Political Regime

Abstract

The political regime of member countries is a major factor determining the evolution and the type of the regional organization. The main focus of this chapter is to study the distinction between autocratic and democratic countries. It suggests that autocracies and democracies have different preferences regarding the regional organization type. The chapter pays particular attention to understanding under which conditions authoritarian states can create a regional organizations characterized by successful economic cooperation across members. It also studies the preconditions under which both democracies and autocracies will sustain a regional organization dominated in particular by the rhetorical goals and objectives.

1 Democracies and Autocracies in Regional Integration

While in previous chapters we have occasionally referred to domestic politics, we have never investigated the details of how preferences with respect to RO type are formed in the domestic political arena. One of the key factors appears to be the political regime of member countries. This topic has undoubtedly received substantial attention in the literature. The general conclusion of most studies is that democracies are more likely than autocracies to establish a successful RO and stick to their commitments. In terms of establishing an RO, autocrats’ survival and their extraction of rents crucially depends on having a monopoly on power. Therefore even limited delegation to an RO can be unacceptable. Autocracies must not merely maintain some marginally sufficient level of control over society; they must demonstrate an overwhelming degree of control to ensure the loyalty of their own bureaucracies.¹ An RO is incompatible with this goal. Furthermore, given the importance of being reelected, entering an RO can be a helpful device for democratic leaders to signal to the public.² Non-democracies are less concerned about this issue.³

Even if the benefits derived from an RO could outweigh the costs of agreements for autocratic governments, the problem of credibility of commitments becomes central, and autocracies lack the instruments to solve it.⁴ There are several reasons for this lack of credibility. A popular argument in the literature suggests that audience costs are lower for non-democracies.⁵ Moreover, the smaller number of veto-players in non-democracies makes it easier for them to swiftly change their policy. Finally, decision-making in non-democracies is less transparent, so higher information asymmetry may also prevent credible commitments from being made. As a result, anticipating non-democracies’ possible future breach of commitments, countries refrain from joining ROs with them. This is especially true when a non-democracy is the leading country (as discussed in Section 5.3), making the risk of manipulation very large.

According to existing empirical evidence, autocratic states are significantly less likely to behave cooperatively in international relations,⁶ exhibit a cooperative attitude toward environmental issues,⁷ create international organizations,⁸ and enter trade agreements.⁹ However, the literature also suggests that non-democracies have a certain advantage in cooperating: because their decision structure involves fewer veto players, they may find it easier to decide to cooperate to overcome the influence of particular domestic groups, which could prevent cooperation in democracies. Interestingly, this argument is somewhat at odds with the credible commitments argument: the smaller number of veto players makes the decision to cooperate easier to make but also easier to break, making it less credible. Empirically, Garriga suggests that due to the need to accommodate domestic political concerns democracies are actually less likely to enter bilateral treaties than non-democracies.¹⁰ Simmons shows that democracies’ compliance with IMF rules is lower than that of autocracies.¹¹ In a study of the Mercosur countries, Remmer does not find that democracy has a robust positive impact on interstate cooperation.¹² Finally, Mattes and Rodrigues suggest that more institutionalized non-democracies are likely to exhibit cooperative behaviour, while less institutionalized non-democracies are not likely to do so.¹³ Solingen also suggests striking differences in the regional dynamics of cooperation of non-democracies in different parts of the world (e.g., East Asia versus Middle East).¹⁴

These arguments certainly apply to ‘Alive and Kicking’ ROs, where the impact of political regimes varies depending on the specific issues covered by the RO. For some regimes, particular issues may be especially sensitive (due to ideology or their role in preserving the power of the leaders). On the other hand, regimes may also be willing to cooperate with each other in order to undermine possible opposition or ideological opponents, e.g., communists for Latin American states. There is some evidence of such cooperation – disguised as an economic RO – in various parts of the world.¹⁵ More importantly, political regimes are likely to greatly influence the formation of ‘Integration Rhetoric’ ROs. Again, a key reason why these ROs are created is regime-boosting, i.e., authoritarian leaders’ attempts to obtain legitimacy by pretending to cooperate with other leaders.

