Skip to main content

Uncovering Turmoil in Stable Budgets

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 188 Accesses

Abstract

In Chap.4, congressional funding data provided by the Army for 1,152 programs over six fiscal years will show that Congress modifies over 40 percent of program funding requests during the budget review process each fiscal year. This is much different from what you might assume given evidence from both domestic and defense budgets over the past 25 years. Program funding is markedly non-incremental and is not confined to a particular or consistent subset of programs. Individual program funding fluctuates wildly as political and programmatic battles are won and lost, contrary to the conventional portrait of an immovable budget. Significant program funding variance occurs both relative to the previous year’s appropriations and the President’s current budget request.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Data is from fiscal years 2004–2009. The average percentage change from the previous year’s budget request is 18%; from the President’s request, only 4%. Budget figures include base procurement and RDTE monies.

  2. 2.

    Department of Defense, “Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy,” http://www.acq.osd.mil/mibp/faqs.shtml (August 10, 2012).

  3. 3.

    Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964). Incrementalism in budgeting is an extension of Charles Lindblom’s work, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’,” Public Administration Review 19 (1959): 79–88. Lindblom proposes a theory of incremental decision-making in bureaucracies.

  4. 4.

    For insightful critiques of incrementalism in budgeting, see Wanat (1974), and LeLoup (1978).

  5. 5.

    Schick (1983), p. 21.

  6. 6.

    Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky (1979), p. 377.

  7. 7.

    Agency budget data is from the Office of Management and Budget (2010). Budget figures are adjusted to constant 2010 dollars.

  8. 8.

    This is described as “punctuated equilibrium” in Jones and Baumgartner (2005), p. 20.

  9. 9.

    Simon (1945), pp. 93–94.

  10. 10.

    See, for example, Kanter (1975), Schick (2000), and Korb (1977).

  11. 11.

    Data includes Department of Defense base budget authority figures only, not supplemental funding.

  12. 12.

    Fenno (1966), p. 354.

  13. 13.

    Natchez and Bupp (1973), p. 962. John Wanat’s critique of incrementalism concludes that “further research attention must be paid to the programmatic portion of the budgetthis is the only part of the budget that is ‘variable.’ It is only in this component of the budget that the ‘politics’ of the budgetary process can be found.” Wanat (1974), p. 1228. See also John Gist’s use of Department of Defense RDTE accounts to reveal both incrementalism and large fluctuation in budgeting at both the program and bureau levels. Gist (1982).

  14. 14.

    Congressional Budget Office (2007), p. xii.

  15. 15.

    Congressional Budget Office (2007), p. 3.

  16. 16.

    U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Committee Print to Accompany H.R. 3326, 111th Cong., 2d sess.

  17. 17.

    Aerial Common Sensor is now named the Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System, or EMARSS.

  18. 18.

    Wlezien (1993), p. 58.

  19. 19.

    U.S. Government Accountability Office (2009a).

  20. 20.

    See the Appendix for a comprehensive list of all the programs contained in AIM for fiscal year 2007 and their funding tracks through Congress.

  21. 21.

    Data obtained from House Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1997, and for Other Purposes, 104th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rpt 104-863; House Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1998, and for Other Purposes, 105th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rpt 105-265; House Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1999, and for Other Purposes, 105th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rpt 105-746; House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Committee Print to Accompany H.R. 3326, 111th Cong., 2d sess.

References

  • Congressional Budget Office. 2007. Replacing and Repairing Equipment Used in Iraq and Afghanistan: the Army’s Reset Program.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dempster, M.A.H., and Aaron Wildavsky. 1979. On change or, there is no magic size for an increment. Political Studies 27:371–389.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fenno, Richard. 1966. The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gist, John. 1982. ‘Stability’ and ‘Competition’ in budgetary theory. American Political Science Review 76:859–872.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, Bryan, and Frank Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kanter, Arnold. 1975. Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korb, Lawrence. 1977. The budget process in the department of defense: the strengths and weaknesses of three systems. Public Administration Review 37:334–346.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • LeLoup, Lance. 1978. The Myth of incrementalism: analytical choices in budgetary theory. Polity 10:488–509.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lindblom, Charles. 1959. The science of ‘Muddling Through.’ Public Administration Review 19:79–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Natchez, Peter, and Irvin Bupp. 1973. Policy and priority in the budgetary process. American Political Science Review 67:951–963.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Office of Management and Budget. 2010. Historical Tables: Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/. Accessed 4 Nov 2010.

  • Schick, Allen. 1983. Incremental budgeting in a decremental age. Policy Sciences 16:1–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schick, Allen. 2000. The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, Herbert. 1945. Administrative Behavior. New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2009. Overseas Contingency Operations: Funding and Cost Reporting for the Department of Defense. 18 Dec 2009.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wanat, John. 1974. Bases of budgetary incrementalism. American Political Science Review 68:1221–1228.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wlezien, Christopher. 1993. The political economy of supplemental appropriations. Legislative Studies Quarterly 18:51–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Demarest, H.B. (2017). Uncovering Turmoil in Stable Budgets. In: US Defense Budget Outcomes. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52301-9_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics