Abstract
The notion of superstition has a long history of being understood in terms of epistemic and psychological features, although many discussions include its problematic political consequences. I argue that Spinoza’s discussion of superstition in Theological-Political Treatise is an exception. Spinoza connects superstition and piety with the problem of political stability via the notion of obedience, and uses the term “superstitious” to label religious attitudes and practices that undermine civil obedience by establishing demands of allegiance, on the part of the religious authority, that compete with those of the government. Contrary to existing interpretations, I will show that, for Spinoza, “superstition” is not intrinsically characterized by features such as intolerance and anti-intellectualism. In Theological-Political Treatise, practices that clearly shows these traits are labeled as pious, rather than superstitious, precisely because, within certain societies, they foster obedience and therefore stability. One of Spinoza’s goals in TTP is to show that what counts as pious among the ancient Jews or in the Ottoman Empire should be considered superstitious in a more modern, diverse society such as the seventeenth century Dutch Republic, and that libertas philosophandi is the best way to inoculate a society (if not every single individual) against superstition.
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Notes
- 1.
There is no space here for a comprehensive literature review, but it should be pointed out that, in his Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, Ch. IX, Leo Strauss also interprets “superstition” as connected to irrationality and hate.
- 2.
“Spinoza’s Exchange with Albert Burgh,” in Melamed and Rosenthal 2010. In a 1986 essay republished in 2011, “Politique et religion chez Hobbes et Spinoza,” Alexandre Matheron similarly defines superstition in terms of false beliefs, in particular belief in revelation and in the necessity of specific forms of worship.
- 3.
See, for example, p. 17.
- 4.
“Miracles, wonder, and the state in Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise,” also in Melamed and Rosenthal (eds.), 2010.
- 5.
Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity, and Tosel, “Superstition and Reading” (in Montag and Stolze, eds. The New Spinoza, 146–167), consider superstition a tool used by absolute rulers to foster unquestioning obedience.
- 6.
The term “pious” is a positive term in TTP, because piety and faith, as Spinoza makes explicit in Ch. 14, are conducive to obedience and therefore to a peaceful and thriving state. I take it to be self-evident that “superstitious” is a derogatory term.
- 7.
Contra Smith and Tosel.
- 8.
An edition in 8 volumes of Hobbes’ works in Latin, including Leviathan, was published in 1668 by Johan Blaeu in collaboration with Hobbes. Hobbes’ work generated much discussion, in particular in the works of the brothers Pieter and Johan de la Court. Between 1660 and 1663 Pieter de la Court (Johan died in 1660) published two books and several pamphlets on political theory, largely indebted to Hobbes’ discussion. See Blom, Morality and Causality in Politics The Rise of Natural in Dutch 17th Century Political Thought, Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall. 1477–1808 and Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750; Wyger R.E. Welema, Republicans. Essays on Eighteenth Century Dutch Political Thought.
- 9.
Two important members of Spinoza’s “circle of friends,” Lodewijk Meyer and Adriaen Koerbag, knew van Berkel. See also Blom, Ch. 7 and 8; van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza: An Essay on Philosophy in the 17th Century Dutch Republic, Ch. 4; Frijhoff and Spies, Dutch Culture in a European Perspective: 1650, Hard-Won Unity, Ch. 5 and 6; Nadler’s Spinoza. A Life, Ch. 10; Israel 2002, Ch. 8 and 9, on the influence of Hobbes’ political ideas on Spinoza’s milieu.
- 10.
The extent of Hobbes’ influence on Spinoza is a matter of debate. Hobbes’ ideas were widely discussed, for example, in Franciscus van den Enden’s house, which Spinoza attended in the mid ‘50s for Latin lessons. Van den Enden’s influence on the young Spinoza has been overestimated by Wim Klever in his 1991, but Nadler, among others, argues that it was in van den Enden’s house that Spinoza was exposed to Bruno, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Grotius, Tacitus, and other important political thought. Spinoza then became acquainted with Hobbes’ political ideas long before the translation of Leviathan became available. I believe that a case can be made for a direct influence of the Hobbesian notion of superstition on Spinoza, but I cannot defend such claim in this paper.
- 11.
All quotes from Leviathan are from Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan. Edited with Introduction and Notes by Edwin Curley. (from now on, L followed by page number). L 31.
- 12.
Leviathan drawn out with a hook, or, Animadversions upon Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan by Alex. Rosse. London: Printed by Tho. Newcomb, for Richard Royston, 1653. On early criticism see Jon Parkin, “The Reception of Hobbes’ Leviathan,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’ Leviathan, 445–459.
- 13.
A. P. Martinich, Hobbes, 198. Martinich, who points out that, in De Cive 16.1, Hobbes had offered an impeccable definition of “superstition” as irrational fear of invisible powers, suggests that, rather than reading this as a philosophically incompetent definition, we should understand Hobbes as somewhat ironically referring to the common, and unphilosophical, use of the term. I find this explanation somewhat ad hoc, since the supposedly ironic definition is placed in a list of definitions that Hobbes intended quite seriously. See also his The Two Gods of Leviathan.
- 14.
Curley, “‘I Durst Not Write So Boldly’ or, How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-political Treatise.” In Bostrenghi, ed., Hobbes e Spinoza, Scienza e Politica.
- 15.
See Leviathan XXXII on the criteria for prophecy: “One is the doing of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other religion than that which is already established.” (L 247–8) By these standards, Christian prophecy becomes false prophecy wherever Christianity is forbidden. See Curley’s and Martinich’s discussions.
- 16.
L 63.
- 17.
