Skip to main content

Inequality in Late-Classical Democratic Athens: Evidence and Models

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Democracy and an Open-Economy World Order

Abstract

This paper contributes to the question of the relationship between democracy and economic inequality in ancient Greece by developing a realistic population and income model for late classical Athens. The model is evidence-based, although hypothetical in many particulars. It aligns with other evidence suggesting that economic inequality in late classical Athens was low by historical standards. While no causal argument is made here, the model is consistent with the hypothesis that democracy tended to lower economic inequality over time, in part through progressive taxation. The model also helps to explain Athenian social stability: poorer Athenians, including many slaves, were beneficiaries of a system that enabled most Athenians to live well above the level of bare subsistence. Some slaves had some chance of earning their way out of slavery by, in effect, purchasing themselves. While taxation could be disruptively heavy for some estates, the overall tax burden on wealthy Athenians, as a class, was not high enough to trigger elite-level revolutionary cooperation against the democratic regime.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Athenian democracy: Hansen (1999); democracy values and democracy’s critics: Ober (1998). An abbreviated version of some parts of this paper appears in Ober (2016, Sect. 2). My thanks to Walter Scheidel, Claire Taylor, Mark Pyzyk, and Nikolaos Kyriazis for discussion of the issues in this paper.

  2. 2.

    For recent, contrasting views of and approaches to economic inequality in classical Greece, see Roubineau (2015), arguing that every Greek polis was grounded in deep social status inequalities, resulting in the impoverishment of many; Patriquin (2015), arguing for minimal inequality among citizens at Athens, because democracy could only arise in a society with only a small gap between rich and poor. Neither attempts the sort of modeling offered here.

  3. 3.

    In addition to Ober (2015b), recent and important books addressing Greek economic growth in the classical era include Acton (2014), Bresson (2015) and Harris et al. (2015). Taylor (forthcoming) addresses the question of economic inequality in classical Athens.

  4. 4.

    Van Wees (2011) discusses a well-known passage in Athenaeus 272c, that records the following figures for Athens’ population, some time after 317 BCE: Athenaioi: 21,000; metoikoi 10,000; oiketai: 400,000. Van Wees’ interpretation of the passage is at odds with all previous scholarship. Van Wees claims that that the passage (as it has come down in the manuscript tradition) accurately records a careful census of residents of Athens, putatively conducted by Demetrius of Phaleron. He proposes that the metoikoi include many disenfranchised Athenians (see below). He also proposes that the figure for oiketai includes about 100,000 native women and children, the rest being slaves. None of this seems plausible: inter alia, a total population of 431,000 would yield a per square km density of over 170 persons, which is much too high for Attica, in an era when Athens was no longer an imperial capital or the center of Aegean trade. Since Athenian agricultural productivity was limited, in order to feed such a population (ca. 10 slaves to every free household), the non-agricultural sector of the economy of Athens would have to be considerably more productive than any historian of antiquity has ever dared suggest. Extrapolating these figures to other regions of Greece (given that there is no reason to assume that Athens post 317 BCE was vastly more densely populated) would yield population figures far higher than the highest estimates proposed by ancient historians. At least for oiketai, the Athenaeus figure must be regarded as wrong, as most previous scholarship on the passage assumed. The other figures in the passage, even if they were accurate for post-317 BCE, need have little bearing on the figures in 330 BCE, given the dramatic changes in Athens’ fortunes after 322 BCE.

  5. 5.

    These are very general categories; for finer-grained distinctions among Athenian categories of persons (in law and social relations) see Kamen (2013).

  6. 6.

    Ancient demography: Scheidel (2007) and Holleran and Pudsey (2011). On the invisibility of Athenian slaves in the archaeological record, see Morris (1998b).

  7. 7.

    Cartledge (1985: 35), seems reasonable: 60,000–100,000 “according to the most cautious estimates.” Kamen (in progress: Chap. 1 n. 37) surveys a dozen respected classical scholars’ estimates of slave numbers in classical Athens. Estimates are for various dates in the late fifth to late fourth century, and are sometimes stated in terms of maxima or minima. For what it is worth, the mean of the estimates comes to 84,400; the median is 78,000. For the low count: Jones (1964). High count: Taylor (2001) and van Wees (2011). For the background conditions that made Greek and Roman slavery profitable, see Scheidel (2005, 2008) and Silver (2006).

