Abstract
In sensory neuroscience, the neural and perceptual levels of investigation are commonly related through a reductive research strategy based in psycho-neural isomorphisms. Davida Teller’s “linking propositions” are a particularly vivid illustration of this epistemology in the context of vision science. For Teller, linking propositions guide the core epistemological practices of vision science by expressing the criteria for acceptable explanations of perceptual phenomena by neural processes and by articulating heuristics for discovering neural properties on grounds of perceptual ones, and vice versa. Furthermore, linking propositions create a uniform discourse in which ontological identity statements can be formulated on the basis of structural terms applicable to both the neurophysiological and perceptual domains.
I argue that the epistemic practices of current color vision science are better understood through Machamer-style mechanisms than isomorphism-based linking propositions. For Machamer, activity types of mechanisms are central for both explanation and the discovery of entities and their properties. The activity type of color cancellation is fundamental to the opponent process paradigm of color vision precisely in this manner. The descriptive inadequacy of linking propositions for clarifying vision scientific research is particularly damaging because activity types have a unifying role for the structural facts of color perception. As a form of local reductionism, Teller’s proffered epistemology aims to create a uniform domain for neuroscience and perceptual psychology but on the basis of a non-unified, disparate set of structural identity statements. By bringing attention to the unifying role of activity types, Machamer mechanisms allow also for critical epistemological explorations of ontological reductions on grounds of the fit between activity types of higher-level and lower-level sciences. They offer a Machamer-ontological-critical or MOCing framework, for short, against local reductionism.
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Notes
- 1.
Teller D. Y. (1980), “Locus questions in visual science”, in C. S. Harris (ed.), Visual coding and adaptability. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 151–176; Teller, D. Y. (1984), “Linking Propositions.” Vision Research, 24, 10, pp. 1233–46; Teller D. Y. (1990), “The domain of visual science,” in L. Spillman and J. S. Werner (eds.), Visual perception: The neurophysiological foundations. New York: Academic Press, 11–21.
- 2.
See, e.g., Machamer, 2003. (Machamer, Peter. 2003. “Activities and Causation: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Mechanisms.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol 18, 27–39).
- 3.
See, e.g., 1980, 152 and 1984, 1235.
- 4.
1984, ibid.
- 5.
Ibid, 1233, and 1990, 20.
- 6.
1984, 1235.
- 7.
1984,1237.
- 8.
Ibid.
- 9.
Ibid, 1237–1238.
- 10.
Ibid, 1239.
- 11.
Ibid.
- 12.
Ibid, 1240.
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
1990, 13.
- 15.
Ibid. See also 1980, 152–155.
- 16.
Ibid.
- 17.
Ibid.
- 18.
1984,1233.
- 19.
Ibid, 1240.
- 20.
See, 1980, 152–3.
- 21.
Ibid., and 1984, 1235.
- 22.
1984, 1241.
- 23.
Ibid, 1240–1241; see also 1980, 156–157.
- 24.
1990, 15. See also 1984, 1235.
- 25.
1990, ibid. Teller’s reductionism differs from recent purportedly descriptively accurate forms of scientific reductionism such as Bechtel and McCauley’s heuristic identity theory (McCauley, R. N. and Bechtel, W. 2001. “Explanatory Pluralism and Heuristic Identity Theory,” Theory & Psychology, Vol 11, 736–760) and the type of mind-brain reductionism that, contrary to the original Smartian intentions, construes identity statements as regular empirical hypotheses (see, e.g., Churchland, P. M. 2005. “Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions from Cognitive Neuroscience,” Philosophical Psychology, 2005, Vol. 18, 527–560).
- 26.
1984, 1240.
- 27.
1990, 13.
- 28.
1984, 1240. See also 1990, 13.
- 29.
1984, ibid.
- 30.
Stevens, S. S. 1946. “On the Theory of Scales of Measurement,” Science, 103, 677–680. Reprinted in B. Lieberman (ed.) Contemporary Problems in Statistics, New York: Oxford University Press, (1971), 3–8.
- 31.
See, e.g., Hurvich, L. M. and Jameson, D. 1957. “An Opponent Process Theory of Color Vision,” Psychological Review, 64, 384–404.
- 32.
Ibid.
- 33.
