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General Consequences

  • Tero TulenheimoEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 41)

Abstract

My framework offers a novel semantic analysis of sentences that ascribe to an agent a mental state having an intentional object. Making use of the analysis of intentional states presented in Sect.  4.7, I discern in Sect. 6.2 four senses of the notion of intentional object and indicate how mental states involving different types of objects of thought can be uniformly represented in my semantic framework: propositional thoughts, plural thoughts, thoughts with an indeterminate object, singular thoughts, and thoughts representing specific physical objects.

Keywords

Noun Phrase Physical Object Relative Clause Intentional State World Line 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CNRS, UMR 8163 – STLLilleFrance
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LilleLilleFrance

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