  8. 8.

    Metics in Athens with discussion of possible numbers: Whitehead (1977), Kamen (2013) and Akrigg (2015). Van Wees (2011: 104), argues that even 10,000 metics is “implausibly high,” based on an over-reading of Thucydides 2.31.2. Van Wees uses the Thucydides passage to produce a citizen-to-metic ratio of 5:1. That ratio is in turn imagined to be constant from the fifth through the late fourth century BCE. The argument for the ratio is strained, and its assumed invariance over time, is implausible. Metoikia as an institution outside Athens: Whitehead (1984).

  9. 9.

    On Athenian taxation, see Lyttkens (2012), Ober (2015b) and Fawcett (2016).

  10. 10.

    See further Scheidel (2010) and Allen (2009).

  11. 11.

    Manumission: Zelnick-Abramson (2005, 2009) and Akrigg (2015).

  12. 12.

    The lower figure of ca. 400 liturgical estates: Davies (1971); the higher figure of ca. 1200 liturgical estates: Hansen (1999: 110–115). Due to the simplifying assumption of equal within-group income, the cut off between groups 14 (citizen 5: annual household income 720 dr) and 25 (citizen 6: annual household income 1000 dr) is artificial. Ancient sources referring to 1200 citizens in the liturgical class (on which see Hansen, above) can be accommodated by assuming that a few hundred of the wealthiest group 14 households were subject to paying liturgical taxes.

  13. 13.

    The derived Gini is “Gini1,” which estimates between-group inequality, assuming within-group inequality to be zero. See Milanovic et al. (2011: 260) for the distinction between Gini1 and Gini2; as they note, the difference is very small for most of the historical societies in their study group. The “optimistic” model in Ober (2015b: Table 4.4) yielded an income Gini of 40.

  14. 14.

    Scheidel and Friesen (2009: 84–85). By way of early modern comparisons, Milanovic et al. (2011, Table 2) report the income Gini for Tuscany in 1427 = 46; Holland in 1561 = 56; England and Wales in 1688 = 45; France in 1788 = 56.

  15. 15.

    US Census Bureau, Income Distribution to &250,000 or More for Households 2013. Accessed 02/02/2016.

  16. 16.

    See Alvaredo et al. (2013) and the data collected in Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, The World Wealth and Income Database, http://www.wid.world, 02/02/2016.

  17. 17.

    Trierarchic liturgy amount: Davies (1971: xxi–xxiv) and Pritchard (2012: n. 71). Gabrielsen (1994) discusses the evidence for financing warships in detail. His final estimate for the number of active service trierarchies per year, 60, is lower than my estimate, but his estimate for the cost of trierarchy is higher than my estimate, at 6000–7000 dr (1994: 216). The total trierarchic tax burden comes to roughly the same amount: 60–70 T.

  18. 18.

    See, further Hansen 1999: 110–115. I estimate festival liturgies at 25 T; annual normal eisphora at 10 T; and extraordinary taxes at 10 T.

  19. 19.

    See, further Gabrielsen (1986), Christ (1990), Cohen (1992) and Kaiser (2007).

  20. 20.

    Kron (forthcoming). It is important to keep in mind that the overall Gini wealth index for Athenian society as a whole, including slaves and metics, would surely be substantially higher—I cannot say how much higher because I know no way to calculate the wealth of metics or slaves. Wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, is typically much higher than income inequality.

  21. 21.

    Foxhall (1992, 2002) and Osborne (1992).

  22. 22.

    Morris (1998a: 235–36). Quote, ibid. p. 36. As Claire Taylor pointed out to me, Morris misreported the Gini coefficient as 38.2–38.6; but Morris’ general point remains valid.

  23. 23.

    Kron (2014, forthcoming). For Olynthos houses, Kron (2014: 129, Table 2) calculates the Gini coefficient at 14, considerably lower than later Hellenistic and Roman era Greek cities. Cf. Bintliff (2012, Chap. 13).

  24. 24.

