter shows that legal rhetoric, international law and commercial law are anomalies that can be defined as scientific disciplines within the framework of User-friendly Legal Science.
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Notes
- 1.
Kuhn TS (1970).
- 2.
Polanyi M (1967).
- 3.
For a very narrow view on legal science and legal discourse, see, for example, Tuori K (2006).
- 4.
For anomalies, see Kuhn TS (1970), Chapter 6.
- 5.
Mäntysaari P (2016a).
- 6.
See Ehrlich E (1913), pp. 398–399 on the connection of commercial law and living law: “Das einzige Rechtsgebiet, dessen Wissenschaft nicht bloß gelegentlich, sondern durchweg von dem tatsächlich Geübten ausgeht, ist das Handelsrecht … Das ist also das lebende Recht im Gegensatze zu dem bloß vor Gericht und den Behörden geltenden.”
- 7.
Bourdieu P (1987), p. 839: “The law is the quintessential form of ‘active’ discourse, able by its own operation to produce its effects. It would not be excessive to say that it creates the social world, but only if we remember that it is this world which first creates the law.”
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
Capra F, Mattei U (2015), p. 14.
- 11.
See ibid, pp. 160–161.
- 12.
- 13.
von Jhering R (1858), Zweiter Theil, Zweite Abteilung, p. 322: “Der Zunft, an dem jeder Laie sich seines Laienthums bewußt werden muß, … ist die juristische Methode. Dem Juristen sollte billigerweise nichts bekannter sein als sie, denn gerade sie ist es, die ihn zum Juristen macht. Und doch ist es nicht zu viel behauptet, daß ein eigentliches Bewußtsein über sie den meisten Juristen völlig fehlt, und daß unsere Wissenschaft alle anderen Gesetze besser kennt als die Gesetze ihrer selbst.”
- 14.
White JB (2002), p. 1399.
- 15.
Hellner J (2001), pp. 69 and 71.
- 16.
Eckhoff T (1993).
- 17.
See already Augustine of Hippo, De doctrina christiana, Second Book, XXXIV and XXXVI.
- 18.
- 19.
For anomalies, see Kuhn TS (1970), Chapter 6.
- 20.
Segal J, Spaeth H (2002), pp. 86–89.
- 21.
See Paso M (2014), p. 237.
- 22.
Kelsen H (1934).
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
Acemoglu D, Robinson JA (2012), p. 307.
- 26.
Cotterrell R (1995), p. 53.
- 27.
Ibid, p. 92.
- 28.
See ibid, p. 100.
- 29.
See ibid, pp. 92–93.
- 30.
Paso M (2014), p. 238.
- 31.
See, for example, McCloskey DN (1988), p. 757: “Take down a modern elementary textbook on logic … and slowly read the section on ‘fallacies.’ Try to ignore the authoritarian and dismissive rhetoric with which the philosophers treat the ‘fallacies,’ and ask yourself – Are these not in fact the usual forms of legal reasoning? Are they really all wrong, to be discarded in serious conversation? Or should we rather make distinctions between good analogies and bad, good arguments from authority and bad, good rhetoric and bad?”
- 32.
See Paso M (2014), p. 237.
- 33.
Mäntysaari P (2016a).
- 34.
See Paso M (2014), p. 248; Mäntysaari P (2016a). The core of the decision is internal justification. However, there is a problem. Paso M (2014), p. 239: “[I]nternal justification does not answer the question of why a certain norm was chosen. The same applies to facts: Internal justification does not answer the question of why a certain fact was considered relevant while another was ignored.” External justification is needed if the premisses cannot be derived from the law.
- 35.
Segal J, Spaeth H (2002), pp. 86–89.
- 36.
Ibid, pp. 86–89.
- 37.
Mäntysaari P (2016a).
- 38.
See, for example, Cicero, De Oratore; Augustine of Hippo, De doctrina christiana; Schopenhauer A (1830); Perelman C, Olbrechts-Tyteca L (1971); Perelman C (1977); Gast W (2015).
- 39.
Plato, Sophist, 226a, Stranger: “Yes, and the sophist is nothing else, apparently, than the money-making class of the disputatious, argumentative, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now again stated.”
- 40.
Plato, Sophist, 232d.
- 41.
Plato, Gorgias, 454e and 455a.
- 42.
Plato, Sophist, 233a and 233b.
- 43.
Plato, Phaedrus, 266b.
- 44.
Aristotle, Rhetoric, First Book, Chapter 3, 1358b.
