Abstract
Lewis’s pragmatic theory of the a priori is given a partial defense. Though the strictly logical function may be vulnerable to Quinean objections, there is an epistemological function of the a priori that is not. Lewis’s use of Einstein on simultaneity has problems, but correcting for those errors does not affect the basic idea. Lewis’s theory of the pragmatic a priori is then contrasted with the similar ideas in Arthur Pap, who Lewis influenced, as well as Michael Friedman and Hasok Chang.
Another version of this chapter appears as part of Chapter 5 of Stump (2015). © Copyright 2015, From Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science: Alternative Interpretations of the A Priori, by Stump. It is modified and reprinted here with the permission of Taylor and Francis, LLC, a division of Informa plc.
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Notes
- 1.
I do not mean to imply here that objects are constituted by the mind. That position, which skids into idealism, was explicitly rejected by Lewis when distinguishing his position from that of his teacher Royce (see Dayton 2006). Lewis believed in a “given,” which makes up the objective component of knowledge.
- 2.
Quine’s critique depends on his dismissal of intentions. Given that Lewis maintains intentions, this could be seen as the fundamental difference between them and Quine might then still have a strong critique of Lewis. I maintain that Quine’s critique only affects Lewis’s second type of a priori, that is, what is true by definition. I thank Carl Sachs for pressing for clarification of this issue.
- 3.
Later reprints of Einstein’s book have different pagination. I refer to the edition used by Lewis.
- 4.
Many have argued, of course, that there is a neo-Kantian element in logical empiricism. Nevertheless, the main current of Logical Empiricism thought rejects the a priori. Indeed, Friedman notes that Schlick convinced Reichenbach to give up the notion of the relative a priori and to adopt a strict empiricism.
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Stump, D.J. (2017). The Pragmatic Theory of the A Priori . In: Olen, P., Sachs, C. (eds) Pragmatism in Transition . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52863-2_7
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