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Introduction

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Abstract

The introductory chapter presents the key arguments of the book. It suggests that the blossoming literature on asymmetric conflict has been published on different forms and aspects of asymmetric conflicts – largely focusing on the material, physical, and motivational forms of asymmetry – which have sought to analyze armed encounters waged from antiquity to nowadays by opponents of disparate organization and strength. Nevertheless, this literature has failed to take into account the structural socio-cultural disparities of the belligerents that often shape conflict outcomes. In addition to providing a critical review of the literature on asymmetric conflict, this chapter theorizes the phenomenon of asymmetry of values; explores the concept of honor cultures; and typologizes retaliation and pro-insurgent support. The concluding part of this chapter details the data and methods used in the book.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We use the terms ‘asymmetric conflict’ and ‘irregular war’ interchangeably.

  2. 2.

    A part of our broader research on the asymmetry of values, this study complements another study of ours that thematizes the impact of the asymmetry of values on irregular warfare following the deployment of indigenous units as part of COIN force. See Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. (2015) ‘Asymmetry of values, indigenous forces, and incumbent success in counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(5), pp. 678–703.

  3. 3.

    Throughout this study we use ‘socio-cultural values’ as a generic term that encapsulates more specific ‘socio-cultural codes’. These socio-cultural codes – socially accepted and culturally imposed systems of principles and rules – are characterized by the existence and functioning of particular traditions and customs guiding the daily lives of people.

  4. 4.

    Ethnographic studies suggest that these three socio-cultural codes are present in most honorific societies. See Sommers (2009).

  5. 5.

    We use the terms ‘honor’ and ‘honorific’ interchangeably.

  6. 6.

    For a critical examination of the terms ‘asymmetry’, ‘asymmetric conflict’, and ‘asymmetric threats’and their (mis)use in US strategic documents, see Blank (2003).

  7. 7.

    One of the first attempts to conceptualize asymmetric warfare undertaken by Joint Strategic Review proposes three key distinctions of asymmetry – strategic, operational, and tactical. See Joint Strategic Review. Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, p. 2.

  8. 8.

    Fischerkeller’s (1998) cultural asymmetry is focused not on social or material cultures of societies in conflict, but on their political and military cultures.

  9. 9.

    In the Albanian-populated areas of the Balkan Peninsula, the custom of blood revenge (gjakmarrja) has persisted among the northern Albanian highlanders (Gheghs) in Albania’s north and in Kosovo. See, for instance, Mustafa, M. and Young, A. (2008) ‘Feud narratives: contemporary deployments of kanun in Shala Valley, northern Albania’, Anthropological Notebooks, 14(2), pp. 87–110.

  10. 10.

    For instance, motivations of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al-Shabaab fighters in Somalia, and Chechen insurgents are often based on a mixture of political, religious and socio-cultural views and values.

  11. 11.

    We also do not exclude that such alternative factors as leadership, strategy, and tactical, operational, and strategic learning within conflict theaters may have an impact on the outcome of a conflict. However, the analysis of the causal weight of these factors is beyond the scope of this study.

  12. 12.

    In other words, if motivation is a sociological phenomenon, socio-cultural values that lie behind the asymmetry of values are of a socio-anthropological nature.

  13. 13.

    Importantly, unlike ideological, political, and economic motivations, socio-cultural codes, as we illustrate in the empirical sections of the study, usually work irrespective of prospective insurgents’ and their supporters’ political views.

  14. 14.

    In addition, it must be admitted that honor cultures also succeed because of cultural dynamics found in institutional societies. For instance, Caverley’s work details how casualty aversion rooted in institutional and cultural factors promoted inefficient COIN doctrines in Vietnam. Lyall and Wilson make a comparable argument about bureaucratic cultures that privilege capital and machine-intensive forms of fighting. See Caverley, J. (2010) ‘The myth of military myopia: Democracy, small wars, and Vietnam’, International Security, 34(3), pp. 119–157; Lyall, J. and Wilson, I. (2009) ‘Rage against the machines: Explaining outcomes in counterinsurgency wars’, International Organization, 63(1), pp. 67–106.

  15. 15.

    Nisbett and Cohen (1996, p. 4) attribute to honor cultures such virtues as the willingness to resort to violence in order to protect honor and readiness to retaliate. They explain that ‘[c]ultures of honor have been independently invented by many of the world’s societies. These cultures vary in many respects but, have one element in common: the individual is prepared to protect his reputation – for probity or strength or both – by resort to violence.’

  16. 16.

    The concept of honor in honor cultures is usually entwined, or explicitly involves, inter alia, such phenomena as blood feuds, codes of silence, and non-collaboration with authorities, hospitality, and so on.

  17. 17.

    See, for instance, Travaglino, G.A., Abrams, D., De Moura, G. R. and Russo, G. (2014) ‘Organized crime and group-based ideology: The association between masculine honor and collective opposition against criminal organizations’, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 17(6), pp. 704–709; Alderman, K. L. ‘Honor amongst thieves: Organized crime and the illicit antiquities trade’, Indiana Law Review, 45(3), pp. 602–614.

  18. 18.

    For instance, clans and tribes are ruled by elders, or, alternatively, councils of elders have important say in a community’s internal and external affairs.

  19. 19.

