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Prosecutorial Discretion in the Netherlands: An Advantage for Politicians?

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Criminal Liability of Political Decision-Makers

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Abstract

Dutch criminal law offers politicians no immunity for public office offences. Cabinet members and Members of Parliament stand trial for these offences in a single instance, before the Supreme Court. The decision to prosecute is made by either the Parliament or the Government. The prosecution is not handled by the Public Prosecution Service, but by the Procurator-General at the Supreme Court. These arrangements exclude the possibility that the Minister of Security and Justice influences the prosecution. This minister enjoys wide powers of instruction vis-à-vis the Public Prosecution Service, which are necessary to keep the application of the expediency principle within acceptable limits. These powers of instruction can also be directed at political opponents. The special arrangements therefore aim at striking a balance between making prosecutions a real possibility and shielding politicians from light-hearted prosecutions. The desired balance is not found, however, because serious legislative shortcomings render the procedural arrangements ineffective. Dutch politicians therefore have little to fear from prosecutions for public office offences.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    M. Verhulst/G. Boogaard, Het hondje van minister Pels Rijcken – Over verwijzingen naar eerdere vervolgingen van politieke ambtsdragers, Nederlands Juristenblad 2016 (no. 74).

  2. 2.

    Commissie van onderzoek, Verslag, 2016 (Tweede Kamer, Den Haag), to be found at https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerleden/commissies/cvo (accessed 14 July 2016).

  3. 3.

    J.L. de Wijkerslooth/J. Simonis, De vervolgbaarheid van ministers en staatssecretarissen, Nederlands Juristenblad 2004, pp. 672-678; E. Sikkema, Hoge bomen vangen (nog) geen wind. Strafrechtelijke verantwoordelijkheid van ministers, vervolgbaarheid van publiekrechtelijke rechtspersonen en de positie van de minister van Justitie, in: Keulen/Knigge/Wolswijk (eds.), Pet af, 2007 (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen), pp. 411-439, at 416.

  4. 4.

    See for instance J. Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion. A Comparative Study, 1995 (Clarendon, Oxford).

  5. 5.

    See on the approach to expediency in England and Wales for instance A. Sanders, Prosecutions in England and Wales, in: Tak (ed.), Tasks and Powers of the Prosecution Services in the EU Member States, 2004 (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen), pp. 97-127.

  6. 6.

    See for instance Art. 4 of the Code des délits et des peines, adopted on 3 Brumaire of the 4th year (25 October 1795).

  7. 7.

    In the Code d’instruction criminelle, entering into force on 16 November 1808, the legality principle is no longer included.

  8. 8.

    P.J.P. Tak, Het vervolgingsbeleid in de Duitse Bondsrepubliek. Een onderzoek naar de uitzonderingen op het legaliteitsbeginsel (par. 153-154d StPO Strafprozessordnung), 1973 (W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle), pp. 1-22.

  9. 9.

    W. Geelhoed, Het opportuniteitsbeginsel en het recht van de Europese Unie. Een onderzoek naar de betekenis van strafvorderlijke beleidsvrijheid in de geëuropeaniseerde rechtsorde, 2013 (Kluwer, Deventer).

  10. 10.

    Art. 130(4) and 136(3) Judicial Organisation Act.

  11. 11.

    G.J.M. Corstens, Waarborgen rondom het vervolgingsbeleid, 1974 (Vermande, IJmuiden).

  12. 12.

    Art. 12i Code of Criminal Procedure (further: CCP).

  13. 13.

    Supreme Court of the Netherlands, no. 103681, 25 June 1996, (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1996, no. 714).

  14. 14.

    Y. Buruma, Rechterlijke controle op de vervolgingsbeslissing, Strafblad 2015 (no. 45).

  15. 15.

    P.P.T. Bovend’Eert, Ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid, 2002 (Ars Aequi, Nijmegen).

  16. 16.

    P. van Velzen, De ongekende ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid, theorie en praktijk 1813-1840, 2005 (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen) traces its origins back to the early 19th century.

  17. 17.

    R.K. Visser, In dienst van het algemeen belang. Ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid en parlementair vertrouwen, 2008 (Boom, Amsterdam).

  18. 18.

    See the report of the Scheltema Commission, Steekhoudend ministerschap; betekenis en toepassing van de ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid, 1993 (Sdu, ’s-Gravenhage). Criticism on this element of the report: S.E. Zijlstra/K. Wilkeshuis, Verantwoordelijkheid en publieke taak, in: Broeksteeg/Van den Berg/Verhey (eds.), Ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid opnieuw gewogen, 2006 (Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn), pp. 9-18.

  19. 19.

    Art. 127 Judicial Organisation Act.

  20. 20.

    Art. 128(1)-(4) Judicial Organisation Act.

  21. 21.

    Art. 128(5) Judicial Organisation Act.

  22. 22.

    Art. 128(6) Judicial Organisation Act.

  23. 23.

    See for a historical perspective M.E. Verburg, De minister de baas. Minister van Justitie en Openbaar Ministerie. Grepen uit de historie van de aanwijzingsbevoegdheid, 2004 (Sdu, Den Haag).

  24. 24.

    P.J.P. Tak, The Dutch Prosecution Service, in: Tak (ed.), Tasks and Powers of the Prosecution Services in the EU Member States, 2004 (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen), pp. 355-383, at 374-375.

  25. 25.

    Art. 71 Basic Law.

  26. 26.

    On the difficulties in this type of cases, see Y. Buruma, ‘Als Wilders Berlusconi was… Een essay over de strafvorderlijke legaliteits- en opportuniteitsbeginselen‘ in: Buruma/Fleuren/Van Kempen/Kusters/Mertens (eds.), Op het rechte pad, 2008 (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen), pp. 135-147.

  27. 27.

    Arts. 355-380 CC are crimes explicitly labelled as such.

  28. 28.

    Art. 44 CC.

  29. 29.

    Sikkema (note 3), pp. 417-418.

  30. 30.

    Art. 119 Basic Law.

  31. 31.

    Art. 5 Ministerial Accountability Act.

  32. 32.

    Art. 7 Ministerial Accountability Act.

  33. 33.

    Art. 8 Ministerial Accountability Act.

  34. 34.

    Art. 13 Ministerial Accountability Act.

  35. 35.

    Art. 16(1) Ministerial Accountability Act.

  36. 36.

    Art. 18(1) Ministerial Accountability Act.

  37. 37.

    Art. 483(3) CCP.

  38. 38.

    Art. 484(1) CCP.

  39. 39.

    This is not to be confused with the Procurator-General at the Supreme Court. As in all legal systems in the French tradition, the Supreme Court is assisted by a Procurator-General and his deputies, the Advocates-General. The Procurators-General at the five Courts of Appeal were the heads of the Public Prosecution Service, before the reform of the judicial organisation in 1999. At that time they were replaced by a College of Procurators-General that is now leading the Public Prosecution Service.

  40. 40.

    In case no majority can be reached, the suspect is acquitted (Art. 76(4) Judicial Organisation Act).

  41. 41.

    See D.J. Elzinga, De strafrechtelijke ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid, in: Elzinga (ed.), Ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid in Nederland, 1994 (W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle), pp. 65-78, at 70-74.

  42. 42.

    Sikkema (note 3), pp. 416-417.

  43. 43.

    Sikkema (note 3), pp. 421-422.

  44. 44.

    See for a description of the events leading up to the investigation the report of the Commissie van onderzoek (note 2), pp. 23-30.

  45. 45.

    Art. 44 in combination with Art. 272 CC.

  46. 46.

    Commissie van onderzoek (note 2), pp. 23-30.

  47. 47.

    Commissie van onderzoek (note 2), pp. 31-43.

  48. 48.

    Art. 30 Parliamentary Inquiry Act.

  49. 49.

    Commissie van onderzoek (note 2), p. 34.

  50. 50.

    Commissie van onderzoek (note 2), p. 45.

  51. 51.

    Commissie Prinsjesdagstukken, Publiek geheim, 2010 (Tweede Kamer, Den Haag).

  52. 52.

    Commissie Prinsjesdagstukken (note 51), p. 79.

  53. 53.

    In 1994, Elzinga still concluded differently: D.J. Elzinga (note 41), pp. 65-78.

  54. 54.

    Sikkema (note 3), pp. 424-426.

  55. 55.

    Kamerstukken II, 2001/02, 25294, no. 15.

  56. 56.

    De Wijkerslooth/Simonis (note 3), pp. 672-678; Sikkema (note 3), p. 416.

  57. 57.

    Art. 355 CC.

  58. 58.

    http://nos.nl/artikel/2099339-pvv-rutte-pleegt-ambtsmisdrijf-rond-referendum.html (accessed 14 July 2016).

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  1. University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Willem Geelhoed

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  1. Faculty of Law, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Frank Zimmermann

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Geelhoed, W. (2017). Prosecutorial Discretion in the Netherlands: An Advantage for Politicians?. In: Zimmermann, F. (eds) Criminal Liability of Political Decision-Makers. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52051-3_23

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