- 45.
For Greek law, see Szramkiewicz R, Descamps O (2013), Chapter I, § 3 B.
- 46.
See, for example, Cicero, De Oratore, First Book, sections 48, 159, 236; Pound R (1959), Chapter 2, § 2, p. 30.
- 47.
- 48.
Cicero, Brutus, section 152: “… postremo habere regulam, qua vera et falsa iudicarentur …”
- 49.
See, for example, Cicero, De Oratore, First Book, sections 199–202.
- 50.
Sherman CP (1908), p. 503.
- 51.
See ibid, pp. 503–504.
- 52.
Pound R (1959), Chapter 2, § 6, p. 43.
- 53.
See, for example, Aune JA (1996); Latour B (2013), p. 366: “Cicero could take his place in the French Council of State or in the Luxembourg Tribunal without having to do anything except learn French!”
- 54.
- 55.
See, for example, Alexy R (2012), C.I.1., p. 261.
- 56.
The traditional view is limited to disputes in the court. See, for example, Llewellyn K (1930), p. 3: “What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.” Capra F, Mattei U (2015), p. 126: “According to a more realist legal vision, the last word in the law does not belong to the legal professionals at the top of the pyramid, such as a supreme court. Rather, it belongs to those at the bottom, because the usual decision maker is the one closest to the actual conflict, the interpreter who actually captures (or makes) the law in action in most cases.”
- 57.
Mäntysaari P (2016a).
- 58.
Weber M (1904), Chapter I: “[D]enn wir sind der Meinung, daß es niemals Aufgabe einer Erfahrungswissenschaft sein kann, bindende Normen und Ideale zu ermitteln, um daraus für die Praxis Rezepte ableiten zu können.”
- 59.
Alexy R (2012), Einleitung 2, p. 33 and C.III.1., p. 349.
- 60.
Mäntysaari P (2016a).
- 61.
Fallon RH Jr. (1999), pp. 562–563.
- 62.
For source pluralism in Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic, see Schröder J (2016).
- 63.
- 64.
For example, while a terrorist on trial might direct his message to fellow extremists and sympathisers, the judge might direct her message to her own peers and the general public. One can also say that they act “strategically”. Alexy R (2012), C.I.2, p. 270.
- 65.
- 66.
See, for example, Llewellyn K (1930), p. 3.
- 67.
The leading predictive-explanatory theory of judicial decisions in political science is the “attitudinal model”. See Segal J, Spaeth H (2002), pp. 86–89.
- 68.
Plato, Republic, 2.
- 69.
Bourdieu P (1975), p. 30.
- 70.
Compare Bourdieu P (1975), p. 23: “The struggle for scientific authority … owes its specificity to the fact that the producers tend to have no possible clients other than their competitors …”
- 71.
Alexy R (2012), C.II, p. 273.
- 72.
Schopenhauer A (1830).
- 73.
See, for example, Augustine of Hippo, De doctrina christiana, Fourth Book, II; Capra F, Mattei U (2015), p. 126: “Thus, the outcome of a legal conflict is not predictable with certainty (as the mechanistic vision claims) but is only probable, since we are not able to master all the factors that determine the prejudices of the interpreter.”
- 74.
Mäntysaari P (2016a).
- 75.
See Ross A (1966), § 30, p. 179; Alexy R (2012), Einleitung 2, p. 38; Graver HP (2000), p. 457. See even Bourdieu P (1987), p. 818: “Furthermore, competition between interpreters is limited by the fact that judicial decisions can be distinguished from naked exercises of power only to the extent that they can be presented as the necessary result of a principled interpretation of unanimously accepted texts.”
- 76.
- 77.
See, for example, Augustine of Hippo, De doctrina christiana, Fourth Book, X.
- 78.
Malloy RP (2004), p. 16 gives an example of ethos arguments. According to Malloy, there are “four general justifications that are typically offered as a basis for private property rights over valuable resources. These justifications can be identified as approaches based on natural rights, distributive justice, economics, and identity.”
- 79.
Schopenhauer A (1830).
- 80.
- 81.
- 82.
Merton RK (1973).
- 83.
- 84.
For the use of economics, see Malloy RP (2004).
- 85.
Heck P (1914), p. 173 (“Begriffskern”, “Begriffshof”).
- 86.
- 87.
- 88.
See, for example, Eckhoff T (1993), Chapter 2, VI, p. 48 and Chapter 2, VIII, p. 54.
