Abstract
The lack of international institutional capacity to oversee the challenge of international trade in GM products has resulted in a conundrum. If the world of global trade is to avoid falling into the scenario of constant trade blockages and barriers, then practical solutions are required to advance the discussion and dialogue. One strategy is to pursue more clear and operational labeling rules through regional trade agreements in order to help facilitate trade.
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Notes
- 1.
Prior to the Uruguay Round renegotiation technical barriers to trade were dealt with in the GATT’s Standards Code.
- 2.
Formally, a neoclassical partial equilibrium comparative statics model underlies trade policy making at the WTO (Kerr 2007).
- 3.
As such they represent a subset of technical barriers to trade. The reduction of trade, and hence the loss of trade benefits, associated with technical barriers to trade, is considerable (Hobbs 2007). Removal of technical barriers to trade or their reconstitution to be the least trade distorting to achieve a particular domestic policy goal is a central tenant of the WTO and preferential trade agreements (Kerr 2010). A discussion of the welfare implications of technical barriers to trade can be found in Kerr (2006).
- 4.
Although it is somewhat inconsistent that critics of biotechnology who are not willing to accept a judgement of hazard for none are willing to accept a judgement of hazard for all from the same science-based system.
- 5.
Fencing in means that the responsibility for containing or mitigating the effects of a negative externality lies with the polluter. The term comes from the regulation of ranching where the responsibility for preventing negative externalities arising from stray cattle lay with the owner of the cattle who was expected to keep them fenced in.
- 6.
Fencing out means that the responsibility for containing or mitigating the effects of negative externalities lies with those receiving the pollution. The term comes from ranching where the responsibility for preventing negative externalities arising from stray cattle lay with the owner of the property where the negative externality would be manifest meaning they were to build a fence to keep out stray cattle.
- 7.
Where the costs of controlling any externalities pertaining to production are legislatively imposed on those wishing to grow GM crops.
- 8.
This will be the case unless the importing country is in a different preferential trade agreement with the potential trading partner. In this case there will be three sets of labeling rules being applied in the importer’s market—those negotiated in the new agreement with the subset of trading partners, those negotiated in the previous trade agreement with a different subset of trading partners and the WTO’s for the remaining trading partners. This will further complicate the importer’s marketplace. Of course, over the last decade and a half many preferential trade agreements have been negotiated—well in excess of one hundred—with a number of countries being members of multiple agreements (Perdikis 2007). This is sometimes referred to as the spaghetti bowl of regional trade agreements (Kerr 2011). Of course, not all of the preferential trade agreements to which a country belongs may have specific rules for GMO labeling. It is clear, however, that multiple labeling rules will make the importer’s marketplace increasingly complex for consumers. This complication is ignored as the discussion of two labeling rules in this section indicates the effects of such complexity.
- 9.
Leaving aside the case of hazard for some.
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Smyth, S.J., Kerr, W.A., Phillips, P.W.B. (2017). Labeling and Preferential Trade Deals. In: Biotechnology Regulation and Trade. Natural Resource Management and Policy, vol 51. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53295-0_12
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