    Athens, and the classical Greek world generally, appear be outliers in the long-term global historical pattern of high inequality (except in the aftermath of major war, natural catastrophe, plague, or state collapse): Scheidel (2017).

  25. 25.

    See Roubineau (2015, Chap. 10).

  26. 26.

    For the association between levels of taxation in democratic societies and social assumptions about fairness, see now Scheve and Stasavage (2016).

References

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. R. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty. New York: Crown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2015). Paths to inclusive political institutions (Working Paper). http://economics.mit.edu/files/11338

  • Acton, P. H. (2014). Poiesis: Manufacturing in classical Athens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Akrigg, B. (2011). Demography and classical Athens. In C. Holleran & A. Pudsey (Eds.), Demography and the Graeco-Roman world: New insights and approaches (pp. 37–59). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Akrigg, B. (2015). Metics in Athens. In C. Taylor & K. Vlassopoulos (Eds.), Communities and networks in the ancient Greek world (pp. 155–176). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Allen, R. C. (2009). How prosperous were the Romans? Evidence from Diocletian’s price edict (AD 301). In A. K. Bowman & A. Wilson (Eds.), Quantifying the Roman economy: Methods and problems (pp. 327–345). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2013). The top 1 percent in international and historical perspective. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 3–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bintliff, J. (2012). The complete archaeology of Greece: From hunter-gatherers to the 20th century A.D. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Boix, C. (2015). Political order and inequality: Their foundations and their consequences for human welfare. Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bresson, A. (2015). The making of the ancient Greek economy: Institutions, markets, and growth in the city-states. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Buikstra, J., & Lagia, A. (2009). Bioarchaeological approaches to Aegean Archaeology. In L. A. Schepartz, S. C. Fox, & C. Bourbou (Eds.), New directions in the skeletal biology of Greece, Hesperia Supplement 43 (pp. 7–30). Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cartledge, P. (1985). Rebels and sambos in Classical Greece: A comparative view. In P. Cartledge, F. D. Harvey, G. E. M. De Ste Croi (Eds.), Crux: Essays presented to G. E. M. de Ste Croix (pp. 16–46). London: Duckworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christ, M. R. (1990). Liturgy avoidance and antidosis in Classical Athens. Transactions of the American Philological Association, 120, 147–169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christ, M. R. (2007). The evolution of the eisphora in Classical Athens. Classical Quarterly, 57, 53–69.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, E. E. (1992). Athenian economy and society: A banking perspective. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davies, J. K. (1971). Athenian propertied families, 600–300 B. C. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fawcett, P. (2016). When i squeeze you with eisphorai: Taxes and tax policy in classical Athens. Hesperia, 85, 153–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foxhall, L. (1992). The control of the Attic landscape. In B. Wells (Ed.), Agriculture in ancient Greece: Proceedings of the seventh international symposium at the Swedish Institute at Athens, 16–17 May, 1990 (pp. 155–159). Stockholm: Paul Åströms Förlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gabrielsen, V. (1994). Financing the Athenian fleet: Public taxation and social relations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallego, J. (2016). El campesinado y la distribución de la tierra en la Atenas del siglo IV a.C. Gerion. Revista de Historia Antigua, 34, 43–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, M. H. (1986). Demography and democracy: The number of Athenian citizens in the fourth century B.C. Herning: Systime.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, M. H. (1988). Three studies in Athenian demography. Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske videnskabernes selskab: Commissioner Munksgaard.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, M. H. (1999). The Athenian democracy in the age of Demosthenes: Structure, principles and ideology. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, M. H. (2006). Studies in the population of Aigina, Athens and Eretria (Vol. 94). Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, E. M., Lewis, D. M., & Woolmer, M. (2015). The ancient Greek economy: Markets, households and city-states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holleran, C., & Pudsey, A. (2011). Demography and the Graeco-Roman world: New insights and approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, A. H. M. (1964). Athenian democracy. Oxford: B. Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaiser, B. A. (2007). The Athenian trierarchy: Mechanism design for the private provision of pulic goods. Journal of Economic History, 67, 445–480.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kamen, D. (in progress). Manumission in ancient Greece: Modes, meanings, and metaphors.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kamen, D. (2013). Status in classical Athens. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Knipper, C., et al. (2015). Superior in life—Superior in death: Dietary distinction of central European prehistoric and medieval elites. Current Anthropology, 56, 579–589.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kron, G. (2014). Comparative evidence and the reconstruction of the ancient economy: Greco-Roman housing and the level and distribution of wealth and income. In F. de Callataÿ (Ed.), Quantifying the Greco-Roman economy and beyond. Bari: Edipuglia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kron, G. (forthcoming). Growth and decline. Forms of growth. Estimating growth in the Greek World. In E. Lo Cascio, A. Bresson, & F. Velde (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of economies in the classical world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lagia, A. (2015). Diet and the polis: An isotopic study of diet in Athens and Laurion during the Classical, Hellenistic, and Roman Periods. In A. Papathanasiou, M. Richards, & S. C. Fox (Eds.), Archaeodiet in the Greek world: Dietary reconstruction from stable isotope analysis (Hesperia Supplement) (pp. 119–146). Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyttkens, C. H. (2012). Economic analysis of institutional change in ancient Greece: Politics, taxation and rational behaviour. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milanovic, B. (2011). The haves and the have-nots: A brief and idiosyncratic history of global inequality. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milanovic, B., Lindert, P. H., & Williamson, J. G. (2011). Pre-industrial inequality. The Economic Journal, 121, 255–272.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morris, I. (1998a). Archaeology as a kind of anthropology (A response to David Small). In I. Morris & K. A. Raaflaub (Eds.), Democracy 2500? Questions and challenges (pp. 229–239). Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morris, I. (1998b). Remaining invisible: The archaeology of the excluded in classical Athens. In S. Murnaghan & S. R. Joshel (Eds.), Women and slaves in Greco-Roman culture (pp. 193–220). New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morris, I. (2004). Economic growth in ancient Greece. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160, 709–742.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ober, J. (1989). Mass and elite in democratic Athens: Rhetoric, ideology, and the power of the people. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ober, J. (1998). Political dissent in democratic Athens: Intellectual critics of popular rule. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ober, J. (2008). Democracy and knowledge: Innovation and learning in classical Athens. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ober, J. (2015a). Classical Athens [State finances]. In W. Scheidel & A. Monoson (Eds.), Fiscal regimes and political economy of early states (pp. 492–522). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Ober, J. (2015b). The rise and fall of classical Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ober, J. (2016). Institutions, growth, and inequality in ancient Greece (Working Paper).

