Abstract
This chapter investigates China’s growing arms trade, especially with Africa, and the evolution of China’s arms export controls. Like other external powers, Beijing’s involvement in multilateralism and especially peace support is in danger of being compromised by its active pursuit of the arms trade in Africa. Examining how international efforts at reigning in the sale of small arms and other other conventional weapons are addressed by China and whether we are seeing gradual change to Chinese policy forms the core of this study.
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Notes
- 1.
United Nations, meetings coverage and press releases (2013), ‘Overwhelming Majority of States in General Assembly Say “Yes” to Arms Trade Treaty to Stave Off Irresponsible Transfers That Perpetuate Conflict, Human Suffering’, 2 April 2013, http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/ga11354.doc.htm.
- 2.
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (2016), accessed on 1 February 2016, http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/.
- 3.
The Arms Trade Treaty, article 6 (3).
- 4.
The Arms Trade Treaty, article 7.
- 5.
Now that the Treaty has come into force, signature is no longer an option for China or any other non-signatory. China can only accede to the Treaty, which means becoming a full State Party with the responsibility to implement all of the Treaty’s provisions in full.
- 6.
SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database does not cover imports and exports of SALW, with the exception of portable guided missiles such as man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and guided anti-tank missiles.
- 7.
Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman (2015). ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2014’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2015.
- 8.
Ibid.
- 9.
Mark Bromley, Mathieu Duchâtel, and Paul Holtom (2013), ‘China’s Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons’, SIPRI Policy Paper 38, p. VI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 2013.
- 10.
Ibid.
- 11.
Ibid.
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
Oscar Nkala (2015), ‘Chinese Company Builds Growing African Presence’, Defence News, 10 October 2015.
- 15.
Bromley et al., Op. Cit. p. VII.
- 16.
Ilya Gridneff (2014), ‘China Sells South Sudan Arms as Its Government Talks Peace’, Bloomberg Business, 9 July 2014.
- 17.
Bromley et al., Op. Cit. p. VII.
- 18.
Small Arms Survey (2009), Shadows of War (Cambridge University Press), p. 31.
- 19.
Bromley et al., Op. Cit. p. 36.
- 20.
Mark Caldwell interviewing Pieter Wezeman (2015), ‘China’s Arms Trade with Africa at Times Questionable’, Deutsche Welle, 16 March 2015.
- 21.
Mark Anderson and Achilleas Galatsidas (2015), ‘Global Weapons Trade Targets Africa as Imports to Algeria and Morocco Soar’, Conflict and Development Datablog, The Guardian, 20 March 2015.
- 22.
China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), Saferworld (2012), ‘The Evolution of EU and Chinese Arms Export Controls’, March 2012.
- 23.
Saferworld (2015), ‘Expanding and Sustaining Dialogue Between China and the Wassenaar Arrangement’, January 2015, p. 3.
- 24.
Bromley et al., Op. Cit. p. 20.
- 25.
Saferworld, Op. Cit. p. 3.
- 26.
Wu Jinhuai (2014), ‘Military Products: China’s Export Control Mechanism and Practices’, presented at an international seminar on ‘Contributing to International Security and Stability: Strengthening Dialogue between China and the Wassenaar Arrangement’, Vienna, 10 June 2014.
- 27.
Saferworld, Op. Cit. p. 7.
- 28.
Ibid., p. 5.
- 29.
Elizabeth Kirkham and Roy Isbister (2014), ‘The Time Available to Sign the Arms Trade Treaty Is Shrinking Fast: Why Should China Sign the Treaty’, ATT Update 7, Saferworld, September 2014.
- 30.
‘Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms’, UN Draft Resolution A/C.1/61/L.55 (2006).
- 31.
Chinese Delegation at the First Committee of the 61st Session of UNGA in Explaining its Position after the Voting of Draft Resolution Titled ‘Towards an Arms Trade Treaty’ (L. 55). www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/zyjh_611308/t309158.shtml.
- 32.
Chinese Delegation at the First Committee of the 63rd Session of UNGA in Explaining its Position after the Voting of Draft Resolution Titled ‘Towards an Arms Trade Treaty’. www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjbxw_602253/t521632.shtml.
- 33.
Statement by H. E. Ambassador Wang Qun (2011), Head of the Chinese Delegation at the General Debate of the First Committee of the 66th session of UNGA, 7 October 2011. www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/jkxw/t865572.htm.
- 34.
Statement by H.E. Li Baodong (2010), Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, at UNSC open debate on ‘The Impact of Illegal Sales and Transfers of Arms on the Peace and Security of Central Africa’, 19 March 2010.
- 35.
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Wang Qun (2010), Head of the Chinese Delegation at the General Debate of the First Committee of the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 7 October 2010.
- 36.
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Wang Qun, Head of the Chinese Delegation at the General Debate of the First Committee of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 7 October 2011.
- 37.
Statement by the Chinese delegation at the General Debate of United Nations Conferences on the Arms Trade Treaty, 9 July 2012.
- 38.
Mark Bromley (2013), ‘China’s Arms Trade Treaty Diplomacy’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), paper presented at the SIPRI conference ‘The HU Jintao Decade in China’s Foreign and Security Policy (2002–12): Assessments and implication’, Stockholm, 18–19 April 2013.
- 39.
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference, 3 April 2013, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1028801.shtml.
- 40.
Being an ATT signatory, does not bind a state to every provision of the Treaty; the only concrete obligation is that it does not act in a way that defeats the object and purpose of the Treaty. However, this would probably mean that very controversial transfer decisions (for example, those that violate Article 6) would certainly be seriously questioned.
- 41.
SIPRI, Op. Cit.
- 42.
Elizabeth Kirkham (2015), ‘China and the ATT: Prospects for Future Engagement’, ATT Update 8, Saferworld, 21 January 2015.
- 43.
Anna Stavrianakis and He Yun (2014), ‘China and the Arms Trade Treaty – Prospects and Challenges’, p. 7, Saferworld, May 2014.
- 44.
Saferworld, ‘The Time Available to Sign the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is Shrinking Fast’.
- 45.
Stavrianakis and He, Op. Cit. p. 8.
- 46.
US Department of State (2013), ‘United States Signs Arms Trade Treaty on September 25, 2013’, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/armstradetreaty/index.htm.
- 47.
Mike Lewis (2009), ‘Skirting the Law: Sudan’s Post-CPA Arms Flows’, HSBA Working Paper 18; Amnesty International (2012), Sudan: No end to violence in Darfur. Arms Supplies Continue Despite Ongoing Human Rights Violations.
- 48.
Under Article 11 of the treaty, states parties must seek to prevent the diversion of weapons through risk assessment as part of a national control system. States parties are obliged to consider mitigation and prevention measures that include, but do not require, the refusal of an authorisation. This is in contrast to the criteria included in Article 7, in which states parties are required not to authorise exports if there is an overriding risk of the negative consequences set out there.
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Mariani, B., Kirkham, E. (2018). China, Africa and the Arms Trade Treaty. In: Alden, C., Alao, A., Chun, Z., Barber, L. (eds) China and Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52893-9_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52893-9_17
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