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The German Concept of Market Economy: Social Market Economy. Its Roots and Its Contribution to Liberal Economic Orders in Germany, Europe and Beyond

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Abstract

Social Market Economy (SME) has been the economic order in Germany since 1948. Its establishment was not an easy task. Germany was more a land of cartels than of a real market economy. The shift to SME was confronted with support (USA) and impediments (France, UK) on the side of the Western Allied Forces. Moreover, it met opposition from national parties, enterprises and its associations, trade unions and in early stages skepticism from the majority of the citizens. The reasons for the great success of SME and its broad acknowledgement is not restricted on Germany. The realization of SME was a core determinant for the successful European integration. Moreover, the theoretical foundations of SME have been contributing essentially to the modern theory of liberalism. One can even say: SME can be regarded as the only concept of liberalism which is globally applicable.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It should be noted that February 4, 1897 was the birthday of Ludwig Erhard who implemented Social Market Economy beginning in 1948 and the German competition law in 1958 which—as its main rule—prohibited the organization of cartels. For more details concerning this development, see Böhm (1948, pp. 197–213).

  2. 2.

    It was the Free Democratic Party (FDP) which proposed Ludwig Erhard in early 1948 as Director of the Administration for the Economy (Verwaltung für Wirtschaft) of the United Economic Regions (Vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiete). Since March 2, 1948 Ludwig Erhard was responsible for the German-side economic policy.

  3. 3.

    France introduced 1945 as a consensus of the political parties forming the coalition-government the system of “planification” which included a lot of nationalization and direct state involvement in economic policy and the market performance of enterprises. The Labour Party government in Great Britain favoured nationalization of various industries and a state policy of global demand based on Keynesian ideas for full employment.

  4. 4.

    For a survey of the participating persons and groups and their ideas, see Stützel et al. (1982), Blumenberg-Lampe (1986), Peacock and Willgerodt (1989), Peacock et al. (1989), Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung (1997), Hasse and Quaas (2002), and Hasse et al. (2008).

  5. 5.

    For all persons being involved in the design and implementation of SME, see for more information Hasse et al. (2008, pp. 27–77).

  6. 6.

    See Oswalt (2005).

  7. 7.

    Many of these conclusions are summarized in the two main books of Eucken ([1939], 1982). See also Vanberg (2004).

  8. 8.

    For a shorter survey, see Hasse et al. (2008). The naming and a broad presentation of the concept of Social Market Economy were first published in 1946/47. Brief selections from the voluminous literature contributed by these authors are given in the section with the references.

  9. 9.

    Misunderstanding still exists which is mainly based on a one-sided interpretation of “social”. The majority of these liberals refer to F. A. Hayek and his wording that “social” is a “weasel word” and causes destructive effects to a market economy due to the behaviour of politicians to prefer short-term welfare policies. Nevertheless this criticism is analytically deficient because it does not differentiate between a conceptual requirement and a political misbehaviour.

  10. 10.

    This is the dominant assumption of models in political economy. In this regard, see Rodrik (2014).

  11. 11.

    Leighton and Lopez (2013) acknowledge that incentives influence the actions of individuals especially when these incentives are introduced by credible institutions. But behind these activities and these institutions must be “political entrepreneurs” to design incentives by ideas. Especially in cases of concurrent ideas/ideologies ideas rule the actions—with positive or negative economic results. See also; Hayek (1949).

  12. 12.

    Information about these persons and their contribution to Social Market Economy: Hasse et al. (2008, pp. 27–77).

  13. 13.

    The conflict about this cautious wage policy was solved by the trade unions by isolating the representative in favour for a class-oriented, aggressive wage-policy, Victor Agartz.

  14. 14.

    This policy was enlarged by co-determination in the supervisory boards of bigger companies. The Works Constitution Act is the most important innovation in labour relations offering the trade unions special competencies but as well responsibility in organizing production processes and hiring and sacking affairs.

  15. 15.

    Please note that L. Erhard never went to Brussels or to negotiations about European integration because he did not favour regional integrations due to their trade diversion effects and their possible barring the international liberalization of trade. In a special intra-governmental agreement arranged by A. Müller-Armack all participants decided to pursue both targets by insisting on an open Common Market with a declaration in the treaty to support the international liberalization of trade. This was codified in Art. 110 of the EEC-Treaty.

  16. 16.

    The administrative order of the EEC followed the French benchmark.

  17. 17.

    The latest version of Walter Eucken (1952), A Policy for Establishing a System of Free Enterprise, translated in: Wolfgang Stützel et al. (1982), eds., Standard Texts on the Social Market Economy, pp. 115–131.

  18. 18.

    Based on: Heinz Grossekettler (1987), Der Beitrag der Freiburger Schule zur Theorie der Gestaltung von Wirtschaftssystemen. Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Nr. 90, Münster, S. 12a.

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Correspondence to Rolf Hasse .

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Appendices

Annex 1

Eucken’s Principles for Economic Policy

  • Fundamental Principles—Rules Footnote 17

  • Striving for market prices in contested markets

  • Primacy of price stability

  • Principle of open markets

  • Preference for private property as a means of allocation and distribution

  • Principle of freedom to contract (in conformity with competition rules)

  • Principle of responsibility and liability; keeping the unity of the power to dispose and being liable for the results

  • Consistency and continuity for reliable economic policy

  • Unity of the fundamental principles: to keep a consistent economic constitution

  • Regulatory and Principles for Process Policy

  • Competition Policy by means of control: checking and prohibiting excessive market power

  • Principle to correct external effects

  • Principle to correct inverse market reactions

  • Redistribution of income to correct societally unsustainable income distribution

  • Potential Supplements Footnote 18

  • Principle of reluctance for global demand policies

  • Keeping the rule state aid for regaining self-responsibility

  • Principle for Governments 2

  • Principle to control and restrain the influence of interest groups

  • Keeping the principle of subsidiarity in cases of state interventions in markets and between different governmental decision levels: municipality, state, central state

Annex 2

figure a

Annex 3

figure b

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Hasse, R. (2017). The German Concept of Market Economy: Social Market Economy. Its Roots and Its Contribution to Liberal Economic Orders in Germany, Europe and Beyond. In: Bitros, G., Kyriazis, N. (eds) Democracy and an Open-Economy World Order. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52168-8_7

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