Abstract
As an alternative to the view that the aim of science is truth, this chapter maintains that the aim of science is plausibility, and specifically to make plausible hypotheses about the world, namely hypotheses such that the arguments for them are stronger than those against them, on the basis of the existing knowledge. The chapter argues that this meets all the difficulties of the view that the aim of science is truth. It also argues that plausibility is different from truth, probability and warranted assertibility, but is to a certain extent related to Aristotle ’s endoxa. Moreover, the chapter discusses the relation between scientific knowledge and common sense knowledge, arguing that, rather than being opposed to common sense knowledge, scientific knowledge gives an explanation of our common sense knowledge, providing an interpretation of it.
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Cellucci, C. (2017). Knowledge, Plausibility, and Common Sense. In: Rethinking Knowledge. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53237-0_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53237-0_9
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