- 89.
See, for example, BVerfGE 19, 206, 219 on the separation of church and state under the German constitution. The outcome was motivated by the combined effect of many provisions: “Das Grundgesetz legt durch Art. 4 Abs. 1, Art. 3 Abs. 3, Art. 33 Abs. 3 GG sowie durch Art. 136 Abs. 1 und 4 und Art. 137 Abs. 1 WRV in Verbindung mit Art. 140 GG dem Staat als Heimstatt aller Staatsbürger ohne Ansehen der Person weltanschaulich-religiöse Neutralität auf. Es verwehrt die Einführung staatskirchlicher Rechtsformen und untersagt auch die Privilegierung bestimmter Bekenntnisse.” You can find a further example in Leiter B (2001): “We prefer simpler explanations to more complex ones … We prefer more comprehensive explanations … We prefer explanations that leave more of our other well-confirmed beliefs and theories intact to those that don’t …”
- 90.
Mäntysaari P (2016a), section 6.5.
- 91.
Ibid, section 6.6.
- 92.
See, for example, Ross A (1958), p. 29 on the prognosis theory.
- 93.
The main principles of a linguistic analysis were set out in Wittgenstein L (1922). The phrase “the linguistic turn” was coined by Gustav Bergmann. Bergmann G (1964), p. 177. It was made popular in 1967 by Richard Rorty. Rorty R (1967), p. 3. For recent discourse in legal science and Koskenniemi, see Dellavalle S (2016).
- 94.
Wittgenstein L (1953), § 1 and § 43.
- 95.
- 96.
Banakar R, Travers M (2005), p. 137.
- 97.
Hart HLA (1961/ 2012), pp. 215–216.
- 98.
See, for example ibid, pp. 214, 220 and 224 on attempts “to reconcile the (absolute) sovereignty of states with the existence of binding rules of international law, by treating all international obligations as self-imposed like the obligation which arises from a promise”.
- 99.
- 100.
Hart HLA (1961/ 2012), p. 233.
- 101.
Kelsen H (1934), pp. 131–132: “Das Völkerrecht weist den nämlichen Charakter auf wie das einzelstaatliche Recht. Es ist wie dieses eine Zwangsordnung … Die spezifischen Unrechtsfolgen des Völkerrechts sind: Repressalie und Krieg. Aber das Völkerrecht ist noch eine primitive Rechtsordnung … Es ist die Technik der Selbsthilfe, von der auch die Entwicklung der einzelstaatlichen Rechtsordnung ausgegangen ist.”
- 102.
Hart HLA (1961/ 2012), p. 236.
- 103.
Ibid, p. 214: “… the rules for states resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting only of primary rules of obligation, which, when we find it among societies of individuals, we are accustomed to contrast with a developed legal system.”
- 104.
Bentham J (1789), Chapter XVII, number XXV, note.
- 105.
Hart HLA (1961/ 2012), pp. 236–237.
- 106.
- 107.
Neff SC (2003), p. 32.
- 108.
Bentham J (1789), Chapter XVII, number XXV, note: “The word international, it must be acknowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous and intelligible. It is calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch of law which goes commonly under the name of the law of nations: an appellation so uncharacteristic, that, were it not for the force of custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence. The chancellor D’Aguesseau has already made, I find, a similar remark: he says that what is commonly called droit des gens, ought rather to be termed droit entre les gens.”
- 109.
Koskenniemi M (2003), pp. 110–111.
- 110.
Ibid, pp. 110–111.
- 111.
Neff SC (2003), p. 42.
- 112.
Ibid, p. 42.
- 113.
- 114.
Koskenniemi M (2003), pp. 110–111.
- 115.
Ibid, p. 90: “If there is an ‘international community’, it is not a teleological but a practical association, a system not designed to realize ultimate ends but to co-ordinate practical action to further the objectives of existing communities.”
- 116.
Ibid, p. 89: “International law certainly seeks to realize the political values, interests, and preferences of various international actors. But it also appears as a standard of criticism and means of controlling those in powerful positions.”
- 117.
Ibid, p. 90.
- 118.
Ibid, p. 89: “Instrumentalism and formalism connote two opposite sensibilities of what it means to be an international lawyer, and two cultures of professional practice, the stereotypes of ‘the advisor’ to a powerful actor with many policy-alternatives and ‘the judge’ scrutinizing the legality of a particular international behaviour.”
- 119.
- 120.