Democracies may also be interested in legitimacy-boosting, but, as mentioned in Chapter 2, they typically face fewer problems with their international legitimacy. The exception is nascent democracies. However, for them the desired ‘status symbol’ is not recognition by other nascent democratic states, but by mature democracies. For example, though it serves as an ‘Integration Rhetoric’ alliance of nascent democracies, GUAM is substantially less attractive to them than the possibility of joining the EU. Mature democracies do not require ‘Integration Rhetoric’ for their own legitimacy, but they may use it to promote democratic regimes in nascent democracies without having to enter a costly ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO.

For other RO types, the effects of political regimes are associated with two issues: the importance of interpersonal meetings among leaders and discretion in governmental (or bureaucratic) control over the budget. For ‘Talking Clubs’, the crucial issue is how important informal interpersonal communication is for decision-making in the participating countries. In non-democracies, meetings between unconstrained leaders are often the only way to discuss serious international issues. We must also not underestimate the importance of interpersonal communication among leaders in democratic systems.

ROs composed of non-democratic countries are quite likely to be ‘Zombies’, because their bureaucracies are not accountable to the public and can keep defunct projects alive for a very long period of time. For ‘Comas’, democracies hardly differ from non-democracies.

In summary, non-democratic regimes appear to be less likely to create ROs with instrumental goals (‘Alive and Kicking’) and more likely to create ROs with other goals (including ‘Integration Rhetoric’ ROs). There are important exceptions to this rule: in some cases, non-democracies that belong to several ‘Integration Rhetoric’ ROs have a fair chance of establishing an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO over time (as happened in post-Soviet Eurasia with the Eurasian Economic Union¹⁶). In what follows, we offer a simple framework that may help us understand the conditions under which ‘Alive and Kicking’ ROs may be feasible among non-democracies as well.

2 External and Internal Regime Constraints

In order to answer to the question formulated above, we look at the interplay between countries’ internal and external characteristics, where ‘internal’ refers to the nature of the autocratic regime and ‘external’ refers to the form of relations existing between countries. In this chapter, we focus on just one aspect of external characteristics and one aspect of internal characteristics. We acknowledge that additional aspects may be important and should also be accounted for. However, even with these constraints we present a number of interesting hypotheses to explain the RO type created by autocracies. Furthermore, the aspects we consider are fundamental in studies on international cooperation and autocratic regimes, and are therefore a plausible starting point for analysis.

Specifically, we focus on the way external and internal factors constrain autocrats.¹⁷ The internal constraints can be determined by two factors. On the one hand, though elections do not serve to constrain politicians in non-democracies, there are other institutions that may be used as constraints: strong bureaucracies¹⁸; succession mechanisms controlled by ruling elites¹⁹; or ruling parties in single-party regimes.²⁰ On the other hand, an autocrat is obviously constrained by the resources available to sustain his/her power – by suppressing possible coups, detecting disloyalty, and rewarding followers. From this point of view, many autocratic rulers are simply too weak to ignore powerful interest groups.²¹ The extent to which an autocrat is constrained by various factors is likely to shift his/her attitude toward foreign policy, including ROs.

With respect to external constraints, it is reasonable to look at a country’s degree of dependence on its potential partners in an RO. To some extent, dependence is a measure of remaining outside the RO: what are the repercussions for the country (and, more importantly, for the regime’s survival) if it ever decides to leave the RO. If dependence is high, then unilaterally ignoring the provisions of the RO, or withdrawing from it, entails very high costs. These costs could result from the autocrat’s loss of the ability to extract rents or public dissatisfaction. In the extreme case, dependence is so high that political incorporation of the country into another polity is perceived as a feasible option. In this case, economic links are enhanced by cultural proximity and social ties, and the costs of exiting the RO are prohibitive.²² Obviously, dependence only matters in the case of ‘Alive and Kicking’ ROs: some costs can be inflicted on a regime by an ‘Integration Rhetoric’ RO (e.g., if its leading country claims that the regime is deviating from the dominant ideology, thus reducing its legitimacy), but the magnitude of these costs is naturally much smaller.