    Google Scholar 

  • Osborne, R. (1992). Is it a farm? The definition of agricultural sites and settlements in ancient Greece. In B. Wells (Ed.), Agriculture in ancient Greece (pp. 22–27). Stockholm: Paul Åströms Förlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Patriquin, L. (2015). Economic equality and direct democracy in ancient Athens. NewYork: Palgrave MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pritchard, D. (2012). Costing festivals and war: Spending priorities of the Athenian democracy. Historia, 61, 18–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pyzyk, M. (in progress). Onerous burdens: Liturgies and the Athenian elite.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roubineau, J. M. (2015). Les cités grecques (VIe-IIe siècle av J.-C.): Essai d’ histoire sociale. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France-PUF.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheidel, W. (2005). Real slave prices and the relative costs of slave labor in the Greco-Roman World. Ancient Society, 35, 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scheidel, W. (2007). Demography. In W. Scheidel, I. Morris, & R. P. Saller (Eds.), The Cambridge economic history of the Greco-Roman world (pp. 38–86). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Scheidel, W. (2008). The comparative economies of slavery in the Greco-Roman world. In E. Dal Lago & C. Katsari (Eds.), Slave systems: Ancient and modern (pp. 105–126). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheidel, W. (2010). Real wages in early economies: Evidence for living standards from 1800 BCE to 1300 CE. Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient, 53, 425–462.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scheidel, W. (2017). The great leveler. Violence and the global history of inequality from the sone age to the present.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheidel, W., & Friesen, S. J. (2009). The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire. Journal of Roman Studies, 99, 61–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scheve, K., & Stasavage, D. (2016). Taxing the rich: A history of fiscal fairness in the United States and Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Silver, M. (2006). Slaves versus free hired workers in ancient Greece. Historia, 55, 257–263.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, C. (forthcoming). Poverty, wealth, and well-being: Experiencing penia in democratic Athens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, T. (2001). Believing the ancients: Quantitative and qualitative dimensions of slavery and the slave trade in Later Prehistoric Eurasia. World Archaeology, 33, 27–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Wees, H. (2011). Demetrius and Draco: Athens’ property classes and population in and before 317 BC. Journal of Hellenic Studies, 131, 95–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whitehead, D. (1977). The ideology of the Athenian metic. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whitehead, D. (1984). Immigrant communities in the classical polis. Some principles for a synoptic treatment. L’Antiquité Classique, 53, 47–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zelnick-Abramovitz, R. (2005). Not wholly free: The concept of manumission and the status of manumitted slaves in the ancient Greek world. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zelnick-Abramovitz, R. (2009). Freed slaves, their status and state control in Ancient Greece. European Review of History, 16, 303–318.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Josiah Ober .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Appendix: Athens, 330 BCE. Model of Population and Income