    However, while facilitating mobilization, norms of retaliation can make it difficult for commanders to rein in undisciplined fighters. A culture of following orders and obeying hierarchy, for one, is a socio-cultural value a number of beleaguered insurgent commanders would have appreciated among their fighters at key moments. Indeed, values such as discipline, literacy, problem-solving, and technical proficiency are key advantages of many institutionalized cultures when compared with honor ones, especially ‘acephalous’ social groups.

  20. 20.

    Metaphorically, these borders could be thought of as a nested doll, in which various layers of identity are wrapped into each other. While religious identity is the broadest one, it is followed by the (sub)ethnic and village (or territorial) level, with the smallest doll (clan identity) being the closest form of insider.

  21. 21.

    This explains the essence of solidarity and confrontation in Chechen society: in the absence of external threat, Chechen clans often engage in conflicts among themselves, while the threat of external invasion pulls (hostile) clans together. For an analysis of the impact of clan-based social structures on asymmetric conflict, see, for instance, Findley, M. G. and Edwards, S. (2007) ‘Accounting for the unaccounted: weak-actor social structure in asymmetric wars’, International Studies Quarterly, 51(3), pp. 583–606.

  22. 22.

    It comes as no surprise that religion in general and religious identity in particular are often instrumentalized by political leaders in clannish or tribal societies to rally popular support transcending tribal, ethnic, and social divides. This had particularly held for situation of armed conflicts with external powers.

  23. 23.

    The code of hospitality as we define it involves elements of both hospitality and solidarity. We opt for the use of the term hospitality for the following reasons. First, there is no such socio-cultural code as solidarity. Instead, solidarity permeates the social fabric of tight-knit communities, clans and tribes, organized along the lines of blood kinship. Together with honor, solidarity is what shapes the codes of retaliation, hospitality, and silence. Second, our focus is on the delivery of non-violent support to insurgents, which encompasses shelter and supplies. These all fall under the code of hospitality as outlined by local customary law, which also stipulates the ways in which the code is to be applied.

  24. 24.

    See also ISAF (2010) ‘Afghan civilians again fight off Taliban in Daykundi province’, Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), June: http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-civilians-again-fight-off-taliban-in-daykundi-province.html, accessed on 4 December 2014; Rasmussen, S. E. (2014) ‘Taliban return to Afghan town that rose up and drove out its leaders’, The Guardian, 27 October: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/27/taliban-return-afghan-town-gizab, accessed on 4 December 2014; RFE (2014) ‘Grieving Afghan mother “Kills 10 Taliban In Revenge”’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 November: http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-grieving-mother-kills-10-taliban/26710028.html, accessed on 4 December 2014.

  25. 25.

    Here, we utilize the concept of ‘imagined community’ coined by Benedict Anderson, who claims that all groups of people above the level of a village, where individuals have face-to-face interaction among themselves – and knowledge of each other – are essentially imagined, that is, socially constructed. For Anderson, a nation (and, for that matter, a religious community) is a political community because the sense of communion between its fellow-members is constructed upon a political myth or narrative – and kept alive through political communication. See Anderson, B. (2006) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. Of course, significantly large clans or tribes, encompassing dozens of thousands of members, where personalized knowledge of each other is missing among fellow-members, form ‘imagined communities’, as well.

  26. 26.

    Of course, there are multiple reasons why and when locals help insurgents, as we discuss in the following section. Against this background, pro-insurgent support based upon the code of hospitality is just one of them.

  27. 27.

    For an overview of some of these causes see Kalyvas, S. N. and Kocher, M. A. (2007) ‘How “Free” is free riding in civil wars?: Violence, insurgency, and the collective action problem’, World Politics, 59(2), pp. 177–216.

  28. 28.

    See Waldmann (2001), Boehm (1984), Kilcullen (2009).

  29. 29.

    Our study suggests that the socio-cultural codes of hospitality and silence apply universally beyond the confines of insurgent organizations and established pro-insurgent social networks.

  30. 30.

    The factor of acceptability of costs and risks builds on the classical costs-benefits paradigm, emphasizing nonetheless the role of emotions, such as ‘the excitement of revolution or the horror of having witnessed slaughter’, as a trigger of popular support. Effectiveness of organization is a multifaceted phenomenon, which is conducive to an insurgent group’s public support. It may be hypothesized that utterly unsuccessful insurgent groups would hardly attain popular support – and vice versa. Motivation is seen as an important source of public support in that those individuals providing aid to an insurgent group ‘believe they are doing something positive, such as contributing to a worthy cause, fulfilling a duty, or maintaining honor’.

  31. 31.

    Since around 2005, as part of Russia’s Chechenization policy, pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitary units, the kadyrovtsy, began to form the core of the local COIN force, gradually replacing Russian military who formerly occupied this role. Since the kadyrovtsy drew on the same socio-cultural values as insurgents, the latter’s initial advantage in terms of the asymmetry of values gradually dissipated, which is part of our argument that we detail in the section on alternative explanations. For a more detailed analysis see, for instance, Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. (2015) ‘Asymmetry of values, indigenous forces, and incumbent success in counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(5), pp. 678–703.

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Souleimanov, E.A., Aliyev, H. (2017). Introduction. In: How Socio-Cultural Codes Shaped Violent Mobilization and Pro-Insurgent Support in the Chechen Wars . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52917-2_2

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