Koskenniemi M (2003), p. 90: “To enquire about the objectives of international law is to study the political preferences of international actors – what it is that they wish to attain by international law.”
- 121.
Ibid, p. 95: “State objectives and State survival remain the highest objectives of the System.”
- 122.
Friedmann W (1964).
- 123.
- 124.
- 125.
Neff SC (2003), p. 45.
- 126.
- 127.
See von Bogdandy A, Goldmann M, Venzke I (2016), Part I on “the regulatory requests surrounding international institutions”.
- 128.
Article 1(3) of the UN Charter.
- 129.
Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:31.
- 130.
Article 55(1) of the UN Charter.
- 131.
Koskenniemi M (2003), p. 96.
- 132.
Neff SC (2003), p. 32.
- 133.
- 134.
Koskenniemi M (2003), p. 93.
- 135.
Ross A (1958), § 12.
- 136.
- 137.
Koskenniemi M (2003), pp. 98–99.
- 138.
Ibid, p. 100.
- 139.
Ibid, p. 101 on interdisciplinary studies in the 1990s.
- 140.
Hart HLA (1961/ 2012), p. 214: “It is indeed arguable … that international law not only lacks the secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying ‘sources’ of law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules.”
- 141.
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice; Scobbie I (2003), p. 62.
- 142.
Neff SC (2003), p. 33: “… a number of fairly standard practices emerged, which helped to place inter-State relations on at least a somewhat stable and predictable footing. This was true in three areas especially: diplomatic relations, treaty-making, and the conduct of war. A major additional contribution of the Greek city-States was the practice of arbitration of disputes …”
- 143.
Nussbaum A (1954), pp. 1–2.
- 144.
Neff SC (2003), p. 33.
- 145.
Article 1 of the UN Charter.
- 146.
Neff SC (2003), p. 36.
- 147.
Ibid, p. 40.
- 148.
Ibid, p. 45.
- 149.
See Dellavalle S (2016): “The practical consequence that Koskenniemi draws from his legal theory is that precisely because the legal language has no truth content in itself, it is up to the legal professional to give a sense to the law according to his/her priorities. In other words, exactly the lack of a truth content in the legal language enables the legal professional to use the law as an instrument at the service of his/her – lastly not rationally justifiable – preferences.”
- 150.
See, for example, Articles 31–32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties.
- 151.
Orford A (2013), p. 176: “If we want to understand the work that a particular legal argument is doing, we have to grasp both aspects of law’s operation—the way it relates to a particular, identifiable social context, and the way in which it gestures beyond that context to a conversation that may persist—sometimes in a neat linear progression, sometimes in wild leaps and bounds—across centuries.”
- 152.
Dellavalle S (2016), Chapter II: “Koskenniemi’s epistemology is, at first, a legal epistemology, addressing mainly the question whether legal propositions contain a provable and coherent reference to phenomena, facts or actions, and thus to a ‘true’ knowledge of the world.” Chapter IV: “[T]he legal system described by legal positivists and system theorists is assumed to be internally coherent insofar as it is regarded as rooted in a consistent idea of rationality. On the contrary, one of the most essential tenets of Koskenniemi’s epistemology consists precisely in the assertion that the linguistic analysis of the legal discourse demonstrates its lack of internal consistency.”
- 153.
Orford A (2013), p. 170.
- 154.
Ibid, pp. 170 and 177; von Holderstein Holtermann J, Madsen MR (2015).
- 155.
Szramkiewicz R, Descamps O (2013), Chapter I, § 2 A.
- 156.
Ibid, Chapter 1, § 2 B; Van de Mieroop M (2005), pp. 17–18.
- 157.
See, for example, Van Caenegem RC, Johnston DEL (1992), pp. 83–85.
- 158.
Schmitthoff CM (1961).
- 159.
See, for example, Michaels R (2007), p. 448.
- 160.
See also Neff SC (2003), p. 36.
- 161.
See Szramkiewicz R, Descamps O (2013) on French law; Schmoeckel M, Maetschke M (2016) on German law; Trakman LE (1983). See also Scott HS (1978), p. 738: “In any case, statutory rules are principally designed to alter rather than to ‘codify’ the existing legal regime. They reflect concern with the ability of various transactors, whether merchants or consumers, to protect themselves in the marketplace, and they are ultimately distributional in character. Since they are designed to alter the existing order or to remedy market failure or inefficiency, statutory commercial rules are unlikely to be optional – mere backstops for existing merchant practices.”