Importantly, both types of constraints create risks and incentives for autocrats when deciding on an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO. On the one hand, a constrained autocrat may have higher exit costs due to the positions of domestic interest groups or may face possible punishment by other partners in the RO. On the other hand, a constrained autocrat may be more interested in an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO if the RO can increase the regime’s stability. These gains and costs are in addition to the traditional gains and costs of an RO discussed in the literature (e.g., gains from trade creation). However, we may assume that the political logic of regime survival dominates any other gains or costs in the eyes of an autocrat.

We will consider the impact of both characteristics from two points of view: their effect on autocracies’ willingness to support an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO (at the stage of its formation or throughout its evolution) and the credibility of commitments to the RO. For simplicity, we will consider four possible cases: high and low external dependence, and high and low regime constraints. Certainly, the difference here is relative rather than absolute. These characteristics should be used to describe the relative chances of an autocrat’s entry into an RO as opposed to that of other autocrats.

1. In the case of high external dependence and low domestic constraints, an autocrat’s support of an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO is associated with (artificially) creating and maintaining veto players who constrain his/her power (especially in the extreme case when political incorporation is possible). Given the argument suggested above, we expect low willingness to support the ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO. The only exception might be a scenario where the partner’s regime is also very weak and even more internally constrained than the autocrat’s regime. The autocratic ruler might then hope to highjack the RO and use it to expand control over the foreign partner, i.e., the RO turns into the autocrat’s tool for international dominance. Equivalently, the autocrat may use informal bilateral relations. The choice of a particular form for the emerging international hierarchy may depend on particular features in the relations between the countries, e.g., existing international institutions, ideologies, and selected rhetoric.

2. In the case of high external dependence and high domestic constraints, an autocrat is still unlikely to prefer an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO, possibly considering such an RO a threat to his/her power due to additional constraints. However, to some extent, he/she might be forced to implement this type of RO as the only way to satisfy domestic interest groups and acquire the resources necessary to maintain control over his/her own country. In this case, the RO is accepted as the only option the leader has to ensure his/her political survival. Foreign support (from the RO or from the leading country in the RO) may take different forms, ranging from direct military intervention and aid to rhetorical support and access to foreign markets. This can give the autocrat the loyalty of some domestic interest groups. This logic is similar to that of democratic regimes where leaders join an RO to credibly respond to pressure from domestic interests, and to ensure reelection. For an autocrat, the main problem is not reelection but rather avoiding shift in power (possibly through a revolution or coup). We might refer to this as ‘survival integration’.

3. Low external dependence and high domestic constraints create a somewhat unusual case of interaction between non-democracies. In this case, autocratic rulers are less concerned about the restrictions imposed by an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO: there are abundant exit options and the costs of leaving the RO are low. The autocrat therefore has a much stronger bargaining position within the RO, and does not feel very constrained by the RO. Still, the RO remains somewhat risky for the autocrat: the external partner may exploit the autocrat’s domestic weakness by establishing alliances with competing domestic groups, thus undermining the autocrat’s control over his/her country. However, the autocrat lacks resources to consolidate the regime, which will likely be his/her main concern. Since dependence is low, domestic interest groups are unlikely to gain a lot from the RO. Accordingly, they are not likely to gain support through regional integration.

This setting, however, is particularly suitable for an ‘Integration Rhetoric’ RO. On the one hand, even rhetorical support may help the autocrat consolidate power in the face of inadequate domestic resources; on the other hand, the risks of excessive dependence can be avoided. For example, ‘Integration Rhetoric’ ROs can issue declarations condemning opposition groups (e.g., describing it as ‘terrorists’ or ‘extremists’); approve of the autocrat’s measures against opposition; organize summits and international meetings to show the autocrat and his subjects the support of other nations to the regime. If the risk to the regime is very strong (e.g., revolution or rebellion), even more advanced forms of cooperation may be acceptable when the regime is in desperate need of its partners’ resources. But in this case economic cooperation should play a much smaller role than security cooperation, since the main goal is not to recruit the support of domestic interest groups but to directly suppress opposition.