This passage has a different tone from the passage from Book VI, because here Hobbes refers to how individuals label their religious views vs. their opponents’. However, it is consistent with my reading of the definition in Leviathan VI.
- 18.
Ch. 18: “... it is annexed to the sovereign to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing, to peace; and consequently, on what occasion, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall examine the doctrines of all books... For... in the well-governing of opinions consisteth the well-governing of men’s actions, in order to their peace and concord.” L 113. One of the most striking differences between Hobbes and Spinoza is in their views of the extent to which freedom of expression should be granted.
- 19.
Matheron 2011.
- 20.
Martinich, in 1992, argues that Hobbes was an orthodox Calvinist. I find Curley’s rebuttal (e.g. “Calvin and Hobbes, or, Hobbes as an Orthodox Christian”) quite persuasive. Also, as Springborg writes in “Hobbes on Religion” (in Springborg, ed., 1996, 346–380), Hobbes’ ‘Calvinism’ failed to impress the Low Countries Synods, who banned Leviathan.
- 21.
L 410.
- 22.
Catholicism, for example, by establishing the Pope as a vicar for Christ on earth, is inherently destabilizing, even when legal and therefore not falling under the definition of “superstition” in Ch. VI. In Ch. XLIV, opening Part IV, “On the Kingdom of Darkness,” Hobbes explains that the Pope’ demands for allegiance from all Christians encourage disobedience.
- 23.
L 11.
- 24.
TTP 1.
- 25.
It is useful to note, at this point, that Spinoza’s connection between pietas and libertas philosophandi (which I prefer to translate as “freedom of inquiry”) is meant to apply to specific historical and political circumstances, rather than being a universal norm. As others have pointed out, Spinoza’s arguments for freedom of inquiry and expression (including religious expression) are based on pragmatic considerations, rather than some notion of inalienable rights. For Spinoza, such freedom is recommended to the extent to which it is conducive to political stability, and what is conducive to stability in the 17th century Dutch Republic is different from what is conducive to stability in the Hebrew state under Moses. See, among many other discussions, J. Smith, “Spinoza’s Curious Defense of Tolerance,” in Melamed and Rosenthal, eds., 2010, Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Republican Argument for Toleration” and “Spinoza on Why the Sovereign Can Command Men’s Tongues But Not their Minds” (in Williams and Waldron, eds., 2008, 54–77), and Israel 2002.
- 26.
Spinoza’s discussion of politics in TTP is a balancing act between his clearly expressed preference for democracy and the conclusion, supported by a series of historical examples, that each community has traits and constraints that might not make it suited for the most desirable form of government. See James, “Democracy and the good life in Spinoza’s philosophy,” in Huenemann, ed., 2008, 128–146.
- 27.
TTP 198. Shirley argues that Spinoza slanders his former correligionists. Shirley may well be correct about Spinoza’s intentional misrepresentations; at the very least, he lacks charity and nuance.
- 28.
TTP 208.
- 29.
On the multiple aspects of the narrative comparing 17th century Holland to the Old Testament Jews (from the liberation from Spanish domination to the reclamation of the land after a flood), see Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age, especially Ch. 2.
- 30.
- 31.
Israel 2002, Ch. 10.
- 32.
It is unclear how familiar Spinoza was with the Ottoman Empire, which, while beginning its decline from the splendors of the 15th and 16th centuries, was still relatively tolerant and culturally lively. In Ch. 20, Spinoza notes that a theocracy such as the Hebrew state would be impossible in the 17th century, unless it renounced any outside trade. But he probably knew that the Ottomans engaged in flourishing trade with many states. So, his view of Ottoman Turkey does not stand to scrutiny. It seems that, just as with the Jews, Spinoza is picking a “low hanging fruit,” a target that can be the object of harsh criticism without backlash.
- 33.
TTP 2–3.
- 34.
Ethics III, in particular P 12 to 15 and P 50, Schol.
- 35.
The philosopher’s ‘bondage’ is nicely discussed in James 2012, Ch. 8.
- 36.
In Political Treatise VI, Spinoza expresses a dismal view of the repressive, yet stable Ottoman Empire. See Curley, “Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan,” in Nadler, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, 315–342.
- 37.
Once again, what is said about the Jews needs to be read with an understanding that Spinoza had contemporary events in mind, especially the attitude of the Counter-Remostrant churches engaged in a similar inflammatory, “us vs. them” rhetoric. Just as for Moses’ Jews, such rhetoric might have worked towards fostering political cohesion in a religiously unified state, but the Dutch Republic was a very different political reality.
- 38.
TTP 157.
- 39.
E.g.: “7. God forgives repentant sinners. There is no one who does not sin, so that, without this belief, all would despair of salvation, and there would be no reason to believe that God is merciful...” (TTP 126). For different reasons, James 2012 and Carlos Fraenkel, in “Spinoza on Miracles and the Truth of the Bible,” argue that Spinoza considered these tenets flexible enough to be compatible with his philosophy. I find that at least three of them (including the one just quoted) are inconsistent with Ethics, and I do not believe that Spinoza would have applied them to the philosopher, who does not need piety in order to respect the law, and who is not, strictly speaking, obedient. Unfortunately, I cannot here address James’ and Fraenkel’s arguments in detail.
- 40.
TTP, 163.
- 41.
See Israel 2002, and his Introduction to the 2007 edition of TTP, viii–xxxiv.
- 42.
TTP, 144.
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di Poppa, F. (2017). Diagnosing Superstition: Superstition and Piety in Spinoza’s Political Philosophy. In: Adams, M., Biener, Z., Feest, U., Sullivan, J. (eds) Eppur si muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 81. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52768-0_5
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