Abstract
This chapter introduces the topic of political connections. Specifically, it employs both anecdotal evidence and the reference to academic publications to show that political connections are assuming a growing importance and nowadays represent a very hot topic. On the basis of anecdotal evidence, the revolving door movement is assuming greater importance in the United States. With regard to academic publications, several studies focus on the measuring of the benefits of being politically connected, for example, in terms of performance. A group of papers shows the existence of a positive link between political connections and industry-level regulation. By relating to such a group, this book exhaustively investigates that link by selecting the most regulated industries in the United States. In addition, it investigates market reaction to the dates of announcement of new political connections. Unique results are guaranteed thanks to the use of a hand-collected dataset.
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Notes
- 1.
Julie Creswell and Ben White, “The Guys From ‘Government Sachs’,” The New York Times, October 17, (2008), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/business/19gold.html.
- 2.
Jillian Berman, “Wall Street and Washington Share Millions of Dollars, Lot of People,” The Huffington Post, August 30, (2012), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/30/wall-street-washington_n_1842517.html.
- 3.
Tyson Slocum, “Chevron Banks on Profitable Political Agenda,” The Huffington Post, May 26, (2011), accessed October 31, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tyson-slocum/chevron-banks-on-profitab_b_867408.html.
- 4.
Dan Eggen and Kimberly Kindy, “Three of Every Four Oil and Gas Lobbyists Worked for Federal Government,” The Washington Post, July 22, (2010), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/21/AR2010072106468.html.
- 5.
Eric Lipton, “The Revolving Door: An Annotated Case Study,” The New York Times, February 2, (2014), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/02/02/us/politics/02revolving-door-documents.html.
- 6.
Matthew Boesler and Jeff Kearns, “‘Revolving Door’ Between Fed and Banks Spins Faster,” Bloomberg, January 30, (2015), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-30/fed-s-revolving-door-spins-faster-as-banks-boost-hiring.
- 7.
Patrick Jenkins, “‘Revolving Door’ Trend Takes Hold in Europe,” Financial Times, July 29, (2016), accessed October 31, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/4fc3a7b4-5599-11e6-9664-e0bdc13c3bef.
- 8.
Julie Creswell and Ben White, “The Guys From ‘Government Sachs’,” The New York Times, October 17, (2008), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/business/19gold.html.
- 9.
Matthew Boesler and Jeff Kearns, “‘Revolving Door’ Between Fed and Banks Spins Faster,” Bloomberg, January 30, (2015), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-30/fed-s-revolving-door-spins-faster-as-banks-boost-hiring.
- 10.
The Editorial Board, “Conflicts of Interest at the F.D.A.,” The New York Times, April 13, (2015), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/opinion/conflicts-of-interest-at-the-fda.html.
- 11.
The Editorial Board, “Conflicts of Interest at the F.D.A.,” The New York Times, April 13, (2015), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/opinion/conflicts-of-interest-at-the-fda.html.
- 12.
On this regard, see for example: “GOP Vs. Democrats: Who’s Best For America’s Economy?,” Forbes, August 31, (2012), accessed October 31, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2012/08/31/gop-vs-democrats-whos-best-for-americas-economy/#1dcce5a13e80.
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Carboni, M. (2017). Introduction on Political Connections. In: The Financial Impact of Political Connections. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52776-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52776-5_1
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