4. Low external dependence and low domestic constraints present a particularly interesting case for our investigation. Here again we must distinguish between two different scenarios. First, consider a situation where external dependence is low enough to ensure that exiting an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO (or, more likely, ceasing to implement commitments in the organization) at any time is viable and associated with relatively low costs, but at the same time the connections between the countries provide certain benefits from cooperation. Under these conditions, a non-democratic regime does not face the risks associated with an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO in terms of a reaction from domestic interests (which are controlled by the autocrat and cannot establish alliances with foreign actors) and potential new veto players created by the RO. Hence, the main disincentives described in the previous three cases are absent. Yet, there are still certain gains to be realized from cooperation. Thus, the regime may be interested in an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO with a relatively narrow scope. Second, what if the countries have so little in common that the benefits of cooperation are negligible? Under these conditions, there are no arguments to oppose cooperation, but there are also no reasons to support this type of RO. Such an RO could come into existence only in exceptional cases if, e.g., the autocrat prefers doing so for ideological reasons.²³

Somewhat simplified, we claim that ‘Alive and Kicking’ ROs created by non-democracies with sufficiently stable domestic regimes are feasible only if the level of interdependence is: below a certain threshold (i.e., the risk of additional veto players emerging is low due to the high costs of disintegration) and simultaneously above another threshold (otherwise there is nothing to be gained from the cooperation). This argument suggests the existence of a ‘corridor’ of interdependence, in which cooperation is feasible.²⁴

Next we must consider how the characteristics described above affect the credibility of commitments made by autocrats. Here must state that if politicians have limited foresight, an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO might be established even if the credibility of commitments is low. However, such an organization would be very unstable and either quickly collapse or deteriorate into a non-functioning structure. The credibility of autocrats’ commitments also differs in the four cases described previously. This discussion somewhat strengthens our analysis of ‘self-reinforcing’ and ‘self-destroying’ RO types in the chapter on historical factors, but for a specific case of non-democracies.

1. High external dependence and low domestic constraint make an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO attractive for autocrats only if their partner is very weak. Hence, commitments are credible only if there is strong power asymmetry that forces other partners to follow the dominant country’s lead. In this case, the problem of credibility is irrelevant, as the decisions are made primarily by the autocratic regime itself and integration does not impose any additional constraints. As soon as this condition is violated, any promises made by autocrats become incredible. The change can be swift and decisive: the ties to an RO can be broken abruptly as soon as the autocrat finds himself in a position where external support is not needed any more.

2. High external dependence and high domestic constraints produce a situation in which credibility of commitments is very low. The very reason why an autocratic regime needs an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO is to survive, to strengthen its position against rival groups at home. If the RO succeeds at solving this problem and the autocrat receives the necessary resources, the situation will eventually inevitably shift into the case of high external dependence and low domestic constraints, which we have described previously. However, in this evolved case autocrats are willing to cooperate only with relatively weak partners. Given the former high external dependence and high domestic constraints, the partner was probably quite strong. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why dependence was high and why cooperation was useful for the regime to survive. Therefore, if an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO comes into existence as a case of ‘survival integration’, it is likely not to be self-reinforcing.