Appendix: Athens, 330 BCE. Model of Population and Income

Group population

Description

Estates

Size

Group pop

dr/day

Days

dr/year

T/year

T/year/group

1

Slave 1

24000

1

24000

0.25

300

75

0.013

300.00

2

Slave 2

24000

1

24000

0.5

300

150

0.025

600.00

3

Slave 3

24000

1

24000

0.75

300

225

0.038

900.00

4

Metic 1

2000

1

2000

0.5

300

150

0.025

50.00

5

Metic 2

2000

1

2000

0.75

300

225

0.038

75.00

6

Metic 3

1000

4.5

4500

1

300

300

0.050

50.00

7

Citizen 1

5000

4.5

22500

1

300

300

0.050

250.00

8

Slave 4

8000

1

8000

1.5

300

450

0.075

600.00

9

Metic 4

3750

1

4750

1.5

300

450

0.075

356.25

10

Metic 5

3750

4.5

16875

2

300

600

0.100

375.00

11

Citizen 2

6125

1

6125

1.6

300

480

0.080

490.00

12

Citizen 3

6125

4.5

27563

1.8

300

540

0.090

551.25

13

Citizen 4

6125

4.5

27563

2.2

300

660

0.110

673.75

14

Citizen 5

6125

4.5

27563

2.4

300

720

0.120

735.00

15

Metic 6

65

4.5

293

  

1000

0.167

10.83

16

Meitc 7

60

4.5

270

  

2000

0.333

20.00

17

Metic 8

50

4.5

225

  

4000

0.667

33.33

18

Metic 9

40

4.5

180

  

6000

1.000

40.00

19

Metic 10

30

4.5

135

  

8000

1.333

40.00

20

Metic 11

25

4.5

113

  

10000

1.667

41.67

21

Metic 12

25

4.5

113

  

15000

2.500

62.50

22

Metic 13

25

4.5

113

  

20000

3.333

83.33

23

Metic 14

10

4.5

45

  

30000

5.000

50.00

24

Metic 15

5

4.5

23

  

40000

6.667

33.33

25

Citizen 6

200

4.5

900

  

1000

0.167

33.33

26

Citizen 7

175

4.5

788

  

2000

0.333

58.33

27

Citizen 8

150

4.5

675

  

4000

0.667

100.00

28

Citizen 9

100

4.5

450

  

6000

1.000

100.00

29

Citizen 10

75

4.5

338

  

8000

1.333

100.00

30

Citizen 11

50

4.5

225

  

10000

1.667

83.33

31

Citizen 12

40

4.5

180

  

15000

2.500

100.00

32

Citizen 13

30

4.5

135

  

20000

3.333

100.00

33

Citizen 14

10

4.5

45

  

30000

5.000

50.00

34

Citizen 15

5

4.5

23

  

40000

6.667

33.33

Total

   

226703

    

7180

  1. Notes: dr drachmas, T Talent (6000 drachmas)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ober, J. (2017). Inequality in Late-Classical Democratic Athens: Evidence and Models. In: Bitros, G., Kyriazis, N. (eds) Democracy and an Open-Economy World Order. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52168-8_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics