Abstract
From this chapter, we will discuss several applications of the moral hazard problem by adopting different models. One fundamental model will be given in this chapter as an introductory. Then, two extensions will be discussed sequentially. Nowadays, people are used to access various sophisticated location-based services (e.g., Foursquare and Yelp) from their smartphones through wireless access networks.
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Zhang, Y., Han, Z. (2017). Incentive Mechanism in Crowdsourcing with Moral Hazard. In: Contract Theory for Wireless Networks. Wireless Networks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53288-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53288-2_3
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