3. The case of low external dependence and high domestic constraints has different implications depending on the scope of the RO. If the RO implies strong economic cooperation, in the long run it may shift the regime into a situation with high external dependence and high domestic constraints, in which it will be forced to accept the external partner’s dominance in ‘survival integration’. This is neither what an autocratic leader wants nor an inevitable outcome, because there is no domestic gain from implementing an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO. An RO with strong binding economic obligations is simply unlikely to ever emerge. If the RO is ‘Integration Rhetoric’,²⁵ then implementing it (i.e., adhering to the joint rhetoric, participating in integration rituals, etc.) is credible, since autocrats are interested in supporting fellow autocrats, especially if they fear the spread of democracy within the region. This will be the case as long as all partners expect that these organizations will not result in de facto cooperation, instead limiting themselves to pure rhetoric. If this consensus breaks, so does the development of regional integration agreements.²⁶

4. The case of low external dependence and low domestic constraints also has different implications for different RO types. In what follows, we will only discuss the case when there are tangible benefits to be extracted from cooperation, otherwise the RO is unlikely to be formed in the first place or sustained. Here, the distinction is more subtle. An ‘Integration Rhetoric’ RO is probably credible but not necessarily attractive for strong regimes,²⁷ and does not provide benefits of cooperation. If the RO is ‘Alive and Kicking’ but has a limited agenda (and institutions that effectively prevent it from expanding over time), then it is also credible. This is because the future costs for the autocratic regime remain relatively low and, given certain persistent gains from entering the RO in the first place, credibility is ensured.²⁸ However, if the ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO has a broad agenda or is constructed in a way that allows this broad agenda to evolve over time, then commitments to implementing this type of the RO are not credible. Low external dependence and low domestic constraints are likely to evolve into high external dependence and low domestic constraints, as described above. In the same way, credibility is undermined in an RO in which cooperation creates the preconditions for growing interdependence.

Table 2 summarizes the argument we present in this section. There are three main conclusions. First, in the long run (i.e., when the credibility of commitments is important and ROs without self-reinforcing properties do not survive), autocrats may support ‘Alive and Kicking’ ROs in two cases: (1) if (a) external dependence is low enough (but there are still tangible gains from cooperation in particular areas); (b) domestic constraints are low, and (c) RO is credibly focused on very narrow issues ensuring that there is no risk that the integration agenda will expand; or (2) if (a) external dependence is high; (b) domestic constraints are low, and (c) partners are clearly subordinate. Case (2) represents coalitions based on coercion by the stronger partner.²⁹ Second, ‘Integration Rhetoric’ ROs may be credible given low external dependence and high domestic constraints. Open rebellion in one of the countries may make even more advanced non-economic cooperation in the short term possible. Third, in the shortrun survival integration (resulting in the creation of an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO) is also possible, but it is likely to deteriorate as soon as the weaker regime becomes strong enough to not rely on the other partner’s support.³⁰

Table 2 Autocrats’ willingness to cooperate based on external dependence and internal constraints

These conclusions are interesting, because in part they imply very different empirical predictions than those produced by analyzing democratic regimes. As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature typically expects mutual dependence to increase the chances of regional cooperation (i.e., ‘Alive and Kicking’ ROs). This is not the case for autocracies, since the risk of external veto players may undermine their willingness to ever join such ROs. Democratic leaders are less concerned about losing absolute control over policies and more concerned about responding to domestic pressures, which can be substantial if there is high dependence. For democratic countries regional integration can be driven as a set of responses to spillovers. It is a good strategy for them to start regional integration in a low-politics functional area; create mechanisms to ensure that decision-making crises are resolved in a way that is consistent with further integration (e.g., a strong supranational bureaucracy); and hope that the integration advances to more important issues. This is the core of the neo-functionalist theory of integration. For non-democracies, the presence of spillovers actually makes ‘Alive and Kicking’ ROs self-destroying: as soon as the interdependence becomes too high, strong autocracies are likely to withdraw from the RO. For democracies, the costs associated with the decision to exit the RO are prohibitive. However, if the autocracies are strong enough, they can afford to do this in the interest of maintaining control over their countries. For democracies, the chances of an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO go up if interdependence increases. For non-democracies an ‘Alive and Kicking’ RO is feasible only within the boundaries of a certain corridor of interdependence, which we described above. Thus, starting with a low-politics functional area, or a very restricted RO, is also a good idea for non-democracies, provided that the RO has no built-in mechanisms that will make it likely to expand to other policy areas.