- 162.
- 163.
This can be contrasted with the earlier 1861 Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB) of the German Federation. As the ADHGB was not complemented by a general private law code, it regulated many questions belonging to general private law.
- 164.
Trakman LE (1983), p. 25.
- 165.
- 166.
Stigler GJ (1971); Fisk C, Gordon RW (2011), p. 539: “Of course, one of the core insights of legal history since Hurst and Horwitz has been that legal regimes facilitate particular economic arrangements and distributions of wealth and that people who are motivated largely by the desire to amass fortunes have been influential creators of the tapestry of law for centuries.”
- 167.
Guével D (2012), p. 23, Introduction, no 21: “On peut donc postuler que le droit des affaires est. compose du droit de commercial ainsi que d’un ensemble de règles (empruntées à d’autres matières) pouvant intéresser l’enterprise privée, le professional et/ou les activités économiques ou professionelles)”.
- 168.
Ibid, pp. 23–26, Introduction, nos 23–33.
- 169.
See, for example, Roth GH (1994), § 1.3.a.
- 170.
Trakman LE (1983), p. 27.
- 171.
Especially for his work in cases such as: Pillans & Rose v Van Mierop & Hopkins [1765] 3 Burr 1663; and Carter v Boehm [1766] 3 Burr 1905. Lord Mansfield was born William Murray in Scotland in 1705.
- 172.
See Goode RM (1998), p. 8.
- 173.
- 174.
- 175.
Roth GH (1994), § 1.2.b: “Auf eine kurze Formel gebracht: Das Handelsrecht ist charakterisiert durch eine tendenziell stärkere Betonung des Verkehrsinteresses gegenüber dem Bestandsinteresse, der Privatautonomie und Selbsverantwortlichkeit gegenüber dem sozialen Rechtsschutz und der Rechtssicherheit und Rechtsklarheit gegenüber der Einzelfallgerechtigkeit.” Szramkiewicz R, Descamps O (2013), Chapter I, § 1(6): “Il est: international, individualiste, laic, conventionnel, restitutif et non répressif, non formaliste.” See also Goode RM (1988), p. 148.
- 176.
See, for example, Guével D (2012), pp. 23–26, Introduction, II, nos 23–32.
- 177.
- 178.
Roth GH (1994), § 1.2.b: “Inhaltlich lassen sich die besonderen Charakteristika des Handelsrechts unschwer von den aus dem genannten wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang erwachsenden Bedürfnissen her erklären.” Guével D (2012), p. 23, Introduction, no 21: “On peut donc postuler que le droit des affaires est. compose du droit de commercial ainsi que d’un ensemble de règles (empruntées à d’autres matières) pouvant intéresser l’enterprise privée, le professional et/ou les activités économiques ou professionelles).”
- 179.
See also Goode RM (1988), p. 141: “[Commercial law] possesses four characteristics. It is based on transactions, not on institutions; it is concerned primarily with dealings between merchants …; it is centred on contract and on the usages of the market; and it is concerned with a large mass of transactions …”
- 180.
Article L. 142–2 of the Code de commerce.
- 181.
Guével D (2012), p. 75, Chapter 1, Section 3, B, no 130: “La clientele est un élément du fonds de commerce … Mais c’est son élément essentiel, un élément indispensable, puisque, comme on l’a vu, de fonds doit être exploité pour exister …”.
- 182.
Ibid, pp. 72–74, Chapter 1, Section 3, A, nos 125–127.
- 183.
Ibid, p. 85, Chapter 2, Section 1, § 1, no 146: “Lˈenterprise devrait être au cœur de droit des affaires. On considère souvent que lˈenterprise constitue l’élément micro-économique fundamental en économie libérale.” See already Weber M (1922).
- 184.
Guével D (2012), p. 88, Chapter 2, Section 1, no 155: “[L]ˈenterprise devrait être une entité autonome, à la fois sujet et objet de droit, comprenant un élément capitalistique, un élément humain et une direction indépendante, agrégés par des contrats et regroupés autour dˈun intérêt commun spécifique, non nécessairement lucratif.”
- 185.
Ibid, p. 86, Chapter 2, Section 1, § 1, no 149: “Lˈenterprise n’a pas la personnalité morale en France.”
- 186.
Ibid, p. 87, Chapter 2, Section 1, § 1, no 149.
- 187.
Ibid, p. 86, Chapter 2, Section 1, no 149: “La définition juridique de lˈenterprise n’est que purement doctrinale et peut donc varier dˈuin auteur á lˈautre.”