See, De Valois, 1965. (De Valois, R. I., “Behavioral and Electrophysiological Studies of Primate Vision,” in W. D. Neff (ed.) Contributions to Sensory Physiology Vol. 1. New York: Academic Press, (1965), 137–178). Earlier, cells were often distinguished into “on-cells” and “off-cells.” This is often called “Hartline’s principle” [see, e.g., Hartline, H. K. “The response of single optic nerve fibers of the vertebrate eye to the illumination of the retina,” American Journal of Physiology, 121, (1938), 400–415]. On-cells respond during light stimulation and off-cells after its termination. The “on/off-principle” of classification conceptualizes a cell response exclusively in terms of increases in firing rate and, according to current color science, the ensuing measurement practice denies that inhibition is a real response.
- 34.
De Valois, 1965, 159. More specifically, the assumption is that “[T]he R + G- cell is signaling red with an increase in activity and green with a decrease in activity, i.e. that the animal will see red when this cell fires rapidly and green when the cell is inhibited.”
- 35.
For more detail, see the analysis given by De Valois et al., 1966, 976 (De Valois, R. I., Abramov, I., and Jacobs, G. H. “Analysis of Response Patterns of LGN cells,” Journal of the Optical Society of America, 56, (1966), 966–977) of what they call “an isomorphic relationship between the relative activity rates of the various cell types and the hue of a given light.”
- 36.
For the two practices, compare, e.g., De Valois 1965, 571, and De Valois et al., 1966, 972.
- 37.
For the clearest illustration of how neural response functions coincide in axes and shapes of graphs with the psychophysical chromatic response curves, see R.L. De Valois and K.K. De Valois, 1993, 1059 (R.L. De Valois, R.L. and. De Valois, K.K., 1993. “A Multi-stage Color Model.” Vision Research, 33, 1053–1065).
- 38.
This analysis provides a critical context for the color subjectivists’ (e.g., Hardin and Clark) main premise for the neurophysiological reduction of color sensations or qualia. Consider, for example, Hardin’s (1993, 54. [Hardin C. L. (1993), Color for philosophers: Unweaving the rainbow (2nd revised edition). Indianapolis: Hackett]) argument for a neurobiological reduction of color sensations: “Some of the chromatically responsive cells show opponent-response patterns that fit psychophysical, inferred chromatic-response patterns beautifully. However, the picture on the individual cell level is not nearly as neat as these selected examples might suggest and statistical analyses have not yet ‘nailed down’ a quantitative picture to general satisfaction...[T]he opponent scheme may be said to be physiologically confirmed in rough outline but not in detail.” The above analysis shows that, first, the two patterns display a visual “fit” because the shape of the neural one was created to match the perceptual one. Second, and as a consequence, the pattern concerning the data of the two graphs does not qualify as a “confirmation” per se because of the “theory-laden” nature of the (representation of the) neurophysiological evidence. Finally, Hardin’s statistical point and justification by potentially “better” statistical analyses (ibid, xxxii) does not without further argument uplift the concern raised by the theory-laden neurophysiological data. Clark’s (see, e.g., Clark A. (1993), Sensory qualities. Oxford: Clarendon Press) color reductionism founders on similar grounds. For a systematic critique of color reductionism, see, Seppalainen, T. V. 2001. “Color Subjectivism is not Supported by Color Reductionism,” Philosophica 68, 901–927.
- 39.
See also Teller’s (1984, 1238–1239) distinction between weak and strong readings of the mutual exclusivity proposition.
- 40.
Machamer, et al. 2000. “Thinking about Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science, 67, 1–25.
- 41.
Ibid, 21.
- 42.
See, Machamer, 2003.
- 43.
Since space does not permit an investigation of the source of the analogical understanding of cancellation activity in explanation, I suffice with a mere reference to Machamer’s views on the need for metaphoric descriptions of activities as an excellent starting point for understanding the case at hand (Machamer, P. 2000. “The Nature of Metaphor and Scientific Description,” in F. Hallyn (ed.) Metaphor and Analogy in the Sciences. Kluwer: Netherlands, 35–52).
- 44.
Machamer et al., 2000, 21.
Acknowledgement
Sincere thanks to Jacqueline Sullivan and Uljana Feest for many helpful comments, suggestions, and criticisms. And thanks to Peter Machamer for his example, insight, and inspiration – both in history and philosophy of science and enology.
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Seppalainen, T. (2017). MOCing Framework for Local Reduction. In: Adams, M., Biener, Z., Feest, U., Sullivan, J. (eds) Eppur si muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 81. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52768-0_14
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