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Aristotelian Hylomorphism: A Framework for Non-physicalist Philosophers About Philosophy of Mind

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Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update - Vol. II

Abstract

The results of a recent survey on the philosophical views of contemporary, mainly Anglo-Saxon professional philosophers have shown that a supposed predominance of physicalist reductionist positions in the philosophy of neurosciences is far from unanimous. This paper explores one possible philosophical position rooting a non-physicalist reductionist conception of mind. It suggests and argues that a classical philosophical frame, Aristotelian hylomorphism, provides adequate non-reductionist answers that do not fall into dualisms. Finally, it offers the corresponding conclusions.

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Acknowledgments

I express my gratitude to William Jaworski, Juan José Sanguineti, Stephen Brock, Ivana Anton Mlinar, Miguel Verstraete, Ceferino Muñoz, Santiago Gelonch and Juan Francisco Franck for useful comments on previous versions of this paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad Austral, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, CONICET, Mariano Acosta s/n y Ruta Nacional 8 Pilar, Buenos Aires, B1629WWA, Argentina

    Ricardo F. Crespo PhD

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  1. Ricardo F. Crespo PhD
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Correspondence to Ricardo F. Crespo PhD .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. National University of Cuyo, Catholic University of Argentina, Guaymallen Mendoza, Argentina

    Pascual Ángel Gargiulo

  2. Institute of Neurobiology Foundation, National Academy of Medicine, Buenos Aires, Argentina

    Humberto Luis Mesones-Arroyo

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Crespo, R.F. (2017). Aristotelian Hylomorphism: A Framework for Non-physicalist Philosophers About Philosophy of Mind. In: Gargiulo, P., Mesones-Arroyo, H. (eds) Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update - Vol. II. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53126-7_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53126-7_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-53125-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-53126-7

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