- 188.
Article L. 121–1 of Code de commerce.
- 189.
Article L. 210–1 of Code de commerce.
- 190.
Article L. 123–7 of Code de commerce.
- 191.
Guével D (2012), pp. 88–89, Chapter 2, Section 1, § 1, no 156.
- 192.
§ 1(1) HGB.
- 193.
§ 6(1) HGB.
- 194.
§ 1(2) HGB.
- 195.
Führlich ER (2006), § 3.I.1: “Unter einem Gewerbe ist jede * äußerlich erkennbare, * selbständige, * planmäßig, auf gewisse Dauer, * mit Gewinnerzielungsabsicht ausgeübte Tätigkeit, * die nicht ‚freier Beruf‘ ist, zu verstehen.”
- 196.
§ 1(2) HGB and § 6(2) HGB.
- 197.
§ 2 HGB.
- 198.
§ 15(4) HGB.
- 199.
See, for example, § 33(2) HGB, § 105(2) HGB and § 264b HGB.
- 200.
One can see evidence of this also in § 3(1)(2) GmbHG and § 23(2)(2) AktG. See, for example, Priester HJ (2004), p. 252.
- 201.
Mäntysaari P (2005), p. 363.
- 202.
La Chambre Criminelle de la Cour de cassation, 4 February 1985.
- 203.
See Hofstetter K (1990).
- 204.
In particular, it must be compatible with group policy, there must be some return for the company providing the assistance and no disruption of the balance of mutual obligations, and the financial assistance should not exceed the capacity of the company. See also Commission Staff Working Document, An EU Framework for Cross-border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, SEC(2009) 1407, paragraph 60.
- 205.
Articles 101, 102 and 107 of the TFEU. For example, the European Commission (SA.38373) took the view that the way to establish the taxable profits for two Irish incorporated companies of the Apple group did not correspond to economic reality. The European Commission decided that the practices of Ireland amounted to prohibited state aid to Apple.
- 206.
For the very different US view, see Kraus JS, Walt SD (2000), p. 1: “Efficiency is the dominant paradigm in contemporary corporate and commercial law scholarship. The jurisprudential foundations of corporate and commercial law, then are the foundations of efficiency analysis.” For a critique, see Posner EA (2002); Eidenmüller H (2005), pp. 169–170, 487 and 490; Mestmäcker EJ (2007), p. 13; Mäntysaari P (2012), section 3.6.
- 207.
See Goode RM (1998), p. 8. For example, there is no such code in the Nordic countries and most common law jurisdictions.
- 208.
For example, it is assumed that company law is at the core of German commercial law, but much of German company law is regulated outside the German commercial law code (HGB). Goode argues that company law does not belong to a commercial law code. Goode RM (1988), p. 141.
- 209.
Compare the Code de commerce (France) and the Uniform Commercial Code (USA).
- 210.
For legal history, see Schmoeckel M, Maetschke M (2016), pp. 3–4, number 5.
- 211.
Kant I (1783), § 1.
- 212.
For example, Finnish commercial law used to consist of the same issues as German commercial law for the most part of the twentieth century. What was perceived as commercial law in Finland changed in the 1980s due to the political preferences of a generation of legal scholars. While the starting point of German commercial law was and still is the perspective of the trader or the firm, the increasingly leftish Finnish commercial law scholars were more interested in how business could be regulated. See Mäntysaari P (2011); Mäntysaari P (2014).
- 213.
For example, Goode argues that company law does not belong to a commercial law code. Goode RM (1988), p. 141. Companies have nevertheless been regulated in the French and German codes.
- 214.
- 215.
- 216.
- 217.
See, for example, Mäntysaari P (2002) on the Finnish corporation as an actor; Orts EW (2015) on the firm as a business person.
- 218.
Mäntysaari P (2010), p. 172.
- 219.
For differences between MBCL and transaction cost economics, see Mäntysaari P (2012), section 4.9.
- 220.
Alchian AA (1950).
- 221.
Ibid. See also Freeman RE (1984).
- 222.
- 223.
- 224.
- 225.
- 226.
For a historical survey, see Stiglitz JE (2002).
- 227.
- 228.
- 229.
- 230.
- 231.
- 232.
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Mäntysaari, P. (2017). Anomalies of Normal Legal Science, Applications of User-Friendly Legal Science. In: User-friendly Legal Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53492-3_7
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