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The Largest Conditional Cash Transfer in the World

  • Michelle Morais de Sá e SilvaEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

Chapter 6 is about the Brazilian Bolsa Familia , the largest conditional cash transfer program in the world. Bolsa Familia currently reaches 14 million families, including 17 million students. It has been one of the main contributors to the stark reduction of extreme poverty and to the elimination of hunger in Brazil over recent years. The chapter gives an account of how the program was created, how it currently works, and how it relates to education policies and practices in Brazil. The chapter also raises questions about the program’s political survival, given the recent and abrupt changes in Brazil’s political system.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Escola Nacional de Administração Pública (ENAP)BrasíliaBrazil

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