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Performance Management in the Public Sector: The State of Art

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Public Policy and Performance Management in Democratic Systems

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Abstract

This chapter explains the core characteristics of performance management and how it came to be part of the New Public Management movement. We explain the broad range of applications both at the macro and micro levels, and the advantages and disadvantages of such mechanisms. We also present a principal-agent framework of the nested relations in the public domain as the basis for further exploration to be carried out in the next chapters. The chapter then discusses the literature related to the ways in which public organizations can manage the core pathologies of performance management systems. The chapter also distinguishes between macro-level governance and policy making, and micro-level organizational management. Throughout the chapter we elaborate the research questions to be explored in the next chapters.

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  1. Public Policy and Administration, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel

    Shlomo Mizrahi

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Mizrahi, S. (2017). Performance Management in the Public Sector: The State of Art. In: Public Policy and Performance Management in Democratic Systems. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52350-7_2

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